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r17933@catbus: nickm | 2008-02-05 19:54:28 -0500

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Stamp out a bunch of atoi users; make more tor_parse_long() users check their outputs.


svn:r13395
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2008-02-06 00:54:47 +00:00
parent 12071df6c8
commit 368f62c79d
4 changed files with 68 additions and 54 deletions
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6
ChangeLog
View File

@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.19-alpha - 2008-02-??
- Reject controller commands over 1MB in length. This keeps rogue
processes from running us out of memory.
o Minor features (misc):
- Reject router descriptors with out-of-range bandwidthcapacity or
bandwidthburst values.
- Give more descriptive well-formedness errors for out-of-range
hidden service descriptor/protocol versions.
o Deprecated features (controller):
- The status/version/num-versioning and status/version/num-concurring
GETINFO options are no longer useful in the V3 directory protocol:

22
src/or/rendservice.c
View File

@ -195,10 +195,10 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
goto err;
}
virtport = atoi(smartlist_get(sl,0));
if (virtport < 1 || virtport > 65535) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Missing or invalid port in hidden service port "
"configuration.");
virtport = (int)tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(sl,0), 10, 1, 65535, NULL,NULL);
if (!virtport) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Missing or invalid port %s in hidden service port "
"configuration", escaped(smartlist_get(sl,0)));
goto err;
}
@ -217,9 +217,12 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string)
realport = p?p:virtport;
} else {
/* No addr:port, no addr -- must be port. */
realport = atoi(addrport);
if (realport < 1 || realport > 65535)
realport = (int)tor_parse_long(addrport, 10, 1, 65535, NULL, NULL);
if (!realport) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Unparseable or out-of-range port %s in hidden "
"service port configuration.", escaped(addrport));
goto err;
}
addr = 0x7F000001u; /* Default to 127.0.0.1 */
}
}
@ -300,7 +303,7 @@ rend_config_services(or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
} else {
smartlist_t *versions;
char *version_str;
int i, version, versions_bitmask = 0;
int i, version, ver_ok=1, versions_bitmask = 0;
tor_assert(!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceVersion"));
versions = smartlist_create();
smartlist_split_string(versions, line->value, ",",
@ -315,7 +318,10 @@ rend_config_services(or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
rend_service_free(service);
return -1;
}
version = atoi(version_str);
version = (int)tor_parse_long(version_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ver_ok,
NULL);
if (!ver_ok)
continue;
versions_bitmask |= 1 << version;
}
/* If exactly one version is set, change descriptor_version to that

2
src/or/rephist.c
View File

@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ parse_possibly_bad_iso_time(const char *s, time_t *time_out)
char b[5];
strlcpy(b, s, sizeof(b));
b[4] = '\0';
year = atoi(b);
year = (int)tor_parse_long(b, 10, 0, INT_MAX, NULL, NULL);
if (year < 1970) {
*time_out = 0;
++n_bogus_times;

92
src/or/routerparse.c
View File

@ -1049,6 +1049,7 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
struct in_addr in;
const char *start_of_annotations, *cp;
size_t prepend_len = prepend_annotations ? strlen(prepend_annotations) : 0;
int ok = 1;
tor_assert(!allow_annotations || !prepend_annotations);
@ -1145,25 +1146,39 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
router->addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
router->or_port =
(uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,65535,NULL,NULL);
(uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,65535,&ok,NULL);
if (!ok) {
log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid OR port %s", escaped(tok->args[2]));
goto err;
}
router->dir_port =
(uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[4],10,0,65535,NULL,NULL);
(uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[4],10,0,65535,&ok,NULL);
if (!ok) {
log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid dir port %s", escaped(tok->args[4]));
goto err;
}
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_BANDWIDTH);
tor_assert(tok && tok->n_args >= 3);
router->bandwidthrate =
tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,INT_MAX,NULL,NULL);
tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,1,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL);
if (!router->bandwidthrate) {
if (!ok) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "bandwidthrate %s unreadable or 0. Failing.",
escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
router->bandwidthburst =
tor_parse_long(tok->args[1],10,0,INT_MAX,NULL,NULL);
router->bandwidthburst = tor_parse_long(tok->args[1],10,0,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL);
if (!ok) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid bandwidthburst %s", escaped(tok->args[1]));
goto err;
}
router->bandwidthcapacity =
tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,INT_MAX,NULL,NULL);
/* XXXX020 we don't error-check these values? -RD */
tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL);
if (!ok) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid bandwidthcapacity %s", escaped(tok->args[1]));
goto err;
}
if ((tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, A_PURPOSE))) {
tor_assert(tok->n_args);
@ -1176,7 +1191,11 @@ router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
if ((tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_UPTIME))) {
tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1);
router->uptime = tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,LONG_MAX,NULL,NULL);
router->uptime = tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,LONG_MAX,&ok,NULL);
if (!ok) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid uptime %s", escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
}
if ((tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIBERNATING))) {
@ -1535,7 +1554,8 @@ authority_cert_parse_from_string(const char *s, const char **end_of_string)
cert->signing_key_digest);
found = 0;
if (old_cert) {
/* XXXX020 can we just compare signed_descriptor_digest ? */
/* XXXX We could just compare signed_descriptor_digest, but that wouldn't
* buy us much. */
if (old_cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len == len &&
old_cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body &&
!memcmp(s, old_cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, len)) {
@ -3180,7 +3200,7 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
smartlist_t *tokens = smartlist_create();
directory_token_t *tok;
char secret_id_part[DIGEST_LEN];
int i, version;
int i, version, num_ok=1;
smartlist_t *versions;
char public_key_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
char test_desc_id[DIGEST_LEN];
@ -3238,17 +3258,15 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_VERSION);
tor_assert(tok);
tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
result->version = atoi(tok->args[0]);
if (result->version != 2) {
result->version =
(int) tor_parse_long(tok->args[0], 10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
if (result->version != 2 || !num_ok) {
/* If it's <2, it shouldn't be under this format. If the number
* is greater than 2, we bumped it because we broke backward
* compatibility. See how version numbers in our other formats
* work. -NM */
/* That means that adding optional fields to the descriptor wouldn't
* require a new version number, but the way of verifying it's origin
* would. Okay. -KL */
/* XXX020 Nick, confirm that you're happy here -RD */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Wrong descriptor version: %d", result->version);
* work. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized descriptor version: %s",
escaped(tok->args[0]));
goto err;
}
/* Parse public key. */
@ -3287,24 +3305,10 @@ rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t **parsed_out,
smartlist_split_string(versions, tok->args[0], ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(versions); i++) {
/* XXXX020 validate the numbers here. -NM */
/* As above, validating these numbers on a hidden service directory
* might require an extension to new valid numbers at some time. But
* this would require making a distinction of hidden service direcoties
* which accept the old valid numbers and those which accept the new
* valid numbers. -KL */
/* As above, increased version numbers are for
* non-backward-compatible changes. This code doesn't know how to
* parse a v3 descriptor, because a v3 descriptor is by definition not
* compatible with this code. -NM */
/* This refers to the permitted versions of introduction cells which might
* change independently from the descriptor version. If we validated the
* numbers here, a hidden service directory might reject a descriptor that
* would be understood by newer clients. Then we would need a "HSDir3" tag
* only to be able to use a new introduction cell version. I really think
* we should not validate it here. -KL */
/* XXX020 Nick, confirm that you're happy here -RD */
version = atoi(smartlist_get(versions, i));
version = (int) tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(versions, i),
10, 0, INT_MAX, &num_ok, NULL);
if (!num_ok) /* It's a string; let's ignore it. */
continue;
result->protocols |= 1 << version;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
@ -3377,7 +3381,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(rend_service_descriptor_t *parsed,
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
extend_info_t *info;
struct in_addr ip;
int result;
int result, num_ok=1;
tor_assert(parsed);
/** Function may only be invoked once. */
tor_assert(!parsed->intro_nodes);
@ -3454,13 +3458,11 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(rend_service_descriptor_t *parsed,
info->addr = ntohl(ip.s_addr);
/* Parse onion port. */
tok = find_first_by_keyword(tokens, R_IPO_ONION_PORT);
info->port = (uint16_t) atoi(tok->args[0]);
/* XXXX020 this next check fails with ports like 65537. -NM */
/* No, uint16_t only allows numbers in the interval 0..65535. -KL */
/* XXX020 Nick, confirm that you're happy here -RD */
if (!info->port) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point onion port is out of range: %d",
info->port);
info->port = (uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,1,65535,
&num_ok,NULL);
if (!info->port || !num_ok) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction point onion port %s is invalid",
escaped(tok->args[0]));
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
goto err;
}