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Nick Mathewson 2003-11-03 21:05:33 +00:00
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doc/tor-design.tex
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@ -401,12 +401,10 @@ it is a security requirement \cite{econymics,back01}. Tor should
therefore not
require modifying applications; should not introduce prohibitive delays;
and should require the user to make as few configuration decisions
as possible.
Platform support is also an important factor in both usability and
deployability. Tor currently runs on linux, Windows, and assorted
BSDs (including MacOS X).
%XXX Did I forget any? We need to say this somewhere. It's a big deal
%XXX so should it instead be at the beginning and/or end? -PS
as possible. Finally, Tor should be easily implemented on all commonly used
platforms; we cannot require users to change their operating system in order
to be anonymous. (The current Tor implementation runs on Windows and
assorted Unix-clones including Linux, FreeBSD, and MacOS X.)
\textbf{Flexibility:} The protocol must be flexible and well-specified,
so that it can serve as a test-bed for future research in low-latency
@ -633,7 +631,7 @@ seven bytes, plus one byte for the command.
%XXXX Discuss what happens with circIDs here.
A User's OP constructs a circuit incrementally, negotiating a
A user's OP constructs a circuit incrementally, negotiating a
symmetric key with each OR on the circuit, one hop at a time. To begin
creating a new circuit, the OP (call her Alice) sends a
\emph{create} cell to the first node in her chosen path. This cell's
@ -1344,15 +1342,16 @@ design withstands them.
end-to-end timing correlations. An attacker watching patterns of
traffic at the initiator and the responder will be
able to confirm the correspondence with high probability. The
greatest protection currently against such confirmation is to hide
greatest protection currently available against such confirmation is to hide
the connection between the onion proxy and the first Tor node,
either because it is local or behind a firewall. This approach
by running the onion proxy locally or
behind a firewall. This approach
requires an observer to separate traffic originating at the onion
router from traffic passes through it; but because we do not mix
router from traffic passing through it; but because we do not mix
or pad, this does not provide much defense.
\item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.} Simple packet counting
without timing consideration will also be effective in confirming
without timing correlation will also be effective in confirming
endpoints of a stream. However, even without padding, we have some
limited protection: the leaky pipe topology means different numbers
of packets may enter one end of a circuit than exit at the other.
@ -1841,6 +1840,7 @@ issues remaining to be ironed out. In particular:
cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
% XXX this is a design paper, not an implementation paper. the design
% says that they're already cached at the ORs. Agree/disagree?
% XXX Agree. -NM
\item \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous
points and location-hidden servers, these feature has not yet been