hs: Onion services put IPv6 addresses in service descriptors

Rewrite service_intro_point_new() to take a node_t. Since
node_get_link_specifier_smartlist() supports IPv6 link specifiers,
this refactor adds IPv6 addresses to onion service descriptors.

Part of 23576, implements 26992.
This commit is contained in:
teor 2018-07-31 14:30:17 +10:00
parent cdda3dc484
commit 6170d3fcf1
7 changed files with 48 additions and 88 deletions

7
changes/bug23576 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
o Minor features (IPv6, v3 onion services):
- Make v3 onion services put IPv6 addresses in service
descriptors. Before this change, service descriptors only
contained IPv4 addressesd. Implements 26992.
o Code simplification and refactoring:
- Simplify v3 onion service link specifier handling code.
Fixes bug 23576; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.

View File

@ -1697,6 +1697,12 @@ hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t *lspecs,
tor_assert(lspecs);
if (smartlist_len(lspecs) == 0) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Empty link specifier list.");
/* Return NULL. */
goto done;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(lspecs, const link_specifier_t *, ls) {
switch (link_specifier_get_ls_type(ls)) {
case LS_IPV4:
@ -1730,6 +1736,12 @@ hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t *lspecs,
/* Legacy ID is mandatory, and we require IPv4. */
if (!have_v4 || !have_legacy_id) {
bool both = !have_v4 && !have_legacy_id;
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Missing %s%s%s link specifier%s.",
!have_v4 ? "IPv4" : "",
both ? " and " : "",
!have_legacy_id ? "legacy ID" : "",
both ? "s" : "");
goto done;
}
@ -1748,6 +1760,10 @@ hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t *lspecs,
* release. */
} else {
/* If we can't reach IPv4, return NULL. */
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
"Received an IPv4 link specifier, "
"but the address is not reachable: %s:%u",
fmt_addr(&addr_v4), port_v4);
goto done;
}
@ -1755,7 +1771,7 @@ hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(const smartlist_t *lspecs,
validate:
/* We'll validate now that the address we've picked isn't a private one. If
* it is, are we allowing to extend to private address? */
* it is, are we allowed to extend to private addresses? */
if (!extend_info_addr_is_allowed(&addr_v4)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
"Requested address is private and we are not allowed to extend to "

