mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
Merge branch 'maint-0.4.3'
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson
commit
553c36d153
5
changes/ticket33188
Normal file
5
changes/ticket33188
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
o Documentation (manpage):
|
||||
- Alphabetize the Server and Directory server sections of the tor
|
||||
manpage. Also split Statistics options into their own section
|
||||
of the manpage. Closes ticket 33188. Work by Swati Thacker as
|
||||
part of Google Season of Docs.
|
||||
636
doc/tor.1.txt
636
doc/tor.1.txt
@ -794,6 +794,11 @@ forward slash (/) in the configuration file and on the command line.
|
||||
fetches by the relay (from authority or other relays), because that is considered
|
||||
"client" activity. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
|
||||
that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
|
||||
changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
[[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
|
||||
on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
|
||||
@ -2060,9 +2065,58 @@ different from other Tor clients:
|
||||
|
||||
== SERVER OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
|
||||
// Please keep them that way!
|
||||
|
||||
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
|
||||
is non-zero):
|
||||
|
||||
[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
|
||||
Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period
|
||||
using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule).
|
||||
Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the
|
||||
number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or
|
||||
received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 TByte, a server
|
||||
could send 900 GBytes and receive 800 GBytes and continue running.
|
||||
It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. This can
|
||||
be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting
|
||||
the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the
|
||||
number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
|
||||
and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate
|
||||
until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers
|
||||
from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
|
||||
in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
|
||||
enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since
|
||||
it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some
|
||||
of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
|
||||
always "available". +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note that (as also described in the Bandwidth section) Tor uses
|
||||
powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024, not
|
||||
one billion. Be careful: some internet service providers might count
|
||||
GBytes differently.
|
||||
|
||||
[[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**::
|
||||
How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we
|
||||
should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate
|
||||
using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the
|
||||
default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent
|
||||
plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the
|
||||
received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes.
|
||||
(Default: max)
|
||||
|
||||
[[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
|
||||
Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given,
|
||||
each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
|
||||
month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed,
|
||||
use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The
|
||||
day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period
|
||||
runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day
|
||||
and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day**
|
||||
is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the
|
||||
same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.
|
||||
(Default: "month 1 0:00")
|
||||
|
||||
[[Address]] **Address** __address__::
|
||||
The IPv4 address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of
|
||||
this server that resolves to an IPv4 address. You can leave this
|
||||
@ -2088,6 +2142,15 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
Note: make sure that no MyFamily lines are present in your torrc when
|
||||
relay is configured in bridge mode.
|
||||
|
||||
//Out of order because it logically belongs after BridgeRelay.
|
||||
[[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
|
||||
GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client
|
||||
addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
|
||||
which countries have blocked access to it. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
|
||||
enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
//Out of order because it logically belongs after BridgeRelay.
|
||||
[[BridgeDistribution]] **BridgeDistribution** __string__::
|
||||
If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its
|
||||
bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it
|
||||
@ -2108,21 +2171,11 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
relay or bridge. (Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set
|
||||
it.)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a
|
||||
non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
|
||||
exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option,
|
||||
or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to exit, and the
|
||||
ExitPolicy, ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options are ignored. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy,
|
||||
ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options. If at least one of these options
|
||||
is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 1. If none of these exit
|
||||
policy options are set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 0.
|
||||
(Default: auto)
|
||||
[[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices
|
||||
that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default,
|
||||
since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections
|
||||
more than it should. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
||||
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
|
||||
@ -2205,12 +2258,6 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both
|
||||
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised
|
||||
public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy.
|
||||
See above entry on ExitPolicy.
|
||||
(Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces]] **ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the
|
||||
beginning of your exit policy. This includes any OutboundBindAddress, the
|
||||
@ -2223,6 +2270,168 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
to disclose.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised
|
||||
public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy.
|
||||
See above entry on ExitPolicy.
