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Merge remote-tracking branch 'mikeperry/bug6475' into maint-0.2.3
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commit
3621f30ad4
6
changes/bug6475
Normal file
6
changes/bug6475
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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o Minor bugfixes:
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- Add internal circuit construction state to protect against
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the noisy warn message "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes".
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Also add some additional rate-limited notice messages to help
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determine the root cause of the warn. Fixes bug 6475.
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Bugfix against 0.2.3.17-beta.
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@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ static entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest);
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static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge);
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static int entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
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static void pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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/**
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* This function decides if CBT learning should be disabled. It returns
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* true if one or more of the following four conditions are met:
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@ -2285,28 +2288,11 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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}
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
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circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
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/* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) {
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control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0);
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} else {
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entry_guard_t *guard =
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entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
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if (guard) {
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guard->circuit_successes++;
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log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
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"for guard %s",
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
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guard->nickname);
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}
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}
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}
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if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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can_complete_circuit=1;
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@ -2322,6 +2308,8 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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consider_testing_reachability(1, 1);
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}
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}
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pathbias_count_success(circ);
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circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
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circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
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@ -2621,6 +2609,194 @@ pathbias_get_scale_factor(const or_options_t *options)
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DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 1, INT32_MAX);
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}
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const char *
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pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state)
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{
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switch(state) {
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case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC:
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return "new";
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case PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP:
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return "first hop";
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case PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED:
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return "succeeded";
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}
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return "unknown";
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}
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/**
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* Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful first hop.
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* If so, record it in the current guard's path bias first_hop count.
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*
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* Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
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*/
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static int
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pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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#define FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
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static ratelim_t first_hop_notice_limit = RATELIM_INIT(FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
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char *rate_msg = NULL;
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/* Completely ignore one hop circuits */
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1);
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return 0;
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}
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if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
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/* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
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if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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/* Don't count cannibalized circs for path bias */
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if (!circ->has_opened) {
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entry_guard_t *guard;
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guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
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circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
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if (guard) {
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if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
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circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP;
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if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
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/* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
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return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
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}
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} else {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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} else {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"Unopened circuit has no known guard. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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/* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
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if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened,
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit
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* completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias
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* success count.
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*
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* Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
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*/
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static void
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pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
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static ratelim_t success_notice_limit = RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
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char *rate_msg = NULL;
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/* Ignore one hop circuits */
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if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1);
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return;
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}
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/* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias */
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if (!circ->has_opened) {
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entry_guard_t *guard =
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entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
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if (guard) {
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if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
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circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED;
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guard->circuit_successes++;
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log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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} else {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
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"for guard %s=%s",
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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}
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} else {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"Completed circuit has no known guard. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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} else {
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if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED) {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG,
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"Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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"Circuit is a %s currently %s. %s",
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pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
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circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose),
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circuit_state_to_string(circ->_base.state),
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rate_msg);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
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* 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should
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* eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
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@ -2666,8 +2842,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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guard->circuit_successes /= scale_factor;
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}
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guard->first_hops++;
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log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s",
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname);
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log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
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hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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return 0;
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}
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@ -2687,22 +2864,13 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
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{
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char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
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crypt_path_t *hop;
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int rv;
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if((rv = pathbias_count_first_hop(circ)) < 0)
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return rv;
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if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
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hop = circ->cpath;
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/* Don't count cannibalized or onehop circs for path bias */
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if (!circ->has_opened && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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entry_guard_t *guard;
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guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
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circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
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if (guard) {
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if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
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/* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
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return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
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if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
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21
src/or/or.h
21
src/or/or.h
@ -2596,6 +2596,23 @@ typedef struct circuit_t {
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* circuit. */
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#define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8
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/**
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* Describes the circuit building process in simplified terms based
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* on the path bias accounting state for a circuit. Created to prevent
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* overcounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See Bug #6475.
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*/
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typedef enum {
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/** This circuit is "new". It has not yet completed a first hop
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* or been counted by the path bias code. */
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PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC = 0,
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/** This circuit has completed a first hop, and has been counted by
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* the path bias logic. */
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PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP = 1,
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/** This circuit has been completely built, and has been counted as
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* successful by the path bias logic. */
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PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED = 2,
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} path_state_t;
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/** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit.
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*/
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typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
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@ -2629,6 +2646,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
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* cannibalized circuits. */
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unsigned int has_opened : 1;
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/** Kludge to help us prevent the warn in bug #6475 and eventually
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* debug why we are not seeing first hops in some cases. */
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path_state_t path_state : 2;
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/** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out
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* according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has
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* been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to
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