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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'

Browse Source 
Conflicts:
	src/common/address.c
	src/common/compat_libevent.c
	src/common/memarea.c
	src/common/util.h
	src/or/buffers.c
	src/or/circuitbuild.c
	src/or/circuituse.c
	src/or/connection.c
	src/or/directory.c
	src/or/networkstatus.c
	src/or/or.h
	src/or/routerlist.c
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2011-04-07 12:17:20 -04:00
commit 67d88a7d60
34 changed files with 188 additions and 134 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
changes/bug539_removal Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Removed code
- Removed workaround code to handle directory responses from
servers that had bug 539 (they would send HTTP status 503
responses _and_ send a body too). Since only server versions
before 0.2.0.16-alpha/0.1.2.19 were affected, there is no longer
reason to keep the workaround in place.

6
changes/connect_err_reporting Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
- Be more careful about reporting the correct error from a failed
connect() operation. Under some circumstances, it was possible to
look at an incorrect value for errno when sending the end reason.
Bugfix on Tor-0.1.0.1-rc.

5
changes/count_overflow Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
- Correctly handle an "impossible" overflow cases in connection
byte counting, where we write or read more than 4GB on an edge
connection in single second. Bugfix on 0.1.2.8-beta.

6
changes/full_ap_circuits Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
o Minor bugfixes
- When a client finds that an origin circuit has run out of 16-bit
stream IDs, we now mark it as unusable for new streams.
Previously, we would try to close the entire circuit. Bugfix on
Tor version 0.0.6.

7
changes/kill_ftime Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
o Code simplification and refactoring
- Remove the old 'fuzzy time' logic. It was supposed to be used
for handling calculations where we have a known amount of clock
skew and an allowed amount of unknown skew. But we only used it
in three places, and we never adjusted the known/unknown skew
values. This is still something we might want to do someday,
but if we do, we'll want to do it differently.

5
changes/noroute Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
- Minor features
- Send END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE in response to EHOSTUNREACH errors.
Clients before 0.2.1.27 didn't handle NOROUTE correctly, but
such clients are already deprecated because of security bugs.

20
src/common/address.c
View File

@ -50,10 +50,14 @@
#include <assert.h>
/** Convert the tor_addr_t in <b>a</b>, with port in <b>port</b>, into a
* socklen object in *<b>sa_out</b> of object size <b>len</b>. If not enough
* room is free, or on error, return -1. Else return the length of the
* sockaddr. */
int
* sockaddr object in *<b>sa_out</b> of object size <b>len</b>. If not enough
* room is available in sa_out, or on error, return 0. On success, return
* the length of the sockaddr.
*
* Interface note: ordinarily, we return -1 for error. We can't do that here,
* since socklen_t is unsigned on some platforms.
**/
socklen_t
tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a,
uint16_t port,
struct sockaddr *sa_out,
@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a,
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
if (len < (int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -1;
return 0;
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa_out;
memset(sin, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN_SIN_LEN
@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a,
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
if (len < (int)sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
return -1;
return 0;
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa_out;
memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_LEN
@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a,
memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, tor_addr_to_in6(a), sizeof(struct in6_addr));
return sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
} else {
return -1;
return 0;
}
}
@ -1096,7 +1100,7 @@ get_interface_address6(int severity, sa_family_t family, tor_addr_t *addr)
/* ======
* IPv4 helpers
* XXXX022 IPv6 deprecate some of these.
* XXXX023 IPv6 deprecate some of these.
*/
/** Return true iff <b>ip</b> (in host order) is an IP reserved to localhost,

2
src/common/address.h
View File

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static INLINE sa_family_t tor_addr_family(const tor_addr_t *a);
static INLINE const struct in_addr *tor_addr_to_in(const tor_addr_t *a);
static INLINE int tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(const tor_addr_t *a, uint32_t u);
int tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a, uint16_t port,
socklen_t tor_addr_to_sockaddr(const tor_addr_t *a, uint16_t port,
struct sockaddr *sa_out, socklen_t len);
int tor_addr_from_sockaddr(tor_addr_t *a, const struct sockaddr *sa,
uint16_t *port_out);

