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clean up the china section

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svn:r3460
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Roger Dingledine 2005-01-29 22:30:44 +00:00
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doc/design-paper/challenges.tex
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@ -782,37 +782,37 @@ designed with ubiquitous access to the network in mind, thousands of
users across the world are trying to use it for exactly this purpose.
% Academic and NGO organizations, peacefire, \cite{berkman}, etc
Anti-censorship networks designed to bridge country-level blocks face
a variety of challenges. One of these is that they need to find a set
of exit nodes---servers on the `free' side that are willing to relay
arbitrary traffic from users to their final destination. Anonymizing
Anti-censorship networks hoping to bridge country-level blocks face
a variety of challenges. One of these is that they need to find enough
exit nodes---servers on the `free' side that are willing to relay
arbitrary traffic from users to their final destinations. Anonymizing
networks including Tor are well-suited to this task, since we have
already gathered a set of exit nodes that are willing to tolerate some
political heat.
The other main challenge is how to distribute a list of reachable relays
The other main challenge is to distribute a list of reachable relays
to the users inside the country, and give them software to use them,
without letting the authorities also enumerate this list and block each
relay. Anonymizer solves this by buying lots of seemingly-unrelated IP
addresses (or having them donated), and tells a few users about the new
addresses, abandoning old ones that have been `used up'. Distributed
addresses (or having them donated), abandoning old addresses as they are
`used up', and telling a few users about the new ones. Distributed
anonymizing networks again have an advantage here, in that we already
have tens of thousands of separate IP addresses whose users might
volunteer to provide this service now that they've installed and use
volunteer to provide this service since they've already installed and use
the software for their own privacy~\cite{koepsell-wpes2004}. Because
the Tor protocol separates routing from network discovery (see Section
\ref{do-we-discuss-this?}), volunteers could configure their Tor clients
to generate server descriptors and send them to a special directory
server that gives them out to dissidents who need to get around blocks.
Of course, this passes the buck in terms of preventing the adversary
Of course, this still doesn't prevent the adversary
from enumerating all the volunteer relays and blocking them preemptively.
Perhaps a tiered-trust system could be built where a few individuals are
given relay IPs, and they recommend other individuals by telling them
given relays' locations, and they recommend other individuals by telling them
those addresses, thus providing a built-in incentive to avoid letting the
adversary learn the addresses. Max-flow trust algorithms~\cite{advogato}
might help to bound the number of IPs leaked to the adversary. Groups
like the W3C are looking into using Tor as a component in a system to
adversary intercept them. Max-flow trust algorithms~\cite{advogato}
might help to bound the number of IP addresses leaked to the adversary. Groups
like the W3C are looking into using Tor as a component in an overall system to
help address censorship; we wish them luck.
%\cite{infranet}