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Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-gitlab/mr/189' into maint-0.3.5
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commit
52e439c13e
6
changes/bug40080
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6
changes/bug40080
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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o Minor bugfixes (security):
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- When completing a channel, relays now check more thoroughly to make
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sure that it matches any pending circuits before attaching those
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circuits. Previously, address correctness and Ed25519 identities were not
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checked in this case, but only when extending circuits on an existing
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channel. Fixes bug 40080; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
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@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ channel_find_by_global_id(uint64_t global_identifier)
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/** Return true iff <b>chan</b> matches <b>rsa_id_digest</b> and <b>ed_id</b>.
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* as its identity keys. If either is NULL, do not check for a match. */
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static int
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int
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channel_remote_identity_matches(const channel_t *chan,
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const char *rsa_id_digest,
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const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
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@ -738,6 +738,9 @@ int channel_is_outgoing(channel_t *chan);
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void channel_mark_client(channel_t *chan);
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void channel_clear_client(channel_t *chan);
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int channel_matches_extend_info(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info);
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int channel_remote_identity_matches(const channel_t *chan,
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const char *rsa_id_digest,
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const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id);
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int channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(channel_t *chan,
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const tor_addr_t *target);
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unsigned int channel_num_circuits(channel_t *chan);
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@ -623,21 +623,37 @@ circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status, int close_origin_circuits)
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circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT)
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continue;
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if (tor_digest_is_zero(circ->n_hop->identity_digest)) {
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const char *rsa_ident = NULL;
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const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_ident = NULL;
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if (! tor_digest_is_zero(circ->n_hop->identity_digest)) {
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rsa_ident = circ->n_hop->identity_digest;
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}
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if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&circ->n_hop->ed_identity)) {
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ed_ident = &circ->n_hop->ed_identity;
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}
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if (rsa_ident == NULL && ed_ident == NULL) {
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/* Look at addr/port. This is an unkeyed connection. */
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if (!channel_matches_extend_info(chan, circ->n_hop))
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continue;
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} else {
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/* We expected a key. See if it's the right one. */
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if (tor_memneq(chan->identity_digest,
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circ->n_hop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
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/* We expected a key or keys. See if they matched. */
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if (!channel_remote_identity_matches(chan, rsa_ident, ed_ident))
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continue;
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/* If the channel is canonical, great. If not, it needs to match
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* the requested address exactly. */
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if (! chan->is_canonical &&
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! channel_matches_extend_info(chan, circ->n_hop)) {
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continue;
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}
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}
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if (!status) { /* chan failed; close circ */
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"Channel failed; closing circ.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED);
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continue;
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}
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if (close_origin_circuits && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"Channel deprecated for origin circs; closing circ.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED);
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