21
src/common/compat_libevent.c
View File

@ -354,21 +354,12 @@ tor_check_libevent_version(const char *m, int server,
version = tor_get_libevent_version(&v);
/* It would be better to disable known-buggy methods than to simply
warn about them. However, it's not trivial to get libevent to change its
method once it's initialized, and it's not trivial to tell what method it
will use without initializing it.
If we saw that the version was definitely bad, we could disable all the
methods that were bad for that version. But the issue with that is that
if you've found a libevent before 1.1, you are not at all guaranteed to
have _any_ good method to use.
As of Libevent 2, we can do better, and have more control over what
methods get used. But the problem here is that there are no versions of
Libevent 2 that have buggy event cores, so there's no point in writing
disable code yet.
*/
/* It would be better to disable known-buggy methods rather than warning
* about them. But the problem is that with older versions of Libevent,
* it's not trivial to get them to change their methods once they're
* initialized... and with newer versions of Libevent, they aren't actually
* broken. But we should revisit this if we ever find a post-1.4 version
* of Libevent where we need to disable a given method. */
if (!strcmp(m, "kqueue")) {
if (version < V_OLD(1,1,'b'))
buggy = 1;

6
src/common/memarea.c
View File

@ -59,7 +59,9 @@ realign_pointer(void *ptr)
{
uintptr_t x = (uintptr_t)ptr;
x = (x+MEMAREA_ALIGN_MASK) & ~MEMAREA_ALIGN_MASK;
/* Reinstate this if bug 930 ever reappears
tor_assert(((void*)x) >= ptr);
*/
return (void*)x;
}
@ -241,10 +243,10 @@ memarea_alloc(memarea_t *area, size_t sz)
}
result = chunk->next_mem;
chunk->next_mem = chunk->next_mem + sz;
/* Reinstate these if bug 930 ever comes back
tor_assert(chunk->next_mem >= chunk->u.mem);
tor_assert(chunk->next_mem <= chunk->u.mem+chunk->mem_size);
*/
chunk->next_mem = realign_pointer(chunk->next_mem);
return result;
}

18
src/common/util.h
View File

@ -247,24 +247,6 @@ time_t approx_time(void);
void update_approx_time(time_t now);
#endif
/* Fuzzy time. */
/** Return true iff <a>a</b> is definitely after <b>b</b>, even if there
* could be up to <b>allow_seconds</b> of skew in one of them. */
static INLINE int
time_definitely_after(time_t a, time_t b, int allow_skew)
{
return a-allow_skew > b;
}
/** Return true iff <a>a</b> is definitely before <b>b</b>, even if there
* could be up to <b>allow_seconds</b> of skew in one of them. */
static INLINE int
time_definitely_before(time_t a, time_t b, int allow_skew)
{
return a+allow_skew < b;
}
/* Rate-limiter */
/** A ratelim_t remembers how often an event is occurring, and how often

7
src/or/buffers.c
View File

@ -643,10 +643,14 @@ read_to_chunk_tls(buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk, tor_tls_t *tls,
* (because of EOF), set *<b>reached_eof</b> to 1 and return 0. Return -1 on
* error; else return the number of bytes read.
*/
/* XXXX023 indicate "read blocked" somehow? */
int
read_to_buf(int s, size_t at_most, buf_t *buf, int *reached_eof,
int *socket_error)
{
/* XXXX023 It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions:
* "error status" and "number of bytes read" are not mutually exclusive.
*/
int r = 0;
size_t total_read = 0;
@ -814,6 +818,9 @@ flush_chunk_tls(tor_tls_t *tls, buf_t *buf, chunk_t *chunk,
int
flush_buf(int s, buf_t *buf, size_t sz, size_t *buf_flushlen)
{
/* XXXX023 It's stupid to overload the return values for these functions:
* "error status" and "number of bytes flushed" are not mutually exclusive.
*/
int r;
size_t flushed = 0;
tor_assert(buf_flushlen);

