Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug18145'

src/or/circuituse.c

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ,
   /* decide if this circ is suitable for this conn */
 
   /* for rend circs, circ->cpath->prev is not the last router in the
-   * circuit, it's the magical extra bob hop. so just check the nickname
+   * circuit, it's the magical extra service hop. so just check the nickname
    * of the one we meant to finish at.
    */
   build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
@@ -1493,11 +1493,11 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
       circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ);
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
-      /* at Bob, waiting for introductions */
+      /* at the service, waiting for introductions */
       rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
-      /* at Bob, connecting to rend point */
+      /* at the service, connecting to rend point */
       rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
@@ -1617,32 +1617,32 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
       circuit_testing_failed(circ, failed_at_last_hop);
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
-      /* at Bob, waiting for introductions */
+      /* at the service, waiting for introductions */
       if (circ->base_.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
         circuit_increment_failure_count();
       }
-      /* no need to care here, because bob will rebuild intro
+      /* no need to care here, because the service will rebuild intro
        * points periodically. */
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
-      /* at Alice, connecting to intro point */
-      /* Don't increment failure count, since Bob may have picked
+      /* at the client, connecting to intro point */
+      /* Don't increment failure count, since the service may have picked
        * the introduction point maliciously */
-      /* Alice will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if
+      /* The client will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if
        * the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
-      /* at Alice, waiting for Bob */
+      /* at the client, waiting for the service */
       circuit_increment_failure_count();
-      /* Alice will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if
+      /* the client will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if
        * the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
       break;
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
-      /* at Bob, connecting to rend point */
-      /* Don't increment failure count, since Alice may have picked
+      /* at the service, connecting to rend point */
+      /* Don't increment failure count, since the client may have picked
        * the rendezvous point maliciously */
       log_info(LD_REND,
-               "Couldn't connect to Alice's chosen rend point %s "
+               "Couldn't connect to the client's chosen rend point %s "
                "(%s hop failed).",
                escaped(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)),
                failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last");
@@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ consider_recording_trackhost(const entry_connection_t *conn,
   char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
 
   /* Search the addressmap for this conn's destination. */
-  /* If he's not in the address map.. */
+  /* If they're not in the address map.. */
   if (!options->TrackHostExits ||
       addressmap_have_mapping(conn->socks_request->address,
                               options->TrackHostExitsExpire))

src/or/config.c

@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
 #endif
 
   /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no
-     Extended ORPort, inform the user that she is missing out. */
+     Extended ORPort, inform the user that they are missing out. */
   if (server_mode(options) && options->ServerTransportPlugin &&
       !options->ExtORPort_lines) {
     log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "We use pluggable transports but the Extended "

src/or/connection.c

@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type)
   if (!SOCKET_OK(news)) { /* accept() error */
     int e = tor_socket_errno(conn->s);
     if (ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e)) {
-      return 0; /* he hung up before we could accept(). that's fine. */
+      return 0; /* they hung up before we could accept(). that's fine. */
     } else if (ERRNO_IS_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e)) {
       warn_too_many_conns();
       return 0;

src/or/connection_or.c

@@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
 }
 
 /** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
- * return -1 if he is lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
+ * return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
  *
  * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
  * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
@@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
  *
  * Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with.
  *
- * If he initiated the connection, make sure he's not already connected,
+ * If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected,
  * then initialize conn from the information in router.
  *
  * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events

src/or/directory.c

@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ connection_dir_request_failed(dir_connection_t *conn)
     return; /* this was a test fetch. don't retry. */
   }
   if (!entry_list_is_constrained(get_options()))
-    router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0); /* don't try him again */
+    router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0); /* don't try this one again */
   if (conn->base_.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC ||
              conn->base_.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_EXTRAINFO) {
     log_info(LD_DIR, "Giving up on serverdesc/extrainfo fetch from "

src/or/entrynodes.c

@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory,
   } else {
     /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
      * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
-     * using him.
+     * using it.
      * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
     preferred_min = 2;
   }

src/or/ext_orport.c

@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(int is_enabled)
 }
 
 /** Read data from <b>conn</b> and see if the client sent us the
- *  authentication type that she prefers to use in this session.
+ *  authentication type that they prefer to use in this session.
  *
  *  Return -1 if we received corrupted data or if we don't support the
  *  authentication type. Return 0 if we need more data in

