diff --git a/src/or/hs_cell.c b/src/or/hs_cell.c
index 0d34ef5965..aff6ee04e9 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_cell.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_cell.c
@@ -7,13 +7,180 @@
**/
#include "or.h"
+#include "config.h"
#include "rendservice.h"
#include "hs_cell.h"
+#include "hs_ntor.h"
/* Trunnel. */
+#include "ed25519_cert.h"
#include "hs/cell_common.h"
#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
+#include "hs/cell_introduce1.h"
+
+/* Compute the MAC of an INTRODUCE cell in mac_out. The encoded_cell param is
+ * the cell content up to the ENCRYPTED section of length encoded_cell_len.
+ * The encrypted param is the start of the ENCRYPTED section of length
+ * encrypted_len. The mac_key is the key needed for the computation of the MAC
+ * derived from the ntor handshake of length mac_key_len.
+ *
+ * The length mac_out_len must be at least DIGEST256_LEN. */
+static void
+compute_introduce_mac(const uint8_t *encoded_cell, size_t encoded_cell_len,
+ const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t encrypted_len,
+ const uint8_t *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len,
+ uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_out_len)
+{
+ size_t offset = 0;
+ size_t mac_msg_len;
+ uint8_t mac_msg[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
+
+ tor_assert(encoded_cell);
+ tor_assert(encrypted);
+ tor_assert(mac_key);
+ tor_assert(mac_out);
+ tor_assert(mac_out_len >= DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ /* Compute the size of the message which is basically the entire cell until
+ * the MAC field of course. */
+ mac_msg_len = encoded_cell_len + (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN);
+ tor_assert(mac_msg_len <= sizeof(mac_msg));
+
+ /* First, put the encoded cell in the msg. */
+ memcpy(mac_msg, encoded_cell, encoded_cell_len);
+ offset += encoded_cell_len;
+ /* Second, put the CLIENT_PK + ENCRYPTED_DATA but ommit the MAC field (which
+ * is junk at this point). */
+ memcpy(mac_msg + offset, encrypted, (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN));
+ offset += (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN);
+ tor_assert(offset == mac_msg_len);
+
+ crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac_out, mac_out_len,
+ mac_key, mac_key_len,
+ mac_msg, mac_msg_len);
+ memwipe(mac_msg, 0, sizeof(mac_msg));
+}
+
+/* From a set of keys, subcredential and the ENCRYPTED section of an
+ * INTRODUCE2 cell, return a newly allocated intro cell keys structure.
+ * Finally, the client public key is copied in client_pk. On error, return
+ * NULL. */
+static hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *
+get_introduce2_key_material(const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key,
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *enc_key,
+ const uint8_t *subcredential,
+ const uint8_t *encrypted_section,
+ curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk)
+{
+ hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *keys;
+
+ tor_assert(auth_key);
+ tor_assert(enc_key);
+ tor_assert(subcredential);
+ tor_assert(encrypted_section);
+ tor_assert(client_pk);
+
+ keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*keys));
+
+ /* First bytes of the ENCRYPTED section are the client public key. */
+ memcpy(client_pk->public_key, encrypted_section, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+
+ if (hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(auth_key, enc_key, client_pk,
+ subcredential, keys) < 0) {
+ /* Don't rely on the caller to wipe this on error. */
+ memwipe(client_pk, 0, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+ tor_free(keys);
+ keys = NULL;
+ }
+ return keys;
+}
+
+/* Using the given encryption key, decrypt the encrypted_section of length
+ * encrypted_section_len of an INTRODUCE2 cell and return a newly allocated
+ * buffer containing the decrypted data. On decryption failure, NULL is
+ * returned. */
+static uint8_t *
+decrypt_introduce2(const uint8_t *enc_key, const uint8_t *encrypted_section,
+ size_t encrypted_section_len)
+{
+ uint8_t *decrypted = NULL;
+ crypto_cipher_t *cipher = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(enc_key);
+ tor_assert(encrypted_section);
+
+ /* Decrypt ENCRYPTED section. */
+ cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((char *) enc_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN * 8);
+ tor_assert(cipher);
+
+ /* This is symmetric encryption so can't be bigger than the encrypted
+ * section length. */
+ decrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_section_len);
+ if (crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, (char *) decrypted,
+ (const char *) encrypted_section,
+ encrypted_section_len) < 0) {
+ tor_free(decrypted);
+ decrypted = NULL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
+ return decrypted;
+}
+
+/* Given a pointer to the decrypted data of the ENCRYPTED section of an
+ * INTRODUCE2 cell of length decrypted_len, parse and validate the cell
+ * content. Return a newly allocated cell structure or NULL on error. The
+ * circuit and service object are only used for logging purposes. */
+static trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *
+parse_introduce2_encrypted(const uint8_t *decrypted_data,
+ size_t decrypted_len, const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(decrypted_data);
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_parse(&enc_cell, decrypted_data,
