Change bug1751 enabling code based on comments from arma

src/or/config.c

@@ -1240,7 +1240,6 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options)
     return -1;
   }
 
-
   /* Change the cell EWMA settings */
   cell_ewma_set_scale_factor(options, networkstatus_get_latest_consensus());
 

src/or/connection_edge.c

@@ -2488,6 +2488,7 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
   char *address=NULL;
   uint16_t port;
   or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
+  or_options_t *options = get_options();
 
   assert_circuit_ok(circ);
   if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
@@ -2500,7 +2501,7 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
    * that we have a stream connected to a circuit, and we don't connect to a
    * circuit until we have a pending/successful resolve. */
 
-  if (!server_mode(get_options()) &&
+  if (!server_mode(options) &&
       circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
     log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
            "Relay begin cell at non-server. Closing.");
@@ -2533,11 +2534,11 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
       tor_free(address);
       return 0;
     }
-    if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn && !get_options()->AllowSingleHopExits &&
+    if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn && !options->AllowSingleHopExits &&
         (or_circ->is_first_hop ||
          (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
                                        or_circ->p_conn->identity_digest) &&
-          should_refuse_unknown_exits(get_options())))) {
+          should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) {
       /* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
        * has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
        * and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
@@ -2557,7 +2558,7 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
       return 0;
     }
   } else if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
-    if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(get_options()) ||
+    if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(options) ||
         circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
       relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
                                     END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY, NULL);

src/or/dirserv.c

@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ directory_caches_dir_info(or_options_t *options)
   if (!server_mode(options) || !advertised_server_mode())
     return 0;
   /* We need an up-to-date view of network info if we're going to try to
-   * block unknown exits. */
+   * block exit attempts from unknown relays. */
   return router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star() &&
     should_refuse_unknown_exits(options);
 }

src/or/or.h

@@ -2470,8 +2470,9 @@ typedef struct {
 
   /** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are
    * relays.  One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "auto" (do
-   * what the consensus says). -RD */
+   * what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says
-  const char *RefuseUnknownExits;
+   * nothing). */
+  char *RefuseUnknownExits;
   /** Parsed version of RefuseUnknownExits. -1 for auto. */
   int RefuseUnknownExits_;
 

src/or/router.c

@@ -982,13 +982,10 @@ server_mode(or_options_t *options)
 int
 should_refuse_unknown_exits(or_options_t *options)
 {
-  networkstatus_t *consensus;
   if (options->RefuseUnknownExits_ != -1) {
     return options->RefuseUnknownExits_;
-  } else if ((consensus = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus()) != NULL) {
-    return networkstatus_get_param(consensus, "refuseunknownexits", 1);
   } else {
-    return 1;
+    return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1);
   }
 }