|
||||
(Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a
|
||||
non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to
|
||||
exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option,
|
||||
or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to exit, and the
|
||||
ExitPolicy, ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options are ignored. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy,
|
||||
ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options. If at least one of these options
|
||||
is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 1. If none of these exit
|
||||
policy options are set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 0.
|
||||
(Default: auto)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost,
|
||||
RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR
|
||||
connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private
|
||||
addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and
|
||||
pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this
|
||||
option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__::
|
||||
A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
|
||||
|
||||
[[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
|
||||
A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
|
||||
|
||||
[[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
|
||||
a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
|
||||
server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
|
||||
to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30
|
||||
minutes. (Default: 6 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
[[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 traffic.
|
||||
When this option is set and ExitRelay is auto, we act as if ExitRelay
|
||||
is 1. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__::
|
||||
Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
|
||||
running.
|
||||
(Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.)
|
||||
|
||||
[[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
|
||||
KeyDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable
|
||||
by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
|
||||
setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the KeyDirectory is the
|
||||
same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log
|
||||
level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's
|
||||
main event loop. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**::
|
||||
This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it
|
||||
needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of
|
||||
memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until
|
||||
it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too
|
||||
low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only
|
||||
affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than
|
||||
this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable
|
||||
default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
|
||||
If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
|
||||
this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
|
||||
Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
|
||||
organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
|
||||
their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
|
||||
This option can be repeated many times, for
|
||||
convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
|
||||
lines are merged into one list.
|
||||
When two relays both declare that they are in the
|
||||
same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
|
||||
relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
|
||||
list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
|
||||
compromise its concealment. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by
|
||||
nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay
|
||||
**must** list all other relays, as described above. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a
|
||||
brigde.
|
||||
|
||||
[[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__::
|
||||
Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
|
||||
characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
|
||||
If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified
|
||||
by their identity fingerprints.
|
||||
|
||||
[[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__::
|
||||
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
|
||||
parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
|
||||
how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret
|
||||
key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent
|
||||
ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary
|
||||
signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ORPort]] **ORPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
|
||||
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
||||
servers. This option is required to be a Tor server.
|
||||
Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not
|
||||
run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
|
||||
**NoAdvertise**;;
|
||||
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
|
||||
NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This
|
||||
can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
|
||||
example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
|
||||
**NoListen**;;
|
||||
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
|
||||
NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This
|
||||
can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port
|
||||
forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
|
||||
**IPv4Only**;;
|
||||
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
|
||||
address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
|
||||
**IPv6Only**;;
|
||||
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
|
||||
address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
|
||||
|
||||
// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
|
||||
[[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]::
|
||||
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
|
||||
IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
|
||||
|
||||
[[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
|
||||
This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
|
||||
a relay. You can
|
||||
choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
|
||||
descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
|
||||
out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
|
||||
directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
|
||||
descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
|
||||
means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the
|
||||
appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning
|
||||
"publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as
|
||||
if you're a bridge".
|
||||
|
||||
[[ReducedExitPolicy]] **ReducedExitPolicy** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If set, use a reduced exit policy rather than the default one. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
@ -2316,161 +2525,6 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 traffic.
|
||||
When this option is set and ExitRelay is auto, we act as if ExitRelay
|
||||
is 1. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
|
||||
If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in
|
||||
this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...::
|
||||
Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or
|
||||
organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by
|
||||
their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints.
|
||||
This option can be repeated many times, for
|
||||
convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily
|
||||
lines are merged into one list.
|
||||
When two relays both declare that they are in the
|
||||
same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each
|
||||
relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to
|
||||
list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would
|
||||
compromise its concealment. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by
|
||||
nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay
|
||||
**must** list all other relays, as described above. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a
|
||||
brigde.
|
||||
|
||||
[[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__::
|
||||
Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
|
||||
characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
|
||||
If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified
|
||||
by their identity fingerprints.
|
||||
|
||||
[[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__::
|
||||
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
|
||||
parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
|
||||
how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ORPort]] **ORPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
|
||||
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
||||
servers. This option is required to be a Tor server.