7
src/or/circuitbuild.c
View File

@ -43,11 +43,12 @@
/********* START VARIABLES **********/
/** Global list of circuit build times */
// FIXME: Add this as a member for entry_guard_t instead of global?
// XXXX023: Add this as a member for entry_guard_t instead of global?
// Then we could do per-guard statistics, as guards are likely to
// vary in their own latency. The downside of this is that guards
// can change frequently, so we'd be building a lot more circuits
// most likely.
/* XXXX023 Make this static; add accessor functions. */
circuit_build_times_t circ_times;
/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
@ -3831,7 +3832,7 @@ entry_guards_compute_status(or_options_t *options, time_t now)
* If <b>mark_relay_status</b>, also call router_set_status() on this
* relay.
*
* XXX022 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
* XXX023 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
*/
int
entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
@ -4321,7 +4322,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
}
entry_guards = new_entry_guards;
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
/* XXX022 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
/* XXX023 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
* few lines, so we don't have to re-dirty it */
if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
entry_guards_dirty = 1;

3
src/or/circuitlist.c
View File

@ -1021,6 +1021,7 @@ circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void)
* This is useful for letting the user change pseudonyms, so new
* streams will not be linkable to old streams.
*/
/* XXX023 this is a bad name for what this function does */
void
circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void)
{
@ -1031,6 +1032,8 @@ circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void)
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
!circ->marked_for_close &&
circ->timestamp_dirty)
/* XXXX023 This is a screwed-up way to say "This is too dirty
* for new circuits. */
circ->timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
}
}

5
src/or/circuituse.c
View File

@ -1277,7 +1277,8 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn,
return -1;
}
} else {
/* XXXX022 Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit */
/* XXXX023 Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit:
* refactor into a single function? */
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node, 0)) {
@ -1616,7 +1617,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn)
/* find the circuit that we should use, if there is one. */
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, &circ);
if (retval < 1) // XXX021 if we totally fail, this still returns 0 -RD
if (retval < 1) // XXX022 if we totally fail, this still returns 0 -RD
return retval;
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,

6
src/or/config.c
View File

@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options)
|| !geoip_is_loaded())) {
/* XXXX Don't use this "<default>" junk; make our filename options
* understand prefixes somehow. -NM */
/* XXXX021 Reload GeoIPFile on SIGHUP. -NM */
/* XXXX023 Reload GeoIPFile on SIGHUP. -NM */
char *actual_fname = tor_strdup(options->GeoIPFile);
#ifdef WIN32
if (!strcmp(actual_fname, "<default>")) {
@ -2537,7 +2537,7 @@ is_local_addr(const tor_addr_t *addr)
if (get_options()->EnforceDistinctSubnets == 0)
return 0;
if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET) {
/*XXXX022 IP6 what corresponds to an /24? */
/*XXXX023 IP6 what corresponds to an /24? */
uint32_t ip = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(addr);
/* It's possible that this next check will hit before the first time
@ -3728,7 +3728,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
"ignore you.");
}
/*XXXX022 checking for defaults manually like this is a bit fragile.*/
/*XXXX023 checking for defaults manually like this is a bit fragile.*/
/* Keep changes to hard-coded values synchronous to man page and default
* values table. */

29
src/or/connection.c
View File

@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static int connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_flushed_some(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read,
static int connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read,
int *socket_error);
static int connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial);
static void client_check_address_changed(int sock);
@ -2510,7 +2510,7 @@ connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(connection_t *conn)
static int
connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn)
{
int max_to_read=-1, try_to_read;
ssize_t max_to_read=-1, try_to_read;
size_t before, n_read = 0;
int socket_error = 0;
@ -2628,7 +2628,8 @@ connection_handle_read(connection_t *conn)
* Return -1 if we want to break conn, else return 0.
*/
static int
connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error)
connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read,
int *socket_error)
{
int result;
ssize_t at_most = *max_to_read;
@ -2746,15 +2747,19 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, int *max_to_read, int *socket_error)
n_read = (size_t) result;
}
if (n_read > 0) { /* change *max_to_read */
/*XXXX022 check for overflow*/
*max_to_read = (int)(at_most - n_read);
}
if (n_read > 0) {
/* change *max_to_read */
*max_to_read = at_most - n_read;
/* Update edge_conn->n_read */
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
/*XXXX022 check for overflow*/
/* Check for overflow: */
if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_read > n_read))
edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read;
else
edge_conn->n_read = UINT32_MAX;
}
}
connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written);
@ -3145,10 +3150,14 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
n_written = (size_t) result;
}
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
if (n_written && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
/*XXXX022 check for overflow.*/
/* Check for overflow: */
if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_written > n_written))
edge_conn->n_written += (int)n_written;
else
edge_conn->n_written = UINT32_MAX;
}
connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written);

