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Section on peer-to-peer bandwidth estimation
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@ -76,6 +76,17 @@ For example, an attacker who wishes to monitor traffic could create several node
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A Tor client trying to minimize latency would be more likely to select these nodes for both entry than exit than it would otherwise.
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This particular problem could be mitigated by selecting entry and exit node as normal, and only using latency measurements to select the middle node.
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\section{Peer-to-peer bandwidth estimation}
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Snader and Borisov proposed that each Tor node opportunistically monitor the data rates that it achieves when communicating with other Tor nodes.
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Since currently Tor uses a clique topology, given enough time, all nodes will communicate with all other Tor nodes.
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If each Tor node reported their measurements back to a central authority, it would be possible to estimate the capacity of each Tor node.
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This estimate would be difficult to game, when compared to the current self-advertisement of bandwidth capacity.
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Experiments show that opportunistic bandwidth measurement has a better systematic error than Tor's current self-advertised measure, although has a poorer log-log correlation (0.48 vs. 0.57).
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The most accurate scheme is active probing of capacity, with a log-log correlation of 0.63, but this introduces network overhead.
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All three schemes do suffer from fairly poor accuracy, presumably due to some nodes with high variance in bandwidth capacity.
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\section{Considering exit policy in node selection}
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When selecting an exit node for a circuit, a Tor client will build a list of all exit nodes which can carry the desired stream, then select from them with a probability weighted by each node's capacity\footnote{The actual algorithm is slightly more complex, in particular exit nodes which are also guard nodes will be weighted less, and there is also preemptive circuit creation}.
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