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@ -426,23 +426,16 @@ service_intro_point_free_void(void *obj)
}
/* Return a newly allocated service intro point and fully initialized from the
* given extend_info_t ei if non NULL.
* If is_legacy is true, we also generate the legacy key.
* If supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any is true, we add the relay's ed25519
* key to the link specifiers.
* given node_t node, if non NULL.
*
* If ei is NULL, returns a hs_service_intro_point_t with an empty link
* If node is NULL, returns a hs_service_intro_point_t with an empty link
* specifier list and no onion key. (This is used for testing.)
* On any other error, NULL is returned.
*
* ei must be an extend_info_t containing an IPv4 address. (We will add supoort
* for IPv6 in a later release.) When calling extend_info_from_node(), pass
* 0 in for_direct_connection to make sure ei always has an IPv4 address. */
* node must be an node_t with an IPv4 address. */
STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
service_intro_point_new(const extend_info_t *ei, unsigned int is_legacy,
unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any)
service_intro_point_new(const node_t *node)
{
hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ip));
@ -472,12 +465,17 @@ service_intro_point_new(const extend_info_t *ei, unsigned int is_legacy,
ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
/* Initialize the base object. We don't need the certificate object. */
ip->base.link_specifiers = smartlist_new();
ip->base.link_specifiers = node_get_link_specifier_smartlist(node, 0);
if (node == NULL) {
goto done;
}
/* Generate the encryption key for this intro point. */
curve25519_keypair_generate(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0);
/* Figure out if this chosen node supports v3 or is legacy only. */
if (is_legacy) {
/* Figure out if this chosen node supports v3 or is legacy only.
* NULL nodes are used in the unit tests. */
if (!node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(node)) {
ip->base.is_only_legacy = 1;
/* Legacy mode that is doesn't support v3+ with ed25519 auth key. */
ip->legacy_key = crypto_pk_new();
@ -490,40 +488,9 @@ service_intro_point_new(const extend_info_t *ei, unsigned int is_legacy,
}
}
if (ei == NULL) {
goto done;
}
/* We'll try to add all link specifiers. Legacy is mandatory.
* IPv4 or IPv6 is required, and we always send IPv4. */
ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_IPV4);
/* It is impossible to have an extend info object without a v4. */
if (BUG(!ls)) {
goto err;
}
smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_LEGACY_ID);
/* It is impossible to have an extend info object without an identity
* digest. */
if (BUG(!ls)) {
goto err;
}
smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
/* ed25519 identity key is optional for intro points. If the node supports
* ed25519 link authentication, we include it. */
if (supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any) {
ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_ED25519_ID);
if (ls) {
smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
}
}
/* IPv6 is not supported in this release. */
/* Finally, copy onion key from the extend_info_t object. */
memcpy(&ip->onion_key, &ei->curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(ip->onion_key));
/* Finally, copy onion key from the node. */
memcpy(&ip->onion_key, node_get_curve25519_onion_key(node),
sizeof(ip->onion_key));
done:
return ip;
@ -2106,7 +2073,6 @@ static hs_service_intro_point_t *
pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
{
const node_t *node;
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
/* Normal 3-hop introduction point flags. */
router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME | CRN_NEED_DESC;
@ -2127,43 +2093,17 @@ pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
* we don't want to use that node anymore. */
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void *) node);
/* We do this to ease our life but also this call makes appropriate checks
* of the node object such as validating ntor support for instance.
*
* We must provide an extend_info for clients to connect over a 3-hop path,
* so we don't pass direct_conn here. */
info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
if (BUG(info == NULL)) {
goto err;
}
/* Create our objects and populate them with the node information. */
ip = service_intro_point_new(node);
/* Let's do a basic sanity check here so that we don't end up advertising the
* ed25519 identity key of relays that don't actually support the link
* protocol */
if (!node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 0)) {
tor_assert_nonfatal(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
} else {
/* Make sure we *do* have an ed key if we support the link authentication.
* Sending an empty key would result in a failure to extend. */
tor_assert_nonfatal(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
}
/* Create our objects and populate them with the node information.
* We don't care if the intro's link auth is compatible with us, because
* we are sending the ed25519 key to a remote client via the descriptor. */
ip = service_intro_point_new(info, !node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(node),
node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node,
0));
if (ip == NULL) {
goto err;
}
log_info(LD_REND, "Picked intro point: %s", extend_info_describe(info));
extend_info_free(info);
log_info(LD_REND, "Picked intro point: %s", node_describe(node));
return ip;
err:
service_intro_point_free(ip);
extend_info_free(info);
return NULL;
}

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@ -369,10 +369,7 @@ STATIC hs_service_t *find_service(hs_service_ht *map,
STATIC void remove_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service);
STATIC int register_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service);
/* Service introduction point functions. */
STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *service_intro_point_new(
const extend_info_t *ei,
unsigned int is_legacy,
unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any);
STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *service_intro_point_new(const node_t *node);
STATIC void service_intro_point_free_(hs_service_intro_point_t *ip);
#define service_intro_point_free(ip) \
FREE_AND_NULL(hs_service_intro_point_t, \

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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ test_gen_establish_intro_cell(void *arg)
attempt to parse it. */
{
/* We only need the auth key pair here. */
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0, 0);
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL);
/* Auth key pair is generated in the constructor so we are all set for
* using this IP object. */
ret = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, buf);
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ test_gen_establish_intro_cell_bad(void *arg)
ed25519_sign_prefixed() function and make it fail. */
cell = trn_cell_establish_intro_new();
tt_assert(cell);
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0, 0);
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL);
cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, NULL);
service_intro_point_free(ip);
expect_log_msg_containing("Unable to make signature for "

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@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ new_establish_intro_cell(const char *circ_nonce,
/* Auth key pair is generated in the constructor so we are all set for
* using this IP object. */
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0, 0);
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL);
tt_assert(ip);
cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, buf);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ new_establish_intro_encoded_cell(const char *circ_nonce, uint8_t *cell_out)
/* Auth key pair is generated in the constructor so we are all set for
* using this IP object. */
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0, 0);
ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL);
tt_assert(ip);
cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip, cell_out);
tt_i64_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0);

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@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static hs_service_intro_point_t *
helper_create_service_ip(void)
{
hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL, 0, 0);
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = service_intro_point_new(NULL);
tor_assert(ip);
/* Add a first unused link specifier. */
ls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ls));