30
src/or/connection_edge.c
View File

@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ connection_ap_expire_beginning(void)
/* kludge to make us not try this circuit again, yet to allow
* current streams on it to survive if they can: make it
* unattractive to use for new streams */
/* XXXX023 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
tor_assert(circ->timestamp_dirty);
circ->timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
/* give our stream another 'cutoff' seconds to try */
@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ connection_ap_attach_pending(void)
/** Tell any AP streams that are waiting for a one-hop tunnel to
* <b>failed_digest</b> that they are going to fail. */
/* XXX022 We should get rid of this function, and instead attach
/* XXX023 We should get rid of this function, and instead attach
* one-hop streams to circ->p_streams so they get marked in
* circuit_mark_for_close like normal p_streams. */
void
@ -2169,8 +2170,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(edge_connection_t *ap_conn)
ap_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
if (ap_conn->stream_id==0) {
/* XXXX023 Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
* retried on another circuit. */
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
/* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
/* XXXX023 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
tor_assert(circ->_base.timestamp_dirty);
circ->_base.timestamp_dirty -= get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
return -1;
}
@ -2230,9 +2237,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(edge_connection_t *ap_conn)
ap_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
if (ap_conn->stream_id==0) {
/* XXXX023 Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
* retried on another circuit. */
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
/*XXXX022 _close_ the circuit because it's full? That sounds dumb. */
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
/* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
/* XXXX023 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
tor_assert(circ->_base.timestamp_dirty);
circ->_base.timestamp_dirty -= get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
return -1;
}
@ -2392,7 +2404,7 @@ tell_controller_about_resolved_result(edge_connection_t *conn,
* certain errors or for values that didn't come via DNS. <b>expires</b> is
* a time when the answer expires, or -1 or TIME_MAX if there's a good TTL.
**/
/* XXXX022 the use of the ttl and expires fields is nutty. Let's make this
/* XXXX023 the use of the ttl and expires fields is nutty. Let's make this
* interface and those that use it less ugly. */
void
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(edge_connection_t *conn,
@ -2833,13 +2845,13 @@ connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to try connecting");
switch (connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port, &socket_error)) {
case -1:
/* XXX021 use socket_error below rather than trying to piece things
* together from the current errno, which may have been clobbered. */
connection_edge_end_errno(edge_conn);
case -1: {
int reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(socket_error);
connection_edge_end(edge_conn, reason);
circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
connection_free(conn);
return;
}
case 0:
conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;

6
src/or/connection_or.c
View File

@ -374,6 +374,9 @@ connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
* per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
* not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
* check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
*
* If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just
* clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
*/
static void
connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset,
@ -430,7 +433,8 @@ connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset,
}
/** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
* Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets. */
* Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
* sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
void
connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns, or_options_t *options)
{