|
||||
Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not
|
||||
run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
|
||||
**NoAdvertise**;;
|
||||
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
|
||||
NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This
|
||||
can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
|
||||
example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
|
||||
**NoListen**;;
|
||||
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
|
||||
NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This
|
||||
can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port
|
||||
forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
|
||||
**IPv4Only**;;
|
||||
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
|
||||
address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
|
||||
**IPv6Only**;;
|
||||
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
|
||||
address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
|
||||
|
||||
// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page.
|
||||
[[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]::
|
||||
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
|
||||
IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
|
||||
|
||||
[[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
|
||||
This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
|
||||
a relay. You can
|
||||
choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
|
||||
descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
|
||||
out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
|
||||
directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its
|
||||
descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which
|
||||
means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the
|
||||
appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning
|
||||
"publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as
|
||||
if you're a bridge".
|
||||
|
||||
[[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
|
||||
When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
|
||||
we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
|
||||
seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
|
||||
(Default: 30 seconds)
|
||||
|
||||
[[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake,
|
||||
set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose
|
||||
some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
|
||||
a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
|
||||
server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
|
||||
to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30
|
||||
minutes. (Default: 6 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log
|
||||
level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's
|
||||
main event loop. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**::
|
||||
Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period
|
||||
using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule).
|
||||
Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the
|
||||
number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or
|
||||
received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 TByte, a server
|
||||
could send 900 GBytes and receive 800 GBytes and continue running.
|
||||
It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. This can
|
||||
be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting
|
||||
the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the
|
||||
number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections
|
||||
and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate
|
||||
until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers
|
||||
from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point
|
||||
in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
|
||||
enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since
|
||||
it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some
|
||||
of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
|
||||
always "available". +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note that (as also described in the Bandwidth section) Tor uses
|
||||
powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024, not
|
||||
one billion. Be careful: some internet service providers might count
|
||||
GBytes differently.
|
||||
|
||||
[[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**::
|
||||
How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we
|
||||
should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate
|
||||
using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the
|
||||
default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent
|
||||
plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the
|
||||
received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes.
|
||||
(Default: max)
|
||||
|
||||
[[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
|
||||
Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given,
|
||||
each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
|
||||
month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed,
|
||||
use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The
|
||||
day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period
|
||||
runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day
|
||||
and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day**
|
||||
is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the
|
||||
same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.
|
||||
(Default: "month 1 0:00")
|
||||
|
||||
[[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this
|
||||
relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such
|
||||
@ -2478,41 +2532,12 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus
|
||||
is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
|
||||
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
|
||||
__filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
|
||||
"**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
|
||||
only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
|
||||
(Defaults to use the system DNS configuration or a localhost DNS service
|
||||
in case no nameservers are found in a given configuration.)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
|
||||
parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
|
||||
Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
|
||||
it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
|
||||
For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
|
||||
"example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
|
||||
connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
|
||||
your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
|
||||
whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
|
||||
requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
|
||||
correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
||||
on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__::
|
||||
When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
|
||||
aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
|
||||
and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject \*:*". This option only affects
|
||||
name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
|
||||
"www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
|
||||
containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
|
||||
@ -2520,12 +2545,12 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
||||
on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
|
||||
GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client
|
||||
addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
|
||||
which countries have blocked access to it. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
|
||||
enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
|
||||
[[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
|
||||
whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
|
||||
requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
|
||||
correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
||||
on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
|
||||
@ -2535,11 +2560,54 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
|
||||
does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__::
|
||||
A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
|
||||
[[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
|
||||
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
|
||||
__filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
|
||||
"**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
|
||||
only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
|
||||
(Defaults to use the system DNS configuration or a localhost DNS service
|
||||
in case no nameservers are found in a given configuration.)
|
||||
|
||||
[[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__::
|
||||
A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics.
