From 565f5f32c5ab44bcffdc921d6e804a9f509d49d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>
Date: Sat, 8 Sep 2007 20:25:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH]  r14363@Kushana:  nickm | 2007-09-08 16:25:45 -0400  Another
 round of whitespeace fixes.

svn:r11407
---
 src/common/util.c | 8 ++++----
 src/or/control.c  | 7 +++----
 src/or/dirvote.c  | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index e0eeee282a..1b3f80a129 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -1263,8 +1263,8 @@ parse_http_time(const char *date, struct tm *tm)
  * model the user's computer as being "skewed" from accurate time by
  * -<b>ftime_skew</b> seconds, such that our best guess of the current time is
  * time(NULL)+ftime_skew.  We also assume that our measurements of time may
- * have up to <b>ftime_slop</b> seconds of inaccuracy; hence, the 
- * measurements;
+ * have up to <b>ftime_slop</b> seconds of inaccuracy; IOW, our window of
+ * estimate for the current time is now + ftime_skew +/- ftime_slop.
  */
 static int ftime_skew = 0;
 static int ftime_slop = 60;
@@ -1290,13 +1290,13 @@ ftime_get_window(time_t now, ftime_t *ft_out)
 int
 ftime_maybe_after(time_t now, time_t when)
 {
-  /* It may be after when iff the latest possible current time is after when. */
+  /* It may be after when iff the latest possible current time is after when */
   return (now + ftime_skew + ftime_slop) >= when;
 }
 int
 ftime_maybe_before(time_t now, time_t when)
 {
-  /* It may be before when iff the earliest possible current time is before. */
+  /* It may be before when iff the earliest possible current time is before */
   return (now + ftime_skew - ftime_slop) < when;
 }
 int
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index 83e5f70cbc..be2e360989 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -995,8 +995,8 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
     int also_password = options->HashedControlPassword != NULL;
     if (password_len != AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN) {
       if (!also_password) {
-        log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Got authentication cookie with wrong length (%d)",
-                 (int)password_len);
+        log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Got authentication cookie with wrong length "
+                 "(%d)", (int)password_len);
         errstr = "Wrong length on authentication cookie.";
         goto err;
       }
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ handle_control_authenticate(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len,
       if (!also_cookie) {
         log_warn(LD_CONTROL,
                  "Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword: invalid base16");
-        errstr ="Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword value in configuration.";
+        errstr="Couldn't decode HashedControlPassword value in configuration.";
       }
       bad_password = 1;
     } else {
@@ -1290,7 +1290,6 @@ munge_extrainfo_into_routerinfo(const char *ri_body, signed_descriptor_t *ri,
   return tor_strndup(ri_body, ri->signed_descriptor_len);
 }
 
-
 /** Implementation helper for GETINFO: knows the answers for questions about
  * directory information. */
 static int
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 6378e6966f..2642679821 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ const char dirvote_c_id[] =
 static int dirvote_add_signatures_to_pending_consensus(
                        const char *detached_signatures_body,
                        const char **msg_out);
-static char *list_v3_auth_ids(void); //XXXX020 nuke this.
+static char *list_v3_auth_ids(void);
 
 /* =====
  * Voting and consensus generation