mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
Added Timeout and Node Sections to the Tor Manual
This commit is contained in:
swati
parent
99671c0dae
commit
304aa4048c
540
doc/tor.1.txt
540
doc/tor.1.txt
@ -998,18 +998,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what
|
||||
arguments it supports.
|
||||
|
||||
// Out of order because it logically belongs before the CircuitBuildTimeout option
|
||||
[[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
|
||||
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
|
||||
open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
|
||||
value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
|
||||
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
|
||||
(Default: 60 seconds)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitPadding]] **CircuitPadding** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If set to 0, Tor will not pad client circuits with additional cover
|
||||
traffic. Only clients may set this option. This option should be offered
|
||||
@ -1025,22 +1013,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
via the UI to mobile users for use where bandwidth may be expensive.
|
||||
(Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
|
||||
this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
|
||||
open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
|
||||
of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
|
||||
idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
|
||||
connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
|
||||
from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
|
||||
Max: 24 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
|
||||
many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
|
||||
If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
|
||||
number like 60. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[ClientAutoIPv6ORPort]] **ClientAutoIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If this option is set to 1, Tor clients randomly prefer a node's IPv4 or
|
||||
IPv6 ORPort. The random preference is set every time a node is loaded
|
||||
@ -1181,13 +1153,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
is launched for some other reason (for example, by a startup
|
||||
process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
If Tor spends this much time without any client activity,
|
||||
enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and
|
||||
directory information is not fetched.
|
||||
Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes.
|
||||
(Default: 24 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DormantOnFirstStartup]] **DormantOnFirstStartup** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory,
|
||||
it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made
|
||||
@ -1198,11 +1163,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was
|
||||
dormant before, and not otherwise. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing)
|
||||
counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout.
|
||||
If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
|
||||
contain information about servers other than the information in their
|
||||
@ -1214,76 +1174,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
|
||||
the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
|
||||
to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
|
||||
Normal circuits include all
|
||||
circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
|
||||
option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
|
||||
UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
||||
EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
|
||||
patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
|
||||
2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must
|
||||
be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign.
|
||||
(Example:
|
||||
ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
|
||||
to override in order to keep working.
|
||||
For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
|
||||
but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
|
||||
Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
|
||||
behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
|
||||
options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
|
||||
Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
|
||||
can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose
|
||||
country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if
|
||||
no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below.
|
||||
|
||||
// Out of order because it logically belongs after the ExcludeNodes option
|
||||
[[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
|
||||
patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
|
||||
node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any
|
||||
node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
|
||||
list too. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify
|
||||
nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
|
||||
patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
|
||||
node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
|
||||
nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
|
||||
if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
|
||||
be able to browse the web. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of
|
||||
the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
|
||||
used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
|
||||
those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
|
||||
at a non-exit node. To
|
||||
keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
||||
ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides
|
||||
this option.
|
||||
|
||||
[[FascistFirewall]] **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
|
||||
that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
|
||||
@ -1297,14 +1187,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
**FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
|
||||
instead. (Default: 80, 443)
|
||||
|
||||
[[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in
|
||||
ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and
|
||||
possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to
|
||||
'1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes
|
||||
and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't
|
||||
configured or can't be found. (Default: auto)
|
||||
|
||||
[[HidServAuth]] **HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
|
||||
Client authorization for a v2 hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
|
||||
characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
|
||||
@ -1315,116 +1197,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
services can be configured to require authorization using the
|
||||
**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
|
||||
|
||||
[[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
|
||||
address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
|
||||
second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits.
|
||||
This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
|
||||
and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
|
||||
to discover your primary guard node.
|
||||
(Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.)
|
||||
+
|
||||
(Example:
|
||||
HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will
|
||||
look like:
|
||||
+
|
||||
C - G - L2 - M - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - M - Intro +
|
||||
+
|
||||
where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
|
||||
L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
|
||||
Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
|
||||
option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create
|
||||
paths of the form:
|
||||
+
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
|
||||
+
|
||||
ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes,
|
||||
which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
|
||||
picked.
|
||||
+
|
||||
When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
|
||||
and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
|
||||
circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
|
||||
as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
|
||||
is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
|
||||
about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
|
||||
in the path.
|
||||
+
|
||||
This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
|
||||
https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
|
||||
updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
|
||||
balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
|
||||
HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
|
||||
Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
|
||||
|
||||
[[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
|
||||
address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
|
||||
third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits.
