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Remove some now-spurious blocks and indentation.

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This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2017-01-18 15:45:02 -05:00
parent 5b97d7e110
commit 3efe8bb8ac
1 changed files with 64 additions and 71 deletions
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135
src/or/entrynodes.c
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@ -2944,22 +2944,20 @@ num_bridges_usable(void)
{
int n_options = 0;
if (1) {
/* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */
tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info();
tor_assert(gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE);
/* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */
tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info();
tor_assert(gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
continue;
if (tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity))
continue;
const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity);
if (node && node->ri)
++n_options;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO)
continue;
if (tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity))
continue;
const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity);
if (node && node->ri)
++n_options;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
return n_options;
}
@ -3106,27 +3104,26 @@ getinfo_helper_format_single_entry_guard(const entry_guard_t *e)
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
if (1) {
/* modern case. This is going to be a bit tricky, since the status
* codes above weren't really intended for prop271 guards.
*
* XXXX use a more appropriate format for exporting this information
*/
if (e->confirmed_idx < 0) {
status = "never-connected";
} else if (! e->currently_listed) {
when = e->unlisted_since_date;
status = "unusable";
} else if (! e->is_filtered_guard) {
status = "unusable";
} else if (e->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) {
when = e->failing_since;
status = "down";
} else {
status = "up";
}
/* This is going to be a bit tricky, since the status
* codes weren't really intended for prop271 guards.
*
* XXXX use a more appropriate format for exporting this information
*/
if (e->confirmed_idx < 0) {
status = "never-connected";
} else if (! e->currently_listed) {
when = e->unlisted_since_date;
status = "unusable";
} else if (! e->is_filtered_guard) {
status = "unusable";
} else if (e->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) {
when = e->failing_since;
status = "down";
} else {
status = "up";
}
node = entry_guard_find_node(e);
if (node) {
node_get_verbose_nickname(node, nbuf);
@ -3247,26 +3244,24 @@ const node_t *
guards_choose_guard(cpath_build_state_t *state,
circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out)
{
if (1) {
const node_t *r = NULL;
const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL;
entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
// XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here.
if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) {
/* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be
* chosen as our guard for this circuit. */
rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t));
memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN);
}
if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
rst,
&r,
guard_state_out) < 0) {
tor_assert(r == NULL);
}
return r;
const node_t *r = NULL;
const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL;
entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
// XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here.
if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) {
/* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be
* chosen as our guard for this circuit. */
rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t));
memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN);
}
if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
rst,
&r,
guard_state_out) < 0) {
tor_assert(r == NULL);
}
return r;
}
/** Helper: pick a directory guard, with whatever algorithm is used. */
@ -3274,25 +3269,23 @@ const node_t *
guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info,
circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out)
{
if (1) {
/* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here,
* apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info
* downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into
* choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you
* find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha,
* when we realized that every Tor on the network would support
* microdescriptors. -NM */
(void) info;
const node_t *r = NULL;
if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD,
NULL,
&r,
guard_state_out) < 0) {
tor_assert(r == NULL);
}
return r;
/* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here,
* apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info
* downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into
* choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you
* find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha,
* when we realized that every Tor on the network would support
* microdescriptors. -NM */
(void) info;
const node_t *r = NULL;
if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD,
NULL,
&r,
guard_state_out) < 0) {
tor_assert(r == NULL);
}
return r;
}
/**