mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-24 04:13:28 +01:00
Dir auths reject relays running < Tor 0.1.2.14
Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than 0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network, none of which are very big.
This commit is contained in:
parent
f7e6e852e8
commit
53a7636a05
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
Changes in version 0.2.2.4-alpha - 2009-??-??
|
||||
o Major bugfixes:
|
||||
- Fix another assert in the circuit_build_times code that causes Tor
|
||||
to fail to start once we have accumulated 5000 build times in the
|
||||
state file. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes bug 1108.
|
||||
to fail to start once we have accumulated 5000 build times in the
|
||||
state file. Bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes bug 1108.
|
||||
|
||||
o Minor features:
|
||||
- Log SSL state transitions at debug level during handshake, and
|
||||
@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.4-alpha - 2009-??-??
|
||||
during the TLS handshake.
|
||||
- Revert to the "June 3 2009" ip-to-country file. The September one
|
||||
seems to have removed most US IP addresses.
|
||||
- Directory authorities now reject Tor relays with versions less than
|
||||
0.1.2.14. This step cuts out four relays from the current network,
|
||||
none of which are very big.
|
||||
|
||||
o Code simplifications and refactoring:
|
||||
- Revise our unit tests to use the "tinytest" framework, so we
|
||||
|
@ -371,10 +371,10 @@ dirserv_get_status_impl(const char *id_digest, const char *nickname,
|
||||
strmap_size(fingerprint_list->fp_by_name),
|
||||
digestmap_size(fingerprint_list->status_by_digest));
|
||||
|
||||
/* 0.1.1.17-rc was the first version that claimed to be stable, doesn't
|
||||
* crash and drop circuits all the time, and is even vaguely compatible with
|
||||
* the current network */
|
||||
if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.1.1.17-rc")) {
|
||||
/* Tor 0.1.2.x is pretty old, but there are a lot of them running still,
|
||||
* and there aren't any critical relay-side vulnerabilities. Once more
|
||||
* of them die off, we should raise this minimum to 0.2.0.x. */
|
||||
if (platform && !tor_version_as_new_as(platform,"0.1.2.14")) {
|
||||
if (msg)
|
||||
*msg = "Tor version is far too old to work.";
|
||||
return FP_REJECT;
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user