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fix some typos in our spec files
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@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@
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selection.
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selection.
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Additionally, the Measured= keyword is present in votes by
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Additionally, the Measured= keyword is present in votes by
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participating bandwidth measurement authorites to indicate
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participating bandwidth measurement authorities to indicate
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a measured bandwidth currently produced by measuring stream
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a measured bandwidth currently produced by measuring stream
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capacities.
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capacities.
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@ -1436,7 +1436,7 @@
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by multiplying the previous published consensus bandwidth by the
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by multiplying the previous published consensus bandwidth by the
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ratio of the measured average node stream capacity to the network
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ratio of the measured average node stream capacity to the network
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average. If 3 or more authorities provide a Measured= keyword for
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average. If 3 or more authorities provide a Measured= keyword for
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a router, the authorites produce a consensus containing a "w"
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a router, the authorities produce a consensus containing a "w"
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Bandwidth= keyword equal to the median of the Measured= votes.
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Bandwidth= keyword equal to the median of the Measured= votes.
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The ports listed in a "p" line should be taken as those ports for
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The ports listed in a "p" line should be taken as those ports for
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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PK -- a public key.
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PK -- a public key.
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SK -- a private key.
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SK -- a private key.
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K -- a key for a symmetric cypher.
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K -- a key for a symmetric cipher.
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a|b -- concatenation of 'a' and 'b'.
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a|b -- concatenation of 'a' and 'b'.
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@ -171,8 +171,8 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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In "renegotiation", the connection initiator sends no certificates, and
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In "renegotiation", the connection initiator sends no certificates, and
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the responder sends a single connection certificate. Once the TLS
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the responder sends a single connection certificate. Once the TLS
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handshake is complete, the initiator renegotiates the handshake, with each
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handshake is complete, the initiator renegotiates the handshake, with each
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parties sending a two-certificate chain as in "certificates up-front".
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party sending a two-certificate chain as in "certificates up-front".
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The initiator's ClientHello MUST include at least once ciphersuite not in
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The initiator's ClientHello MUST include at least one ciphersuite not in
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the list above. The responder SHOULD NOT select any ciphersuite besides
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the list above. The responder SHOULD NOT select any ciphersuite besides
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those in the list above.
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those in the list above.
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[The above "should not" is because some of the ciphers that
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[The above "should not" is because some of the ciphers that
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@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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to decide which to use.
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to decide which to use.
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In all of the above handshake variants, certificates sent in the clear
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In all of the above handshake variants, certificates sent in the clear
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SHOULD NOT include any strings to identify the host as a Tor server. In
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SHOULD NOT include any strings to identify the host as a Tor server. In
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the "renegotation" and "backwards-compatible renegotiation", the
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the "renegotiation" and "backwards-compatible renegotiation" steps, the
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initiator SHOULD chose a list of ciphersuites and TLS extensions chosen
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initiator SHOULD choose a list of ciphersuites and TLS extensions
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to mimic one used by a popular web browser.
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to mimic one used by a popular web browser.
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Responders MUST NOT select any TLS ciphersuite that lacks ephemeral keys,
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Responders MUST NOT select any TLS ciphersuite that lacks ephemeral keys,
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@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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6 -- CREATED_FAST (Circuit created, no PK) (See Sec 5.1)
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6 -- CREATED_FAST (Circuit created, no PK) (See Sec 5.1)
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7 -- VERSIONS (Negotiate proto version) (See Sec 4)
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7 -- VERSIONS (Negotiate proto version) (See Sec 4)
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8 -- NETINFO (Time and address info) (See Sec 4)
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8 -- NETINFO (Time and address info) (See Sec 4)
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9 -- RELAY_EARLY (End-to-end data; limited) (See sec 5.6)
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9 -- RELAY_EARLY (End-to-end data; limited)(See Sec 5.6)
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The interpretation of 'Payload' depends on the type of the cell.
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The interpretation of 'Payload' depends on the type of the cell.
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PADDING: Payload is unused.
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PADDING: Payload is unused.
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@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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The address format is a type/length/value sequence as given in section
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The address format is a type/length/value sequence as given in section
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6.4 below. The timestamp is a big-endian unsigned integer number of
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6.4 below. The timestamp is a big-endian unsigned integer number of
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seconds since the unix epoch.
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seconds since the Unix epoch.
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Implementations MAY use the timestamp value to help decide if their
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Implementations MAY use the timestamp value to help decide if their
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clocks are skewed. Initiators MAY use "other OR's address" to help
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clocks are skewed. Initiators MAY use "other OR's address" to help
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@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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Onion skin [DH_LEN+KEY_LEN+PK_PAD_LEN bytes]
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Onion skin [DH_LEN+KEY_LEN+PK_PAD_LEN bytes]
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Identity fingerprint [HASH_LEN bytes]
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Identity fingerprint [HASH_LEN bytes]
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The port and address field denote the IPV4 address and port of the next
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The port and address field denote the IPv4 address and port of the next
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onion router in the circuit; the public key hash is the hash of the PKCS#1
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onion router in the circuit; the public key hash is the hash of the PKCS#1
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ASN1 encoding of the next onion router's identity (signing) key. (See 0.3
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ASN1 encoding of the next onion router's identity (signing) key. (See 0.3
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above.) Including this hash allows the extending OR verify that it is
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above.) Including this hash allows the extending OR verify that it is
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@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
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6.4. Remote hostname lookup
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6.4. Remote hostname lookup
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To find the address associated with a hostname, the OP sends a
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To find the address associated with a hostname, the OP sends a
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RELAY_RESOLVE cell containing the hostname to be resolved with a nul
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RELAY_RESOLVE cell containing the hostname to be resolved with a NUL
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terminating byte. (For a reverse lookup, the OP sends a RELAY_RESOLVE
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terminating byte. (For a reverse lookup, the OP sends a RELAY_RESOLVE
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cell containing an in-addr.arpa address.) The OR replies with a
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cell containing an in-addr.arpa address.) The OR replies with a
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RELAY_RESOLVED cell containing a status byte, and any number of
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RELAY_RESOLVED cell containing a status byte, and any number of
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