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Look up the rend circ whose INTRODUCE1 is being ACKed correctly
This change cannibalizes circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose because it had exactly one caller.
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14
changes/bug4759
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14
changes/bug4759
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Make sure we never mark the wrong rendezvous circuit as having
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had its introduction cell acknowleged by the introduction-point
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relay. Previously, when we received an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on a
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client-side hidden-service introduction circuit, we might have
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marked a rendezvous circuit other than the one we specified in
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the INTRODUCE1 cell as INTRO_ACKED, which would have produced a
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warning message and interfered with the hidden service
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connection-establishment process. Bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha, when
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the stream-isolation feature which might cause Tor to open
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multiple rendezvous circuits for the same hidden service was
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added. Fixes bug 4759.
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@ -873,26 +873,30 @@ circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason)
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}
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}
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/** Return a circ such that:
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* - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to <b>rend_query</b>, and
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* - circ-\>purpose is equal to <b>purpose</b>.
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/** Return a circ such that
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* - circ-\>rend_data-\>onion_address is equal to
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* <b>rend_data</b>-\>onion_address,
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* - circ-\>rend_data-\>rend_cookie is equal to
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* <b>rend_data</b>-\>rend_cookie, and
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* - circ-\>purpose is equal to CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY.
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*
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* Return NULL if no such circuit exists.
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*/
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origin_circuit_t *
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circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query, uint8_t purpose)
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circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data)
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{
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circuit_t *circ;
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tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(purpose));
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for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
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if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
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circ->purpose == purpose) {
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circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {
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origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
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if (ocirc->rend_data &&
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!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_query,
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ocirc->rend_data->onion_address))
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!rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data->onion_address,
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ocirc->rend_data->onion_address) &&
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tor_memeq(ocirc->rend_data->rend_cookie,
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rend_data->rend_cookie,
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REND_COOKIE_LEN))
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return ocirc;
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}
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}
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@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ int circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn);
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circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn);
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void circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason);
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origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id);
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origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(const char *rend_query,
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uint8_t purpose);
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origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(
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const rend_data_t *rend_data);
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origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start,
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const char *digest, uint8_t purpose);
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or_circuit_t *circuit_get_rendezvous(const char *cookie);
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@ -350,8 +350,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
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* and tell it.
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*/
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log_info(LD_REND,"Received ack. Telling rend circ...");
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rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(
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circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
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rendcirc = circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(circ->rend_data);
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if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
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#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
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tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
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