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Merge remote-tracking branch 'yawning/feature16533'
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5fe18bcf54
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changes/feature16533
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4
changes/feature16533
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor features (performance)
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- Improve the runtime speed of Ed25519 signature verification by using
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Ed25519-donna's batch verification support when there are a lot of
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signatures to verify at once. Implements ticket 16533.
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@ -2365,10 +2365,19 @@ crypto_seed_rng(void)
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}
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/** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on
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* success, -1 on failure.
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* success, -1 on failure, with support for mocking for unit tests.
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*/
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MOCK_IMPL(int,
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crypto_rand, (char *to, size_t n))
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{
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return crypto_rand_unmocked(to, n);
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}
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/** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on
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* success, -1 on failure. Most callers will want crypto_rand instead.
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*/
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int
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crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n)
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{
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int r;
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tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
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@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
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/* random numbers */
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int crypto_seed_rng(void);
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MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
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int crypto_rand_unmocked(char *to, size_t n);
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int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
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int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max);
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int crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max);
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@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ typedef struct {
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unsigned char *);
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int (*sign)(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t,
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const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *);
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int (*open_batch)(const unsigned char **, size_t *, const unsigned char **,
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const unsigned char **, size_t, int *);
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int (*blind_secret_key)(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *,
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const unsigned char *);
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@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ static const ed25519_impl_t impl_ref10 = {
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ed25519_ref10_open,
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ed25519_ref10_sign,
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NULL,
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ed25519_ref10_blind_secret_key,
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ed25519_ref10_blind_public_key,
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@ -74,6 +77,7 @@ static const ed25519_impl_t impl_donna = {
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ed25519_donna_open,
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ed25519_donna_sign,
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ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna,
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ed25519_donna_blind_secret_key,
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ed25519_donna_blind_public_key,
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@ -197,8 +201,13 @@ ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
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const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
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int n_checkable)
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{
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int res, i;
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int i, res;
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const ed25519_impl_t *impl = get_ed_impl();
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if (impl->open_batch == NULL) {
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/* No batch verification implementation available, fake it by checking the
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* each signature individually.
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*/
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res = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
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const ed25519_checkable_t *ch = &checkable[i];
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@ -208,15 +217,19 @@ ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
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if (okay_out)
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okay_out[i] = (r == 0);
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}
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#if 0
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/* This is how we'd do it if we were using ed25519_donna. I'll keep this
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* code around here in case we ever do that. */
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} else {
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/* ed25519-donna style batch verification available.
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*
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* Theoretically, this should only be called if n_checkable >= 3, since
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* that's the threshold where the batch verification actually kicks in,
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* but the only difference is a few mallocs/frees.
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*/
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const uint8_t **ms;
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size_t *lens;
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const uint8_t **pks;
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const uint8_t **sigs;
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int *oks;
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int all_ok;
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ms = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
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lens = tor_malloc(sizeof(size_t)*n_checkable);
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@ -232,21 +245,24 @@ ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
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oks[i] = 0;
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}
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ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna_fb(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks);
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res = 0;
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all_ok = impl->open_batch(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks);
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for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
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/* XXX/yawning: Propagate to okay_out? */
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if (!oks[i])
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--res;
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}
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/* XXX: For now sanity check oks with the return value. Once we have
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* more confidence in the code, if `all_ok == 0` we can skip iterating
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* over oks since all the signatures were found to be valid.
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*/
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tor_assert(((res == 0) && !all_ok) || ((res < 0) && all_ok));
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tor_free(ms);
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tor_free(lens);
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tor_free(pks);
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if (! okay_out)
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tor_free(oks);
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#endif
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}
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return res;
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}
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@ -13,5 +13,5 @@
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static void
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ED25519_FN(ed25519_randombytes_unsafe) (void *p, size_t len)
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{
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crypto_rand(p, len);
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crypto_rand_unmocked(p, len);
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}
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