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Improved workaround for disabled OpenSSL renegotiation.

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It turns out that OpenSSL 0.9.8m is likely to take a completely
different approach for reenabling renegotiation than OpenSSL 0.9.8l
did, so we need to work with both. :p   Fixes bug 1158.

(patch by coderman; commit message by nickm)
This commit is contained in:
Martin Peck 2009-12-04 14:25:08 -05:00 committed by Nick Mathewson
parent a89f51c936
commit 3a2d677fa7
1 changed files with 12 additions and 0 deletions
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12
src/common/tortls.c
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@ -565,6 +565,18 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime)
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*
* (OpenSSL 0.9.8l introdeced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAGE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
* here. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully turned it into an option and (it
* seems) broke anything that used SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need
* to do both.)
*/
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
#endif
/* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data
* we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */