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r11911@catbus: nickm | 2007-02-24 02:51:37 -0500

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Clarify rules about certificates on incoming connections. Does it make more sense now?


svn:r9635
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2007-02-24 07:54:47 +00:00
parent 50f22e858a
commit 38dcc368c4
1 changed files with 6 additions and 7 deletions
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13
doc/spec/tor-spec.txt
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@ -174,13 +174,12 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
EXTEND cell, the expected identity key is the one given in the cell.) If
the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection.
All parties SHOULD reject connections to or from ORs that have malformed
or missing certificates.
[XXX How can we recognize that it's an OR if it's an incoming connection
with malformed/missing certs? Should we change the above to just "to
ORs"? -RD]
ORs SHOULD NOT reject incoming connections from OPs with malformed
or missing certificates.
When connecting to an OR, all parties SHOULD reject the connection if that
OR has a malformed or missing certificate. When accepting an incoming
connection, an OR SHOULD NOT reject incoming connections from parties with
malformed or missing certificates. (However, an OR should not believe
that an incoming connection is from another OR unless the certificates
are present and well-formed.)
[Before version 0.1.2.8-rc, ORs rejected incoming connections from ORs and
OPs alike if their certificates were missing or malformed.]