|
||||
This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
|
||||
and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
|
||||
to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes.
|
||||
(Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.)
|
||||
+
|
||||
(Example:
|
||||
HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths
|
||||
will look like: +
|
||||
C - G - M - L3 - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - M - L3 - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - M - L3 - Intro +
|
||||
where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
|
||||
L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
|
||||
Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
|
||||
option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be
|
||||
combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:
|
||||
+
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
|
||||
+
|
||||
ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes,
|
||||
which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
|
||||
picked.
|
||||
+
|
||||
When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
|
||||
and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
|
||||
circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
|
||||
as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
|
||||
is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
|
||||
about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
|
||||
in the path.
|
||||
+
|
||||
This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
|
||||
https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
|
||||
updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
|
||||
balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
|
||||
HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
|
||||
Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
|
||||
|
||||
[[HTTPTunnelPort]] **HTTPTunnelPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
|
||||
Open this port to listen for proxy connections using the "HTTP CONNECT"
|
||||
protocol instead of SOCKS. Set this to
|
||||
@ -1510,26 +1282,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it,
|
||||
but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default: 32)
|
||||
|
||||
[[MiddleNodes]] **MiddleNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
|
||||
to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits.
|
||||
Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections
|
||||
to directory servers. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
This is an **experimental** feature that is meant to be used by researchers
|
||||
and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely. Using it
|
||||
without care will strongly influence your anonymity. This feature might get
|
||||
removed in the future.
|
||||
+
|
||||
The HSLayer2Node and HSLayer3Node options override this option for onion
|
||||
service circuits, if they are set. The vanguards addon will read this
|
||||
option, and if set, it will set HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes to nodes
|
||||
from this set.
|
||||
+
|
||||
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
||||
MiddleNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
[[NATDPort]] **NATDPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
|
||||
Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as
|
||||
included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol.
|
||||
@ -1871,24 +1623,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for
|
||||
conflicting flags.
|
||||
|
||||
[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
|
||||
unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
|
||||
2 minutes)
|
||||
|
||||
[[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option
|
||||
as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if
|
||||
doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes does not apply to
|
||||
ExcludeExitNodes, ExitNodes, MiddleNodes, or MapAddress). If StrictNodes
|
||||
is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list,
|
||||
but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors.
|
||||
Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded
|
||||
node when it is *necessary* to perform relay reachability self-tests,
|
||||
connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client,
|
||||
fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download
|
||||
directory information. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[TokenBucketRefillInterval]] **TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]::
|
||||
Set the refill delay interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds.
|
||||
NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. When Tor is out of bandwidth,
|
||||
@ -2033,6 +1767,278 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
||||
used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting
|
||||
is needed.
|
||||
|
||||
== TIMEOUT OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
The following options are useful for configuring timeouts:
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for
|
||||
this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept
|
||||
open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each
|
||||
of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely
|
||||
idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS
|
||||
connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized
|
||||
from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes;
|
||||
Max: 24 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
// Out of order because it logically belongs before the CircuitBuildTimeout option
|
||||
[[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
|
||||
open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
|
||||
value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
|
||||
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
|
||||
(Default: 60 seconds)
|
||||
|
||||
[[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
|
||||
many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
|
||||
If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
|
||||
number like 60. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
||||
If Tor spends this much time without any client activity,
|
||||
enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and
|
||||
directory information is not fetched.
|
||||
Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes.
|
||||
(Default: 24 hours)
|
||||
|
||||
[[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing)
|
||||
counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout.
|
||||
If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1)
|
||||
|
||||
[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
|
||||
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
|
||||
unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
|
||||
2 minutes)
|
||||
|
||||
== ADVANCED OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
The following options include Tor nodes:
|
||||
|
||||
[[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
|
||||
to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
|
||||
Normal circuits include all
|
||||
circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
|
||||
option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
|
||||
UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
||||
EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
|
||||
patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are
|
||||
2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must
|
||||
be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign.
|
||||
(Example:
|
||||
ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
|
||||
to override in order to keep working.
|
||||
For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
|
||||
but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
|
||||
Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
|
||||
behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
|
||||
options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
|
||||
Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
|
||||
can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose
|
||||
country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if
|
||||
no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below.