+ decrypted_len) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to parse the decrypted ENCRYPTED section of "
+ "the INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell) !=
+ HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key type is invalid. Got %u but "
+ "expected %u on circuit %u for service %s",
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell),
+ HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell) !=
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key length is invalid. Got %ld but "
+ "expected %d on circuit %u for service %s",
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell),
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* XXX: Validate NSPEC field as well. */
+
+ return enc_cell;
+ err:
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
+ return NULL;
+}
/* Build a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and RSA
* encryption key. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be
@@ -183,3 +350,154 @@ hs_cell_parse_intro_established(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
return ret;
}
+/* Parsse the INTRODUCE2 cell using data which contains everything we need to
+ * do so and contains the destination buffers of information we extract and
+ * compute from the cell. Return 0 on success else a negative value. The
+ * service and circ are only used for logging purposes. */
+ssize_t
+hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data,
+ const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ uint8_t *decrypted = NULL;
+ size_t encrypted_section_len;
+ const uint8_t *encrypted_section;
+ curve25519_public_key_t client_pk;
+ trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell = NULL;
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL;
+ hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *intro_keys = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(data);
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(service);
+
+ /* Parse the cell so we can start cell validation. */
+ if (trn_cell_introduce1_parse(&cell, data->payload,
+ data->payload_len) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to parse INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u "
+ "for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: Add/Test replaycache. */
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Received a decodable INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u "
+ "for service %s. Decoding encrypted section...",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+
+ encrypted_section = trn_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_encrypted(cell);
+ encrypted_section_len = trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_encrypted(cell);
+
+ /* Encrypted section must at least contain the CLIENT_PK and MAC which is
+ * defined in section 3.3.2 of the specification. */
+ if (encrypted_section_len < (CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted section length "
+ "for service %s. Dropping cell.",
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Build the key material out of the key material found in the cell. */
+ intro_keys = get_introduce2_key_material(data->auth_pk, data->enc_kp,
+ data->subcredential,
+ encrypted_section, &client_pk);
+ if (intro_keys == NULL) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted data. Unable to "
+ "compute key material on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate MAC from the cell and our computed key material. The MAC field
+ * in the cell is at the end of the encrypted section. */
+ {
+ uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ /* The MAC field is at the very end of the ENCRYPTED section. */
+ size_t mac_offset = encrypted_section_len - sizeof(mac);
+ /* Compute the MAC. Use the entire encoded payload with a length up to the
+ * ENCRYPTED section. */
+ compute_introduce_mac(data->payload,
+ data->payload_len - encrypted_section_len,
+ encrypted_section, encrypted_section_len,
+ intro_keys->mac_key, sizeof(intro_keys->mac_key),
+ mac, sizeof(mac));
+ if (tor_memcmp(mac, encrypted_section + mac_offset, sizeof(mac))) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid MAC validation for INTRODUCE2 cell on "
+ "circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ /* The ENCRYPTED_DATA section starts just after the CLIENT_PK. */
+ const uint8_t *encrypted_data =
+ encrypted_section + sizeof(data->client_pk);
+ /* It's symmetric encryption so it's correct to use the ENCRYPTED length
+ * for decryption. Computes the length of ENCRYPTED_DATA meaning removing
+ * the CLIENT_PK and MAC length. */
+ size_t encrypted_data_len =
+ encrypted_section_len - (sizeof(data->client_pk) + DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ /* This decrypts the ENCRYPTED_DATA section of the cell. */
+ decrypted = decrypt_introduce2(intro_keys->enc_key,
+ encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
+ if (decrypted == NULL) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to decrypt the ENCRYPTED section of an "
+ "INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse this blob into an encrypted cell structure so we can then extract
+ * the data we need out of it. */
+ enc_cell = parse_introduce2_encrypted(decrypted, encrypted_data_len,
+ circ, service);
+ memwipe(decrypted, 0, encrypted_data_len);
+ if (enc_cell == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: Implement client authorization checks. */
+
+ /* Extract onion key and rendezvous cookie from the cell used for the
+ * rendezvous point circuit e2e encryption. */