|
||||
[[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
|
||||
For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
|
||||
"example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
|
||||
connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
|
||||
your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__::
|
||||
When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
|
||||
aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
|
||||
and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject \*:*". This option only affects
|
||||
name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default:
|
||||
"www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org")
|
||||
|
||||
[[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
|
||||
When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
|
||||
we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
|
||||
seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.
|
||||
(Default: 30 seconds)
|
||||
|
||||
[[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
|
||||
For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a
|
||||
permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically
|
||||
generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option
|
||||
configures their lifetime.
|
||||
(Default: 30 days)
|
||||
|
||||
[[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake,
|
||||
set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose
|
||||
some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
== STATISTICS OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.
|
||||
// Please keep them that way!
|
||||
|
||||
Relays publish most statistics in a document called the
|
||||
extra-info document. The following options affect the different
|
||||
types of statistics that Tor relays collect and publish:
|
||||
|
||||
[[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays only.
|
||||
@ -2551,14 +2619,14 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of
|
||||
extra-info document. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays and bridges only.
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
|
||||
sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
|
||||
These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
|
||||
information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
|
||||
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
|
||||
as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
|
||||
[[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays only.
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of
|
||||
traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24
|
||||
hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is
|
||||
being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
|
||||
enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays and bridges only.
|
||||
@ -2587,23 +2655,6 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
is enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays only.
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of
|
||||
traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24
|
||||
hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is
|
||||
being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is
|
||||
enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays only.
|
||||
When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated
|
||||
statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction
|
||||
point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If
|
||||
ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further
|
||||
published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
|
||||
its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
|
||||
@ -2613,61 +2664,22 @@ is non-zero):
|
||||
because they are required by BridgeDB.
|
||||
(Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost,
|
||||
RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR
|
||||
connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private
|
||||
addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and
|
||||
pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this
|
||||
option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**::
|
||||
This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it
|
||||
needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of
|
||||
memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until
|
||||
it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too
|
||||
low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only
|
||||
affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than
|
||||
this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable
|
||||
default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices
|
||||
that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default,
|
||||
since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections
|
||||
more than it should. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**::
|
||||
For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a
|
||||
permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically
|
||||
generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option
|
||||
configures their lifetime.
|
||||
(Default: 30 days)
|
||||
|
||||
[[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret
|
||||
key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent
|
||||
ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary
|
||||
signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__::
|
||||
Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is
|
||||
running.
|
||||
(Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.)
|
||||
|
||||
[[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
|
||||
KeyDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable
|
||||
by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the
|
||||
setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the KeyDirectory is the
|
||||
same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto)
|
||||
|
||||
[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
|
||||
that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
|
||||
changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
|
||||
[[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays only.
|
||||
When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated
|
||||
statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction
|
||||
point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If
|
||||
ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further
|
||||
published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
Relays and bridges only.
|
||||
When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells
|
||||
sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts.
|
||||
These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This
|
||||
information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding.
|
||||
If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published
|
||||
as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
== DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2675,11 +2687,19 @@ The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with
|
||||
enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see DirCache for
|
||||
details.)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
|
||||
When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
|
||||
the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
|
||||
to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
|
||||
contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.
|
||||
[[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except
|
||||
extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If
|
||||
**DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached.
|
||||
Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients
|
||||
connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay
|
||||
and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
||||
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
||||
directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
|
||||
except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by
|
||||
some entry in the policy is accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
[[DirPort]] **DirPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]::
|
||||
If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.
|
||||
@ -2689,19 +2709,11 @@ details.)
|
||||
+
|
||||
The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
|
||||
|
||||
[[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
||||
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
||||
directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above,
|
||||
except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by
|
||||
some entry in the policy is accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
[[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except
|
||||
extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If
|
||||
**DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached.
|
||||
Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients
|
||||
connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay
|
||||
and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1)
|
||||
[[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
|
||||
When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
|
||||
the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
|
||||
to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
|
||||
contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html.
|
||||
|
||||
[[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user