Look up the rend circ whose INTRODUCE1 is being ACKed correctly

This change cannibalizes circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose because it
had exactly one caller.
This commit is contained in:
Robert Ransom 2011-12-22 07:15:24 -08:00
parent 66f77561c0
commit 4c3a23b283
4 changed files with 30 additions and 13 deletions

14
changes/bug4759 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
- Make sure we never mark the wrong rendezvous circuit as having
had its introduction cell acknowleged by the introduction-point
relay. Previously, when we received an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on a
client-side hidden-service introduction circuit, we might have
marked a rendezvous circuit other than the one we specified in
the INTRODUCE1 cell as INTRO_ACKED, which would have produced a
warning message and interfered with the hidden service
connection-establishment process. Bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha, when
the stream-isolation feature which might cause Tor to open
multiple rendezvous circuits for the same hidden service was
added. Fixes bug 4759.

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@ -873,26 +873,30 @@ circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason)
}
}
/** Return a circ such that:
* - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to <b>rend_query</b>, and
* - circ-\>purpose is equal to <b>purpose</b>.
/** Return a circ such that
* - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to
* <b>rend_data</b>-\>onion_address,
* - circ-\>rend_data-\>rend_cookie is equal to
* <b>rend_data</b>-\>rend_cookie, and
* - circ-\>purpose is equal to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY.
*
* Return NULL if no such circuit exists.
*/
origin_circuit_t *
circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query, uint8_t purpose)
circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data)
{
circuit_t *circ;
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(purpose));
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
circ->purpose == purpose) {
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (ocirc->rend_data &&
!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query,
ocirc->rend_data->onion_address))
!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data->onion_address,
ocirc->rend_data->onion_address) &&
tor_memeq(ocirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
rend_data->rend_cookie,
REND_COOKIE_LEN))
return ocirc;
}
}

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@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ int circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn);
circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn);
void circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason);
origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id);
origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query,
uint8_t purpose);
origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(
const rend_data_t *rend_data);
origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start,
const char *digest, uint8_t purpose);
or_circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const char *cookie);

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@ -350,8 +350,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
* and tell it.
*/
log_info(LD_REND,"Received ack. Telling rend circ...");
rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(
circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
rendcirc = circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(circ->rend_data);
if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));