+ memcpy(data->onion_pk.public_key,
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_onion_key(enc_cell),
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ memcpy(data->rendezvous_cookie,
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_rend_cookie(enc_cell),
+ sizeof(data->rendezvous_cookie));
+
+ /* Extract rendezvous link specifiers. */
+ for (size_t idx = 0;
+ idx < trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspec(enc_cell); idx++) {
+ link_specifier_t *lspec =
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspecs(enc_cell, idx);
+ smartlist_add(data->link_specifiers, hs_link_specifier_dup(lspec));
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Valid INTRODUCE2 cell. Launching rendezvous circuit.");
+
+ done:
+ memwipe(&client_pk, 0, sizeof(client_pk));
+ if (intro_keys) {
+ memwipe(intro_keys, 0, sizeof(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t));
+ tor_free(intro_keys);
+ }
+ tor_free(decrypted);
+ trn_cell_introduce1_free(cell);
+ trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
+ return ret;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/hs_cell.h b/src/or/hs_cell.h
index 8e34028896..901ff81aae 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_cell.h
+++ b/src/or/hs_cell.h
@@ -9,14 +9,53 @@
#ifndef TOR_HS_CELL_H
#define TOR_HS_CELL_H
+#include "or.h"
#include "hs_service.h"
+/* Onion key type found in the INTRODUCE1 cell. */
+typedef enum {
+ HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR = 1,
+} hs_cell_onion_key_type_t;
+
+/* This data structure contains data that we need to parse an INTRODUCE2 cell
+ * which is used by the INTRODUCE2 cell parsing function. On a successful
+ * parsing, the onion_pk and rendezvous_cookie will be populated with the
+ * computed key material from the cell data. */
+typedef struct hs_cell_introduce2_data_t {
+ /*** Immutable Section. ***/
+
+ /* Introduction point authentication public key. */
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_pk;
+ /* Introduction point encryption keypair for the ntor handshake. */
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *enc_kp;
+ /* Subcredentials of the service. */
+ const uint8_t *subcredential;
+ /* Payload of the received encoded cell. */
+ const uint8_t *payload;
+ /* Size of the payload of the received encoded cell. */
+ size_t payload_len;
+
+ /*** Muttable Section. ***/
+
+ /* Onion public key computed using the INTRODUCE2 encrypted section. */
+ curve25519_public_key_t onion_pk;
+ /* Rendezvous cookie taken from the INTRODUCE2 encrypted section. */
+ uint8_t rendezvous_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
+ /* Client public key from the INTRODUCE2 encrypted section. */
+ curve25519_public_key_t client_pk;
+ /* Link specifiers of the rendezvous point. Contains link_specifier_t. */
+ smartlist_t *link_specifiers;
+} hs_cell_introduce2_data_t;
+
ssize_t hs_cell_build_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce,
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
uint8_t *cell_out);
ssize_t hs_cell_parse_intro_established(const uint8_t *payload,
size_t payload_len);
+ssize_t hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data,
+ const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const hs_service_t *service);
#endif /* TOR_HS_CELL_H */
diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
index 51c07c0ba7..a11699227c 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
@@ -312,6 +312,18 @@ send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
/* Public API */
/* ========== */
+int
+hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key,
+ const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie)
+{
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(onion_key);
+ tor_assert(rendezvous_cookie);
+ /* XXX: Implement rendezvous launch support. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* For a given service and a service intro point, launch a circuit to the
* extend info ei. If the service is a single onion, a one-hop circuit will be
* requested. Return 0 if the circuit was successfully launched and tagged
@@ -468,6 +480,60 @@ hs_circ_handle_intro_established(const hs_service_t *service,
return ret;
}
+/* Handle an INTRODUCE2 unparsed payload of payload_len for the given circuit
+ * and service. This cell is associated with the intro point object ip and the
+ * subcredential. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+int
+hs_circ_handle_introduce2(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ const uint8_t *subcredential,
+ const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ hs_cell_introduce2_data_t data;
+
+ tor_assert(service);
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(ip);
+ tor_assert(subcredential);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+
+ /* Populate the data structure with everything we need for the cell to be
+ * parsed, decrypted and key material computed correctly. */
+ data.auth_pk = &ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey;
+ data.enc_kp = &ip->enc_key_kp;
+ data.subcredential = subcredential;
+ data.payload = payload;
+ data.payload_len = payload_len;
+ data.link_specifiers = smartlist_new();
+
+ if (hs_cell_parse_introduce2(&data, circ, service) < 0) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point, we just confirmed that the full INTRODUCE2 cell is valid
+ * so increment our counter that we've seen one on this intro point. */
+ ip->introduce2_count++;
+
+ /* Launch rendezvous circuit with the onion key and rend cookie. */
