nihilist/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-11-14 07:03:44 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Squelch spurious LD_BUG message in connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply()

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Andrea Shepard 2014-06-03 14:37:49 -07:00
parent be9058003d
commit 2de0281879
1 changed files with 15 additions and 7 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

22
src/or/connection_edge.c
View File

@ -2295,13 +2295,21 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) { endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) {
if (!conn->edge_.on_circuit || if (!conn->edge_.on_circuit ||
!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->edge_.on_circuit)) { !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->edge_.on_circuit)) {
// DNS remaps can trigger this. So can failed hidden service if (endreason != END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED) {
// lookups. log_info(LD_BUG,
log_info(LD_BUG, "No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream "U64_FORMAT
"No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream "U64_FORMAT ". Reason: %d",
". Reason: %d", U64_PRINTF_ARG(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier),
U64_PRINTF_ARG(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier), endreason);
endreason); }
/*
* Else DNS remaps and failed hidden service lookups can send us
* here with END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED; ignore it
*
* Perhaps we could make the test more precise; we can tell hidden
* services by conn->edge_.renddata != NULL; anything analogous for
* the DNS remap case?
*/
} else { } else {
// XXX: Hrmm. It looks like optimistic data can't go through this // XXX: Hrmm. It looks like optimistic data can't go through this
// codepath, but someone should probably test it and make sure. // codepath, but someone should probably test it and make sure.