src/or/or.h

@@ -458,9 +458,11 @@ typedef enum {
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MIN_ 1
 /** OR-side circuit purpose: normal circuit, at OR. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR 1
-/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from Bob, waiting for intro from Alices. */
+/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the service, waiting for intro from
+ * clients. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT 2
-/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from Alice, waiting for Bob. */
+/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the client, waiting for the service.
+ */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING 3
 /** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, both circuits have this purpose. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED 4
@@ -479,43 +481,47 @@ typedef enum {
  *     to becoming open, or they are open and have sent the
  *     establish_rendezvous cell but haven't received an ack.
  *   circuits that are c_rend_ready are open and have received a
- *     rend ack, but haven't heard from bob yet. if they have a
+ *     rend ack, but haven't heard from the service yet. if they have a
  *     buildstate->pending_final_cpath then they're expecting a
- *     cell from bob, else they're not.
+ *     cell from the service, else they're not.
  *   circuits that are c_rend_ready_intro_acked are open, and
  *     some intro circ has sent its intro and received an ack.
  *   circuits that are c_rend_joined are open, have heard from
- *     bob, and are talking to him.
+ *     the service, and are talking to it.
  */
 /** Client-side circuit purpose: Normal circuit, with cpath. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL 5
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, connecting to intro point. */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, connecting to intro point. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING 6
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point,
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point,
  * waiting for ACK/NAK. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT 7
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, introduced and acked, closing. */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, introduced and acked, closing.
+ */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED 8
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, waiting for ack. */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for ack. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND 9
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, waiting for Bob. */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY 10
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, waiting for Bob, INTRODUCE
- * has been acknowledged. */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service,
+ * INTRODUCE has been acknowledged. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED 11
-/** Client-side circuit purpose: at Alice, rendezvous established. */
+/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, rendezvous established. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED 12
 /** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 13
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 13
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, waiting for introductions. */
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for
+ * introductions. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 14
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, successfully established
- * intro. */
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully
+ * established intro. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 15
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, connecting to rend point. */
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend
+ * point. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 16
-/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at Bob, rendezvous established. */
+/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous
+ * established. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 17
 /** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. */
 #define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 18

src/or/relay.c

@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
             }
           }
         }
-        /* check if he *ought* to have allowed it */
+        /* check if the exit *ought* to have allowed it */
 
         adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(circ,
                                                    conn,

src/or/rendclient.c

@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
     goto cleanup;
   }
 
-  /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */
+  /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of the service's pk */
   intro_key = NULL;
   SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
                     intro, {
@@ -1096,9 +1096,9 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
   circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
 
   /* From a path bias point of view, this circuit is now successfully used.
-   * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from Bob. He could induce
-   * Alice to attempt to connect to his hidden service and never reply
-   * to her rend requests */
+   * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from malicious hidden services.
+   * They could induce the client to attempt to connect to their hidden
+   * service and never reply to the client's rend requests */
   pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
 
   /* XXXX This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
   return 0;
 }
 
-/** Bob sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */
+/** The service sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */
 int
 rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
                                size_t request_len)
@@ -1135,7 +1135,8 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
 
   log_info(LD_REND,"Got RENDEZVOUS2 cell from hidden service.");
 
-  /* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from bob. Finish the dh handshake...*/
+  /* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh
+   * handshake...*/
   tor_assert(circ->build_state);
   tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
   hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
@@ -1164,7 +1165,7 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
   circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
   hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
   /* set the windows to default. these are the windows
-   * that alice thinks bob has.
+   * that the client thinks the service has.
    */
   hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
   hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;

src/or/rendmid.c

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
     goto err;
   }
 
-  /* The request is valid.  First, compute the hash of Bob's PK.*/
+  /* The request is valid.  First, compute the hash of the service's PK.*/
   if (crypto_pk_get_digest(pk, pk_digest)<0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
     goto err;
@@ -178,7 +178,8 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
   base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
                 (char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
 
-  /* The first 20 bytes are all we look at: they have a hash of Bob's PK. */
+  /* The first 20 bytes are all we look at: they have a hash of the service's
+   * PK. */
   intro_circ = circuit_get_intro_point((const uint8_t*)request);
   if (!intro_circ) {
     log_info(LD_REND,
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
              "Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to Tor client.");
     goto err;
   }
-  /* And send an ack down Alice's circuit.  Empty body means succeeded. */
+  /* And send an ack down the client's circuit.  Empty body means succeeded. */
   if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0,TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
                                    RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK,
                                    NULL,0,NULL)) {
@@ -337,7 +338,7 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
     circ->circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats = 1;
   }
 
-  /* Send the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to Alice. */
+  /* Send the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to the client. */
   if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ),
                                    RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2,
                                    (char*)(request+REND_COOKIE_LEN),

src/or/rendservice.c

@@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
   /* help predict this next time */
   rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, circ_needs_uptime, 1);
 
-  /* Launch a circuit to alice's chosen rendezvous point.
+  /* Launch a circuit to the client's chosen rendezvous point.
    */
   for (i=0;i<MAX_REND_FAILURES;i++) {
     int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
@@ -2970,7 +2970,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
   /* Append the cpath entry. */
   hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
   /* set the windows to default. these are the windows
-   * that bob thinks alice has.
+   * that the service thinks the client has.
    */
   hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
   hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;

src/or/router.c

@@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
   if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
     /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
     log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
-              "but he's just reporting his own IP address. Ignoring.",
+              "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
               suggestion);
     return;
   }

src/or/transports.c

@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp)
 
   smartlist_add(mp->transports, transport);
 
-  /* For now, notify the user so that he knows where the server
+  /* For now, notify the user so that they know where the server
      transport is listening. */
   log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Server transport %s at %s:%d.",
            method_name, address, (int)port);