+ ret = hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(service, &data.onion_pk,
+ data.rendezvous_cookie);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Success. */
+ ret = 0;
+
+ done:
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(data.link_specifiers, link_specifier_t *, lspec,
+ link_specifier_free(lspec));
+ smartlist_free(data.link_specifiers);
+ memwipe(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Circuit circ just finished the rend ntor key exchange. Use the key
* exchange output material at ntor_key_seed and setup circ to
* serve as a rendezvous end-to-end circuit between the client and the
diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.h b/src/or/hs_circuit.h
index bc29781d8f..1cada0b8a6 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_circuit.h
+++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ int hs_circ_service_intro_has_opened(hs_service_t *service,
int hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service,
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
extend_info_t *ei, time_t now);
+int hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key,
+ const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie);
/* Cell API. */
void hs_circ_send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
@@ -33,6 +36,11 @@ int hs_circ_handle_intro_established(const hs_service_t *service,
origin_circuit_t *circ,
const uint8_t *payload,
size_t payload_len);
+int hs_circ_handle_introduce2(const hs_service_t *service,
+ const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
+ const uint8_t *subcredential,
+ const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len);
/* e2e circuit API. */
diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c
index 0b60a33ed1..83b8b507f0 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_service.c
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
/* Trunnel */
#include "ed25519_cert.h"
-#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
#include "hs/cell_common.h"
+#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
/* Helper macro. Iterate over every service in the global map. The var is the
* name of the service pointer. */
@@ -1845,10 +1845,85 @@ service_handle_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
return -1;
}
+/* Handle an INTRODUCE2 cell arriving on the given introduction circuit.
+ * Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
+static int
+service_handle_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ hs_service_t *service = NULL;
+ hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
+ hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+ tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
+
+ /* We'll need every object associated with this circuit. */
+ get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
+
+ /* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
+ if (service == NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown service identity key %s when handling "
+ "an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ip == NULL) {
+ /* We don't recognize the key. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown introduction auth key when handling "
+ "an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If we have an IP object, we MUST have a descriptor object. */
+ tor_assert(desc);
+
+ /* XXX: Handle legacy IP connection. */
+
+ if (hs_circ_handle_introduce2(service, circ, ip, desc->desc->subcredential,
+ payload, payload_len) < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
/* ========== */
/* Public API */
/* ========== */
+/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE2 cell on the circ. Respond to the cell and
+ * launch a circuit to the rendezvous point. */
+int
+hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(payload);
+
+ /* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRODUCE2 cell on a "
+ "non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = (circ->hs_ident) ? service_handle_introduce2(circ, payload,
+ payload_len) :
+ rend_service_receive_introduction(circ, payload,
+ payload_len);
+ done:
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell. Mark the circuit as an
* established introduction point. Return 0 on success else a negative value
* and the circuit is closed. */
diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.h b/src/or/hs_service.h
index 3de96d64e0..f12094a927 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_service.h
+++ b/src/or/hs_service.h
@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ void hs_service_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ);
int hs_service_receive_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
const uint8_t *payload,
size_t payload_len);
+int hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
+ size_t payload_len);
/* These functions are only used by unit tests and we need to expose them else
* hs_service.o ends up with no symbols in libor.a which makes clang throw a
diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c
index 2cd66cb9ce..8b555a3164 100644
--- a/src/or/rendcommon.c
+++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c
@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint,
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2:
if (origin_circ)
- r = rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circ,payload,length);
+ r = hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circ,payload,length);
break;
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK:
if (origin_circ)