16
src/or/directory.c
View File

@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ directory_get_from_dirserver(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose,
if (!get_via_tor) {
if (options->UseBridges && type != BRIDGE_AUTHORITY) {
/* want to ask a running bridge for which we have a descriptor. */
/* XXX022 we assume that all of our bridges can answer any
/* XXX023 we assume that all of our bridges can answer any
* possible directory question. This won't be true forever. -RD */
/* It certainly is not true with conditional consensus downloading,
* so, for now, never assume the server supports that. */
@ -1602,15 +1602,13 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn)
(void) skewed; /* skewed isn't used yet. */
if (status_code == 503) {
if (body_len < 16) {
routerstatus_t *rs;
trusted_dir_server_t *ds;
log_info(LD_DIR,"Received http status code %d (%s) from server "
"'%s:%d'. I'll try again soon.",
status_code, escaped(reason), conn->_base.address,
conn->_base.port);
rs = router_get_mutable_consensus_status_by_id(conn->identity_digest);
if (rs)
if ((rs = router_get_mutable_consensus_status_by_id(conn->identity_digest)))
rs->last_dir_503_at = now;
if ((ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(conn->identity_digest)))
ds->fake_status.last_dir_503_at = now;
@ -1618,12 +1616,6 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn)
tor_free(body); tor_free(headers); tor_free(reason);
return -1;
}
/* XXXX022 Remove this once every server with bug 539 is obsolete. */
log_info(LD_DIR, "Server at '%s:%d' sent us a 503 response, but included "
"a body anyway. We'll pretend it gave us a 200.",
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
status_code = 200;
}
plausible = body_is_plausible(body, body_len, conn->_base.purpose);
if (compression != NO_METHOD || !plausible) {
@ -1980,7 +1972,7 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn)
ds->nickname);
/* XXXX use this information; be sure to upload next one
* sooner. -NM */
/* XXXX021 On further thought, the task above implies that we're
/* XXXX023 On further thought, the task above implies that we're
* basing our regenerate-descriptor time on when we uploaded the
* last descriptor, not on the published time of the last
* descriptor. If those are different, that's a bad thing to
@ -2810,7 +2802,7 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers,
ssize_t estimated_len = 0;
smartlist_t *items = smartlist_create();
smartlist_t *dir_items = smartlist_create();
int lifetime = 60; /* XXXX022 should actually use vote intervals. */
int lifetime = 60; /* XXXX023 should actually use vote intervals. */
url += strlen("/tor/status-vote/");
current = !strcmpstart(url, "current/");
url = strchr(url, '/');

11
src/or/dirserv.c
View File

@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable(void)
void
dirserv_set_router_is_running(routerinfo_t *router, time_t now)
{
/*XXXX022 This function is a mess. Separate out the part that calculates
/*XXXX023 This function is a mess. Separate out the part that calculates
whether it's reachable and the part that tells rephist that the router was
unreachable.
*/
@ -1781,9 +1781,12 @@ dirserv_thinks_router_is_unreliable(time_t now,
{
if (need_uptime) {
if (!enough_mtbf_info) {
/* XXX022 Once most authorities are on v3, we should change the rule from
/* XXX023 Once most authorities are on v3, we should change the rule from
* "use uptime if we don't have mtbf data" to "don't advertise Stable on
* v3 if we don't have enough mtbf data." */
* v3 if we don't have enough mtbf data." Or maybe not, since if we ever
* hit a point where we need to reset a lot of authorities at once,
* none of them would be in a position to declare Stable.
*/
long uptime = real_uptime(router, now);
if ((unsigned)uptime < stable_uptime &&
(unsigned)uptime < UPTIME_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE)
@ -3288,7 +3291,7 @@ lookup_cached_dir_by_fp(const char *fp)
d = strmap_get(cached_consensuses, "ns");
else if (memchr(fp, '\0', DIGEST_LEN) && cached_consensuses &&
(d = strmap_get(cached_consensuses, fp))) {
/* this here interface is a nasty hack XXXX022 */;
/* this here interface is a nasty hack XXXX023 */;
} else if (router_digest_is_me(fp) && the_v2_networkstatus)
d = the_v2_networkstatus;
else if (cached_v2_networkstatus)

2
src/or/dns.c
View File

@ -1206,7 +1206,7 @@ configure_nameservers(int force)
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen = tor_addr_to_sockaddr(&addr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&ss, sizeof(ss));
if (socklen < 0) {
if (socklen <= 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't convert outbound bind address to sockaddr."
" Ignoring.");
} else {

2
src/or/dnsserv.c
View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_EVENT2_DNS_H
#include <event2/dns.h>
#include <event2/dns_compat.h>
/* XXXX022 this implies we want an improved evdns */
/* XXXX023 this implies we want an improved evdns */
#include <event2/dns_struct.h>
#else
#include "eventdns.h"

2
src/or/eventdns.c
View File

@ -1999,7 +1999,7 @@ evdns_request_timeout_callback(int fd, short events, void *arg) {
/* retransmit it */
/* Stop waiting for the timeout. No need to do this in
* request_finished; that one already deletes the timeout event.
* XXXX021 port this change to libevent. */
* XXXX023 port this change to libevent. */
del_timeout_event(req);
evdns_request_transmit(req);
}

