diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 349063d325..a724006b28 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ)
           circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER ||
           circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND ||
           circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED ||
-          (circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && 
+          (circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
            circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
     return;
   }
 
-  /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias 
+  /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias
    * build success.. They get counted under use success */
   if (!circ->has_opened) {
     if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) {
@@ -1456,14 +1456,14 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
       } else if ((reason & ~END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE)
                   == END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED &&
                  circ->n_chan &&
-                 circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing 
+                 circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing
                   != CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED) {
         /* If we didn't close the channel ourselves, it could be bias */
         /* FIXME: Only count bias if the network is live?
          * What about clock jumps/suspends? */
         log_info(LD_CIRC,
-            "Circuit %d's channel closed without successful use for reason %d, "
-            "channel reason %d. Circuit purpose %d currently %s.",
+            "Circuit %d's channel closed without successful use for reason "
+            "%d, channel reason %d. Circuit purpose %d currently %s.",
             ocirc->global_identifier,
             reason, circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing,
             circ->purpose, circuit_state_to_string(circ->state));
@@ -1494,7 +1494,7 @@ pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ)
   }
 
   if (guard) {
-    /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + 
+    /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
      *                                     circ_failure + stream_failure */
     guard->successful_circuits_closed++;
     entry_guards_changed();
@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ)
 }
 
 /**
- * Count a circuit that fails after it is built, but before it can 
+ * Count a circuit that fails after it is built, but before it can
  * carry any traffic.
  *
  * This is needed because there are ways to destroy a
@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
 
     ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
 
-    if(!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info)
+    if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info)
       continue;
 
     if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED &&
@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
  * if it should return guard->circ_successes or
  * guard->successful_circuits_closed.
  */
-double 
+double
 pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
 {
   if (pathbias_use_close_counts(get_options())) {
@@ -1680,8 +1680,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
                  "were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
                  "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
                  guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
-                 (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
-                 (int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
+                 (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
+                 (int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
+                 (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
                  (int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
                  (long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
           guard->path_bias_disabled = 1;
@@ -1698,8 +1699,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
                  "were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
                  "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
                  guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
-                 (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
-                 (int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
+                 (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
+                 (int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
+                 (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
                  (int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
                  (long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
       }
@@ -1716,8 +1718,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
                  "were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
                  "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
                  guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
-                 (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
-                 (int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
+                 (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
+                 (int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
+                 (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
                  (int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
                  (long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
       }
@@ -1732,8 +1735,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
                    "were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
                    "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
                    guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
-                   (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), (int)guard->circ_attempts,
-                   (int)guard->circ_successes, (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
+                   (int)pathbias_get_closed_count(guard),
+                   (int)guard->circ_attempts, (int)guard->circ_successes,
+                   (int)guard->unusable_circuits,
                    (int)guard->collapsed_circuits, (int)guard->timeouts,
                    (long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
       }
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
index 53c9fe5c0f..8cd61fae2d 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
@@ -59,3 +59,4 @@ void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ);
 void pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason);
 
 #endif
+
diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c
index 6fab4920ae..0ee29000ed 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitlist.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c
@@ -1040,9 +1040,9 @@ circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason)
     if (circ->n_chan == chan) {
       circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, 0, NULL);
       mark = 1;
-    
+
       /* If we didn't request this closure, pass the remote
-       * bit to mark_for_close. */ 
+       * bit to mark_for_close. */
       if (chan->reason_for_closing != CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED)
         reason |= END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE;
     }
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ circuit_mark_for_close_(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line,
     }
     reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
   }
-  
+
   if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
     pathbias_check_close(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), reason);
 
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index 381c2b01cb..d3b480139e 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
   control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0);
 
   /* Cannibalized circuits count as used for path bias.
-   * (PURPOSE_GENERAL circs especially, since they are 
+   * (PURPOSE_GENERAL circs especially, since they are
    * marked dirty and often go unused after preemptive
    * building). */
   // XXX: Cannibalized now use RELAY_EARLY, which is visible
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
           circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) {
         /* Path bias: Cannibalized rends pre-emptively count as a
          * successfully used circ. We don't wait until the extend,
-         * because the rend point could be malicious. 
+         * because the rend point could be malicious.
          *
          * Same deal goes for client side introductions. Clients
          * can be manipulated to connect repeatedly to them
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index ca6060ca57..570ffe4941 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -2184,13 +2184,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
       endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET ||
       endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE ||
       endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) {
-    if(!conn->edge_.on_circuit ||
+    if (!conn->edge_.on_circuit ||
        !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->edge_.on_circuit)) {
       // DNS remaps can trigger this. So can failed hidden service
       // lookups.
       log_info(LD_BUG,
-               "(Harmless.) No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream %ld. "
-               "Reason: %d", ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier, endreason);
+               "No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream %ld. Reason: "
+               "%d", ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier, endreason);
     } else {
       TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(conn->edge_.on_circuit)->path_state
           = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c
index 96b075a35c..066dbecc2a 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
       }
 
       /* First try 3 params, then 2. */
-      /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + 
+      /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
        *                                     collapsed_circuits +
        *                                     unusable_circuits */
       if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%lf %lf %lf %lf %lf %lf",
@@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
       if (e->circ_attempts) {
         *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
         line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathBias");
-        /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + 
+        /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close +
          *                                     collapsed_circuits +
          *                                     unusable_circuits */
         tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%lf %lf %lf %lf %lf %lf",
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h
index b9d0e555f1..2686a4f34d 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.h
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ typedef struct entry_guard_t {
   double collapsed_circuits; /**< Number of fully built circuits that were
                                  * remotely closed before any streams were
                                  * attempted. */
-  double unusable_circuits; /**< Number of circuits for which streams were 
+  double unusable_circuits; /**< Number of circuits for which streams were
                                 *  attempted, but none succeeded. */
   double timeouts; /**< Number of 'right-censored' circuit timeouts for this
                        * guard. */
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index 1638dae4fd..3ee0c835b2 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
   (void) layer_hint; /* unused */
 
   if (rh->length > 0) {
-    /* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit, 
+    /* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit,
      * it wasn't due to tagging */
     // XXX: This relies on recognized+digest being strong enough not
     // to be spoofable.. Is that a valid assumption?
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index fbf14e9349..e70f969e8f 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
   if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0)
     goto err;
   memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
-   
+
   /* For path bias: This intro circuit was used successfully */
   circuit->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
 
@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
   tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
 
   /* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias */
-  if(!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
+  if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
     circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 
   hop = circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath;