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fix typos and trivial syntax problems
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@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.9.3-alpha - 2016-09-23
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o Major bugfixes (circuit building):
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- Hidden service client-to-intro-point and service-to-rendezvous-
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point cicruits use the TAP key supplied by the protocol, to avoid
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point circuits use the TAP key supplied by the protocol, to avoid
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epistemic attacks. Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc.
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o Major bugfixes (compilation, OpenBSD):
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@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ sandbox_getaddrinfo(const char *name, const char *servname,
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return err;
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}
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/* Otherwise, the sanbox is on. If we have an item, yield its cached
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/* Otherwise, the sandbox is on. If we have an item, yield its cached
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result. */
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if (item) {
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*res = item->res;
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@ -2127,7 +2127,7 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
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* will have to launch one!
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*/
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/* THe chosen exit node, if there is one. */
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/* The chosen exit node, if there is one. */
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extend_info_t *extend_info=NULL;
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const int n_pending = count_pending_general_client_circuits();
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@ -2430,8 +2430,8 @@ using_default_dir_authorities(const or_options_t *options)
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* Fail if one or more of the following is true:
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* - DNS name in <b>options-\>Address</b> cannot be resolved.
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* - <b>options-\>Address</b> is a local host address.
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* - Attempt to getting local hostname fails.
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* - Attempt to getting network interface address fails.
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* - Attempt at getting local hostname fails.
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* - Attempt at getting network interface address fails.
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*
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* Return 0 if all is well, or -1 if we can't find a suitable
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* public IP address.
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@ -2811,7 +2811,7 @@ compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_options_t *options)
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#define MIN_REND_POST_PERIOD (10*60)
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#define MIN_REND_POST_PERIOD_TESTING (5)
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/** Higest allowable value for PredictedPortsRelevanceTime; if this is
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/** Highest allowable value for PredictedPortsRelevanceTime; if this is
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* too high, our selection of exits will decrease for an extended
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* period of time to an uncomfortable level .*/
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#define MAX_PREDICTED_CIRCS_RELEVANCE (60*60)
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@ -2954,12 +2954,12 @@ options_validate_single_onion(or_options_t *options, char **msg)
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REJECT("Non-anonymous (Tor2web) mode is incompatible with using Tor as a "
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"hidden service. Please remove all HiddenServiceDir lines, or use "
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"a version of tor compiled without --enable-tor2web-mode, or use "
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" HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode.");
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"HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode.");
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}
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if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options)
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&& options->UseEntryGuards) {
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/* Single Onion services only use entry guards when uploading descriptors,
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/* Single Onion services only use entry guards when uploading descriptors;
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* all other connections are one-hop. Further, Single Onions causes the
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* hidden service code to do things which break the path bias
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* detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and
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@ -3002,7 +3002,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
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*msg = NULL;
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/* Set UseEntryGuards from the configured value, before we check it below.
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* We change UseEntryGuards whenn it's incompatible with other options,
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* We change UseEntryGuards when it's incompatible with other options,
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* but leave UseEntryGuards_option with the original value.
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* Always use the value of UseEntryGuards, not UseEntryGuards_option. */
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options->UseEntryGuards = options->UseEntryGuards_option;
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@ -1638,7 +1638,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
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return -1;
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}
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/* You can't make connections to internal addresses, by default.
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* Exceptions are begindir requests (where the address is meaningless,
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* Exceptions are begindir requests (where the address is meaningless),
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* or cases where you've hand-configured a particular exit, thereby
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* making the local address meaningful. */
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if (options->ClientRejectInternalAddresses &&
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@ -3209,7 +3209,7 @@ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr,
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if (!authdir_mode_bridge(get_options()) ||
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ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
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char addrstr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
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/* This is a bridge or we're not a bridge authorititative --
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/* This is a bridge or we're not a bridge authority --
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mark it as reachable. */
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log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Found router %s to be reachable at %s:%d. Yay.",
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router_describe(ri),
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@ -4533,7 +4533,7 @@ typedef struct {
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* XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */
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int ExitRelay;
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/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our singning keys to be valid? */
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/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */
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int SigningKeyLifetime;
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/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */
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int TestingLinkCertLifetime;
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@ -4585,7 +4585,7 @@ router_exit_policy_rejects_all(const routerinfo_t *router)
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return router->policy_is_reject_star;
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}
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/** Create an directory server at <b>address</b>:<b>port</b>, with OR identity
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/** Create a directory server at <b>address</b>:<b>port</b>, with OR identity
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* key <b>digest</b> which has DIGEST_LEN bytes. If <b>address</b> is NULL,
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* add ourself. If <b>is_authority</b>, this is a directory authority. Return
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* the new directory server entry on success or NULL on failure. */
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