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Add an option to disable dirauth ed25519 link key checks.

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If there is some horrible bug in our ed25519 link authentication
code that causes us to label every single ed25519-having node as
non-running, we'll be glad we had this.  Otherwise we can remove it
later.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2016-11-10 12:41:17 -05:00
parent 7daf152172
commit 3d7e485402
4 changed files with 18 additions and 2 deletions
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7
doc/tor.1.txt
View File

@ -2270,6 +2270,13 @@ on the public Tor network.
(default), the flag "shared-rand-participate" is added to the authority
vote indicating participation in the protocol. (Default: 1)
[[AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys]] **AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys** **0**|**1**::
Authoritative directories only. If this option is set to 0, then we treat
relays as "Running" if their RSA key is correct when we probe them,
regardless of their Ed25519 key. We should only ever set this option to 0
if there is some major bug in Ed25519 link authentication that causes us
to label all the relays as not Running. (Default: 1)
[[BridgePassword]] **BridgePassword** __Password__::
If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially

1
src/or/config.c
View File

@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
V(User, STRING, NULL),
OBSOLETE("UserspaceIOCPBuffers"),
V(AuthDirSharedRandomness, BOOL, "1"),
V(AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys, BOOL, "1"),
OBSOLETE("V1AuthoritativeDirectory"),
OBSOLETE("V2AuthoritativeDirectory"),
VAR("V3AuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL, V3AuthoritativeDir, "0"),

7
src/or/dirserv.c
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@ -3186,7 +3186,8 @@ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(const tor_addr_t *addr,
ri = node->ri;
if (ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
if (get_options()->AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys &&
ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
/* We allow the node to have an ed25519 key if we haven't been told one in
* the routerinfo, but if we *HAVE* been told one in the routerinfo, it
* needs to match. */
@ -3256,6 +3257,7 @@ dirserv_should_launch_reachability_test(const routerinfo_t *ri,
void
dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
channel_t *chan = NULL;
node_t *node = NULL;
tor_addr_t router_addr;
@ -3266,7 +3268,8 @@ dirserv_single_reachability_test(time_t now, routerinfo_t *router)
node = node_get_mutable_by_id(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
tor_assert(node);
if (node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node)) {
if (options->AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys &&
node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node)) {
ed_id_key = &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key;
} else {
ed_id_key = NULL;

5
src/or/or.h
View File

@ -4577,6 +4577,11 @@ typedef struct {
/** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells?
* If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */
int ExtendByEd25519ID;
/** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority,
* do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */
/* NOTE: remove this option someday. */
int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys;
} or_options_t;
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */