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forward-port the 0.2.2.38 changelog
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25
ChangeLog
25
ChangeLog
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Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12
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Tor 0.2.2.38 fixes a rare race condition that can crash exit relays;
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fixes a remotely triggerable crash bug; and fixes a timing attack that
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could in theory leak path information.
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o Security fixes:
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- Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur
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when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480;
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bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
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- Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus
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document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could
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lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
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- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would
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stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it
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had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked
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a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this
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timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible),
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they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays
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a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to
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be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by
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other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best
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not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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Changes in version 0.2.3.20-rc - 2012-08-05
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Tor 0.2.3.20-rc is the third release candidate for the Tor 0.2.3.x
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series. It fixes a pair of code security bugs and a potential anonymity
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25
ReleaseNotes
25
ReleaseNotes
@ -3,6 +3,31 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release
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of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in
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each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file.
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Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-12
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Tor 0.2.2.38 fixes a rare race condition that can crash exit relays;
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fixes a remotely triggerable crash bug; and fixes a timing attack that
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could in theory leak path information.
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o Security fixes:
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- Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur
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when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480;
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bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
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- Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus
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document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could
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lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
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- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would
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stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it
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had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked
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a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this
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timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible),
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they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays
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a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to
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be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by
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other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best
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not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06
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Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation
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bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself
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