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Space fixes.

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This commit is contained in:
Mike Perry 2012-12-09 23:47:04 -08:00
parent b75880d7b3
commit 4590993ff3
9 changed files with 36 additions and 31 deletions
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38
src/or/circuitbuild.c
View File

@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ)
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER ||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND ||
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED ||
(circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
(circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) {
return 0;
}
@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
return;
}
/* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias
/* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias
* build success.. They get counted under use success */
if (!circ->has_opened) {
if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) {
@ -1456,14 +1456,14 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
} else if ((reason & ~END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE)
== END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED &&
circ->n_chan &&
circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing
circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing
!= CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED) {
/* If we didn't close the channel ourselves, it could be bias */
/* FIXME: Only count bias if the network is live?
* What about clock jumps/suspends? */
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Circuit %d's channel closed without successful use for reason %d, "
"channel reason %d. Circuit purpose %d currently %s.",
"Circuit %d's channel closed without successful use for reason "
"%d, channel reason %d. Circuit purpose %d currently %s.",
ocirc->global_identifier,
reason, circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing,
circ->purpose, circuit_state_to_string(circ->state));
@ -1494,7 +1494,7 @@ pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
if (guard) {
/* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
/* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
* circ_failure + stream_failure */
guard->successful_circuits_closed++;
entry_guards_changed();
@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
/**
* Count a circuit that fails after it is built, but before it can
* Count a circuit that fails after it is built, but before it can
* carry any traffic.
*
* This is needed because there are ways to destroy a
@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
if(!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info)
if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info)
continue;
if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED &&
@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
* if it should return guard->circ_successes or
* guard->successful_circuits_closed.
*/
double
double
pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
if (pathbias_use_close_counts(get_options())) {
@ -1680,8 +1680,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
(int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
(int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
(int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
guard->path_bias_disabled = 1;
@ -1698,8 +1699,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
(int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
(int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
(int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
}
@ -1716,8 +1718,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
(int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
(int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
(int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
}
@ -1732,8 +1735,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
(int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
(int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
(int)guard->unusable_circuits,
(int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
}

1
src/or/circuitbuild.h
View File

@ -59,3 +59,4 @@ void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ);
void pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason);
#endif

6
src/or/circuitlist.c
View File

@ -1040,9 +1040,9 @@ circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason)
if (circ->n_chan == chan) {
circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, 0, NULL);
mark = 1;
/* If we didn't request this closure, pass the remote
* bit to mark_for_close. */
* bit to mark_for_close. */
if (chan->reason_for_closing != CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED)
reason |= END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE;
}
@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
}
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
}
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
pathbias_check_close(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), reason);

4
src/or/circuituse.c
View File

@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0);
/* Cannibalized circuits count as used for path bias.
* (PURPOSE_GENERAL circs especially, since they are
* (PURPOSE_GENERAL circs especially, since they are
* marked dirty and often go unused after preemptive
* building). */
// XXX: Cannibalized now use RELAY_EARLY, which is visible
@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) {
/* Path bias: Cannibalized rends pre-emptively count as a
* successfully used circ. We don't wait until the extend,
* because the rend point could be malicious.
* because the rend point could be malicious.
*
* Same deal goes for client side introductions. Clients
* can be manipulated to connect repeatedly to them

6
src/or/connection_edge.c
View File

@ -2184,13 +2184,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET ||
endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE ||
endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) {
if(!conn->edge_.on_circuit ||
if (!conn->edge_.on_circuit ||
!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->edge_.on_circuit)) {
// DNS remaps can trigger this. So can failed hidden service
// lookups.
log_info(LD_BUG,
"(Harmless.) No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream %ld. "
"Reason: %d", ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier, endreason);
"No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream %ld. Reason: "
"%d", ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier, endreason);
} else {
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(conn->edge_.on_circuit)->path_state
= PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;

4
src/or/entrynodes.c
View File

@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
}
/* First try 3 params, then 2. */
/* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
/* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
* collapsed_circuits +
* unusable_circuits */
if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%lf %lf %lf %lf %lf %lf",
@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
if (e->circ_attempts) {
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathBias");
/* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
/* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
* collapsed_circuits +
* unusable_circuits */
tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%lf %lf %lf %lf %lf %lf",

2
src/or/entrynodes.h
View File

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ typedef struct entry_guard_t {
double collapsed_circuits; /**< Number of fully built circuits that were
* remotely closed before any streams were
* attempted. */
double unusable_circuits; /**< Number of circuits for which streams were
double unusable_circuits; /**< Number of circuits for which streams were
* attempted, but none succeeded. */
double timeouts; /**< Number of 'right-censored' circuit timeouts for this
* guard. */

2
src/or/relay.c
View File

@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
(void) layer_hint; /* unused */
if (rh->length > 0) {
/* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit,
/* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit,
* it wasn't due to tagging */
// XXX: This relies on recognized+digest being strong enough not
// to be spoofable.. Is that a valid assumption?

4
src/or/rendservice.c
View File

@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0)
goto err;
memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
/* For path bias: This intro circuit was used successfully */
circuit->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
/* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias */
if(!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
hop = circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath;