switch the paper over to llncs

svn:r3415

doc/design-paper/challenges.tex

@@ -1,8 +1,24 @@
-\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
+\documentclass{llncs}
+
+\usepackage{url}
+\usepackage{amsmath}
+\usepackage{epsfig}
+
+\newenvironment{tightlist}{\begin{list}{$\bullet$}{
+  \setlength{\itemsep}{0mm}
+    \setlength{\parsep}{0mm}
+    %  \setlength{\labelsep}{0mm}
+    %  \setlength{\labelwidth}{0mm}
+    %  \setlength{\topsep}{0mm}
+    }}{\end{list}}
+
+\begin{document}
 
 \title{Challenges in bringing low-latency stream anonymity to the masses (DRAFT)}
 
-\begin{document}
+\author{Roger Dingledine and Nick Mathewson}
+\institute{The Free Haven Project\\
+\email{\{arma,nickm\}@freehaven.net}}
 
 \section{Introduction}
 
@@ -172,5 +188,36 @@ assuming that, how much anonymity can we get. we're not here to model or
 to simulate or to produce equations and formulae. but those have their
 roles too.
 
+
+
+
+
+%%%
+
+
+TCP vs UDP
+argument 1: we need to do IP-level packet normalization, to block things like ip
+fingerprinting.
+argument 2: we still need to be easy to integrate with applications, so they can do
+application-level scrubbing.
+argument 3: we need a block-level encryption approach that can provide security despite
+packet loss and out-of-order delivery. i believe you that such a thing can be created,
+but no thing has yet been specified. so specify it for me if you want me to believe it.
+(freedom and cebolla are vulnerable to tagging and malleability attacks i believe.)
+argument 4: we still need to play with parameters for throughput, congestion control,
+etc -- since we need sequence numbers and maybe more to do replay detection,
+and just to handle duplicate frames. so we would be reimplementing some subset of tcp
+anyway.
+argument 5: tls over udp is not implemented or even specified.
+argument 6: exit policies over arbitrary IP packets seems to be an IDS-hard problem. i
+don't want to build an IDS into tor.
+argument 7: certain protocols are going to leak information at the IP layer anyway. for
+example, if we anonymizer your dns requests, but they still go to comcast's dns servers,
+that's bad.
+argument 8: hidden services, .exit addresses, etc are broken unless we have some way to
+reach into the application-level protocol and decide the hostname it's trying to get.
+
+\bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{tor-design}
+
 \end{document}