mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-24 04:13:28 +01:00
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.4'
This commit is contained in:
commit
61029d6926
8
changes/bug9780
Normal file
8
changes/bug9780
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
o Minor bugfixes (performance, fingerprinting):
|
||||
- Our default TLS ecdhe groups were backwards: we meant to be using
|
||||
P224 for relays (for performance win) and P256 for bridges (since
|
||||
it is more common in the wild). Instead we had it backwards. After
|
||||
reconsideration, we decided that the default should be P256 on all
|
||||
hosts, since its security is probably better, and since P224 is
|
||||
reportedly used quite little in the wild. Found by "skruffy" on
|
||||
IRC. Fix for bug 9780; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha.
|
@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
What EC group should we try to use for incoming TLS connections?
|
||||
P224 is faster, but makes us stand out more. Has no effect if
|
||||
we're a client, or if our OpenSSL version lacks support for ECDHE.
|
||||
(Default: P224 for public servers; P256 for bridges.)
|
||||
(Default: P256)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that
|
||||
|
@ -1344,10 +1344,8 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
|
||||
nid = NID_secp224r1;
|
||||
else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
|
||||
nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
|
||||
else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER)
|
||||
nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
|
||||
else
|
||||
nid = NID_secp224r1;
|
||||
nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
|
||||
/* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
|
||||
ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
|
||||
if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user