5
src/or/geoip.c
View File

@ -621,8 +621,9 @@ _dirreq_map_put(dirreq_map_entry_t *entry, dirreq_type_t type,
tor_assert(entry->type == type);
tor_assert(entry->dirreq_id == dirreq_id);
/* XXXX022 once we're sure the bug case never happens, we can switch
* to HT_INSERT */
/* XXXX we could switch this to HT_INSERT some time, since it seems that
* this bug doesn't happen. But since this function doesn't seem to be
* critical-path, it's sane to leave it alone. */
old_ent = HT_REPLACE(dirreqmap, &dirreq_map, entry);
if (old_ent && old_ent != entry) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error when putting directory request into local "

11
src/or/networkstatus.c
View File

@ -1630,7 +1630,7 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
if (from_cache && !accept_obsolete &&
c->valid_until < now-OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE) {
/* XXX022 when we try to make fallbackconsensus work again, we should
/* XXXX If we try to make fallbackconsensus work again, we should
* consider taking this out. Until then, believing obsolete consensuses
* is causing more harm than good. See also bug 887. */
log_info(LD_DIR, "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding.");
@ -1790,7 +1790,8 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
routerstatus_list_update_named_server_map();
cell_ewma_set_scale_factor(options, current_consensus);
/* XXX022 where is the right place to put this call? */
/* XXXX023 this call might be unnecessary here: can changing the
* current consensus really alter our view of any OR's rate limits? */
connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options);
circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(&circ_times, current_consensus);
@ -1807,7 +1808,11 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus,
write_str_to_file(consensus_fname, consensus, 0);
}
if (time_definitely_before(now, c->valid_after, 60)) {
/** If a consensus appears more than this many seconds before its declared
* valid-after time, declare that our clock is skewed. */
#define EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW 60
if (now < current_consensus->valid_after - EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW) {
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char dbuf[64];
long delta = now - c->valid_after;

12
src/or/or.h
View File

@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ typedef struct connection_t {
/** Unique identifier for this connection on this Tor instance. */
uint64_t global_identifier;
/* XXXX022 move this field, and all the listener-only fields (just
/* XXXX023 move this field, and all the listener-only fields (just
socket_family, I think), into a new listener_connection_t subtype. */
/** If the connection is a CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER, this field points
* to the evdns_server_port is uses to listen to and answer connections. */
@ -2283,8 +2283,14 @@ typedef struct circuit_t {
* resolution than most so that the circuit-build-time tracking code can
* get millisecond resolution. */
struct timeval timestamp_created;
time_t timestamp_dirty; /**< When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the
* circuit is clean. */
/** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean.
*
* XXXX023 Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward
* in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new
* streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it.
* That's a kludge we should fix.
*/
time_t timestamp_dirty;
uint16_t marked_for_close; /**< Should we close this circuit at the end of
* the main loop? (If true, holds the line number

8
src/or/reasons.c
View File

@ -174,13 +174,7 @@ errno_to_stream_end_reason(int e)
S_CASE(ENETUNREACH):
return END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL;
S_CASE(EHOSTUNREACH):
/* XXXX022
* The correct behavior is END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE, but older
* clients don't recognize it. So we're going to continue sending
* "MISC" until 0.2.1.27 or later is "well established".
*/
/* return END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE; */
return END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
return END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE;
S_CASE(ECONNREFUSED):
return END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED;
S_CASE(ECONNRESET):

2
src/or/relay.c
View File

@ -793,6 +793,8 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
< MAX_RESOLVE_FAILURES) {
/* We haven't retried too many times; reattach the connection. */
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP,circ);
/* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
/* XXXX023 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
tor_assert(circ->_base.timestamp_dirty);
circ->_base.timestamp_dirty -= get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness;

4
src/or/rendclient.c
View File

@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
log_info(LD_REND,"Got rendezvous ack. This circuit is now ready for "
"rendezvous.");
circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY;
/* XXXX022 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
/* XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
* than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */
/* If we already have the introduction circuit built, make sure we send
@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
onion_append_to_cpath(&circ->cpath, hop);
circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */
/* XXXX022 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
/* XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
* than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */
connection_ap_attach_pending();

