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r11767@catbus: nickm | 2007-02-12 14:56:03 -0500

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Mark proposal 106 accepted.


svn:r9567
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Nick Mathewson 2007-02-12 19:56:07 +00:00
parent da3cfa3d4d
commit 3af0d90a7a
1 changed files with 8 additions and 4 deletions
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12
doc/spec/proposals/106-less-tls-constraint.txt
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Version: $Revision: 12105 $
Last-Modified: $Date: 2007-01-30T07:50:01.643717Z $
Author: Nick Mathewson
Created:
Status: Open
Status: Accepted
Overview:
@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ a client and don't treat them as a server. great. -rd]
there's really no harm in letting every router have any commonName it
wants.
[this is the better choice -rd]
[agreed. -nm]
REMAINING WAYS TO RECOGNIZE CLIENT->SERVER CONNECTIONS:
@ -91,8 +92,8 @@ If we stop verifying the above requirements:
server running TLS, and believe that you're talking to a Tor server (until
you send the first cell).
It will be far easier for non-Tor SSL clients to accidentally to Tor servers
and speak HTTPS or whatever to them.
It will be far easier for non-Tor SSL clients to accidentally connect to
Tor servers and speak HTTPS or whatever to them.
If, in a later release, we have clients not send certificates, and we make
DNs less recognizable:
@ -104,5 +105,8 @@ DNs less recognizable:
If clients don't send certs, they look slightly less like servers.
OTHER SPEC CHANGES:
When a client doesn't give us an identity, we should never extend any
circuits to it (duh), and we should allow it to set circuit ID however it
wants.