|
||||
|
||||
// Out of order because it logically belongs after the ExcludeNodes option
|
||||
[[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
|
||||
patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
|
||||
node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any
|
||||
node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
|
||||
list too. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify
|
||||
nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
|
||||
|
||||
[[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address
|
||||
patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
|
||||
node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
|
||||
nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
|
||||
if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
|
||||
be able to browse the web. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of
|
||||
the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
|
||||
used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
|
||||
those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
|
||||
at a non-exit node. To
|
||||
keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
||||
ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides
|
||||
this option.
|
||||
|
||||
[[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
||||
If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in
|
||||
ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and
|
||||
possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to
|
||||
'1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes
|
||||
and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't
|
||||
configured or can't be found. (Default: auto)
|
||||
|
||||
[[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
|
||||
address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
|
||||
second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits.
|
||||
This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
|
||||
and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
|
||||
to discover your primary guard node.
|
||||
(Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.)
|
||||
+
|
||||
(Example:
|
||||
HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will
|
||||
look like:
|
||||
+
|
||||
C - G - L2 - M - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - M - Intro +
|
||||
+
|
||||
where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
|
||||
L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
|
||||
Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
|
||||
option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create
|
||||
paths of the form:
|
||||
+
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
|
||||
+
|
||||
ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes,
|
||||
which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
|
||||
picked.
|
||||
+
|
||||
When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
|
||||
and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
|
||||
circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
|
||||
as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
|
||||
is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
|
||||
about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
|
||||
in the path.
|
||||
+
|
||||
This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
|
||||
https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
|
||||
updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
|
||||
balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
|
||||
HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
|
||||
Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
|
||||
|
||||
[[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and
|
||||
address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the
|
||||
third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits.
|
||||
This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes
|
||||
and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order
|
||||
to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes.
|
||||
(Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.)
|
||||
+
|
||||
(Example:
|
||||
HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
||||
+
|
||||
When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths
|
||||
will look like: +
|
||||
C - G - M - L3 - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - M - L3 - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - M - L3 - Intro +
|
||||
where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node,
|
||||
L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node.
|
||||
Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this
|
||||
option.
|
||||
+
|
||||
While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be
|
||||
combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form:
|
||||
+
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir +
|
||||
C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir +
|
||||
S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro +
|
||||
+
|
||||
ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes,
|
||||
which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be
|
||||
picked.
|
||||
+
|
||||
When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet
|
||||
and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service
|
||||
circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present
|
||||
as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This
|
||||
is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information
|
||||
about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points
|
||||
in the path.
|
||||
+
|
||||
This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as
|
||||
https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and
|
||||
updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load
|
||||
balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in
|
||||
HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work.
|
||||
Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually.
|
||||
|
||||
[[MiddleNodes]] **MiddleNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
||||
A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes
|
||||
to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits.
|
||||
Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections
|
||||
to directory servers. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry. +
|
||||
+
|
||||
This is an **experimental** feature that is meant to be used by researchers
|
||||
and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely. Using it
|
||||
without care will strongly influence your anonymity. This feature might get
|
||||
removed in the future.
|
||||
+
|
||||
The HSLayer2Node and HSLayer3Node options override this option for onion
|
||||
service circuits, if they are set. The vanguards addon will read this
|
||||
option, and if set, it will set HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes to nodes
|
||||
from this set.
|
||||
+
|
||||
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
||||
MiddleNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See
|
||||
the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes.
|
||||
|
||||
[[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
|
||||
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option
|
||||
as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if
|
||||
doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes does not apply to
|
||||
ExcludeExitNodes, ExitNodes, MiddleNodes, or MapAddress). If StrictNodes
|
||||
is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list,
|
||||
but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors.
|
||||
Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded
|
||||
node when it is *necessary* to perform relay reachability self-tests,
|
||||
connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client,
|
||||
fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download
|
||||
directory information. (Default: 0)
|
||||
|
||||
== SERVER OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3652,7 +3658,7 @@ __DataDirectory__/**`approved-routers`**::
|
||||
__DataDirectory__ for an example fingerprint line. If the status is
|
||||
**!reject** then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint/pubkey)
|
||||
are rejected by this server. If it is **!invalid** then descriptors are
|
||||
accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not
|
||||
accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not
|
||||
recommended.
|
||||
|
||||
__DataDirectory__/**`v3-status-votes`**::
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user