2
src/or/rendcommon.c
View File

@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e)
if (!*e)
return 0;
tor_assert((*e)->parsed && (*e)->parsed->intro_nodes);
/* XXX022 hack for now, to return "not found" if there are no intro
/* XXX023 hack for now, to return "not found" if there are no intro
* points remaining. See bug 997. */
if (smartlist_len((*e)->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0)
return 0;

2
src/or/rephist.c
View File

@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(const char *id, time_t when)
int
rep_hist_have_measured_enough_stability(void)
{
/* XXXX021 This doesn't do so well when we change our opinion
/* XXXX022 This doesn't do so well when we change our opinion
* as to whether we're tracking router stability. */
return started_tracking_stability < time(NULL) - 4*60*60;
}

16
src/or/routerlist.c
View File

@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ trusted_dirs_remove_old_certs(void)
time_t cert_published;
if (newest == cert)
continue;
expired = time_definitely_after(now, cert->expires, CERT_EXPIRY_SKEW);
expired = now > cert->expires;
cert_published = cert->cache_info.published_on;
/* Store expired certs for 48 hours after a newer arrives;
*/
@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ authority_certs_fetch_missing(networkstatus_t *status, time_t now)
continue;
cl = get_cert_list(ds->v3_identity_digest);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cl->certs, authority_cert_t *, cert, {
if (! time_definitely_after(now, cert->expires, CERT_EXPIRY_SKEW)) {
if (now < cert->expires) {
/* It's not expired, and we weren't looking for something to
* verify a consensus with. Call it done. */
download_status_reset(&cl->dl_status);
@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth_weights(smartlist_t *sl,
sl_last_weighted_bw_of_me = weight*this_bw;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* XXXX022 this is a kludge to expose these values. */
/* XXXX023 this is a kludge to expose these values. */
sl_last_total_weighted_bw = weighted_bw;
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Choosing node for rule %s based on weights "
@ -1885,7 +1885,7 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
if (node->rs->has_bandwidth) {
this_bw = kb_to_bytes(node->rs->bandwidth);
} else { /* guess */
/* XXX022 once consensuses always list bandwidths, we can take
/* XXX023 once consensuses always list bandwidths, we can take
* this guessing business out. -RD */
is_known = 0;
flags = node->rs->is_fast ? 1 : 0;
@ -2004,7 +2004,7 @@ smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth(smartlist_t *sl,
}
}
/* XXXX022 this is a kludge to expose these values. */
/* XXXX023 this is a kludge to expose these values. */
sl_last_total_weighted_bw = total_bw;
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Total weighted bw = "U64_FORMAT
@ -3420,7 +3420,7 @@ router_add_extrainfo_to_routerlist(extrainfo_t *ei, const char **msg,
int inserted;
(void)from_fetch;
if (msg) *msg = NULL;
/*XXXX022 Do something with msg */
/*XXXX023 Do something with msg */
inserted = extrainfo_insert(router_get_routerlist(), ei);
@ -4671,7 +4671,7 @@ update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now, int is_vote,
/** How often should we launch a server/authority request to be sure of getting
* a guess for our IP? */
/*XXXX021 this info should come from netinfo cells or something, or we should
/*XXXX023 this info should come from netinfo cells or something, or we should
* do this only when we aren't seeing incoming data. see bug 652. */
#define DUMMY_DOWNLOAD_INTERVAL (20*60)
@ -4690,7 +4690,7 @@ update_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now)
update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(now, 0,
networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(now, FLAV_NS));
/* XXXX021 we could be smarter here; see notes on bug 652. */
/* XXXX023 we could be smarter here; see notes on bug 652. */
/* XXXX NM Microdescs: if we're not fetching microdescriptors, we need
* to make something else invoke this. */
/* If we're a server that doesn't have a configured address, we rely on

2
src/or/routerparse.c
View File

@ -1806,7 +1806,7 @@ authority_cert_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char **end_of_string)
struct in_addr in;
char *address = NULL;
tor_assert(tok->n_args);
/* XXX021 use tor_addr_port_parse() below instead. -RD */
/* XXX023 use tor_addr_port_parse() below instead. -RD */
if (parse_addr_port(LOG_WARN, tok->args[0], &address, NULL,
&cert->dir_port)<0 ||
tor_inet_aton(address, &in) == 0) {