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document a cool attack that we evaluated
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@ -1452,7 +1452,17 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
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else
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else
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accept = ! policy->is_accept;
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accept = ! policy->is_accept;
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/* ???? are these right? */
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/* ???? are these right? -NM */
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/* We should be sure not to return ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED in the accept
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* case here, because it would cause clients to believe that the node
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* allows exit enclaving. Trying it anyway would open up a cool attack
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* where the node refuses due to exitpolicy, the client reacts in
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* surprise by rewriting the node's exitpolicy to reject *:*, and then
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* a bad guy targets users by causing them to attempt such connections
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* to 98% of the exits.
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*
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* Once microdescriptors can handle addresses in special cases (e.g. if
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* we ever solve ticket 1774), we can provide certainty here. -RD */
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if (accept)
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if (accept)
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return ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_ACCEPTED;
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return ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_ACCEPTED;
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else
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else
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