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Remove workaround code for broken client-side renegotiation

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Since 11150 removed client-side support for renegotiation, we no
longer need to make sure we have an openssl/TLSvX combination that
supports it (client-side)
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2015-10-07 10:16:37 -04:00
parent 6505d529a5
commit 5bd3290df3
1 changed files with 0 additions and 17 deletions
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17
src/common/tortls.c
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@ -1124,23 +1124,6 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
* historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
/* Disable TLS1.1 and TLS1.2 if they exist. We need to do this to
* workaround a bug present in all OpenSSL 1.0.1 versions (as of 1
* June 2012), wherein renegotiating while using one of these TLS
* protocols will cause the client to send a TLS 1.0 ServerHello
* rather than a ServerHello written with the appropriate protocol
* version. Once some version of OpenSSL does TLS1.1 and TLS1.2
* renegotiation properly, we can turn them back on when built with
* that version. */
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,1,'e')
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2);
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1);
#endif
#endif
/* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them;
* using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
* create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them