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Extend DoS protection to IP addresses with known relays

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This exemption used to be helpful in keeping exit relays from tripping
the DoS detection subsystem and losing Tor connectivity. Now exit relays
block re-entry into the network (tor issue #2667) so it's no longer
needed. We'd like to re-enable protection on these addresses to avoid
giving attackers a way around our DoS mitigations.
This commit is contained in:
Micah Elizabeth Scott 2023-08-11 16:32:22 -07:00
parent 3e18507dc7
commit 2b8d629079
2 changed files with 6 additions and 30 deletions
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8
src/core/or/dos.c
View File

@ -976,14 +976,6 @@ dos_new_client_conn(or_connection_t *or_conn, const char *transport_name)
goto end;
}
/* We ignore any known address meaning an address of a known relay. The
* reason to do so is because network reentry is possible where a client
* connection comes from an Exit node. Even when we'll fix reentry, this is
* a robust defense to keep in place. */
if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr)) {
goto end;
}
/* We are only interested in client connection from the geoip cache. */
entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr, transport_name,
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);

28
src/test/test_dos.c
View File

@ -434,12 +434,12 @@ test_dos_bucket_refill(void *arg)
dos_free_all();
}
/* Test if we avoid counting a known relay. */
/* Test if we avoid counting a known relay. (We no longer do) */
static void
test_known_relay(void *arg)
{
clientmap_entry_t *entry = NULL;
routerstatus_t *rs = NULL; microdesc_t *md = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
routerstatus_t *rs = NULL;
(void) arg;
@ -475,8 +475,7 @@ test_known_relay(void *arg)
* client connection. */
geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
NULL, 0);
/* Suppose we have 5 connections in rapid succession, the counter should
* always be 0 because we should ignore this. */
/* Suppose we have 5 connections in rapid succession */
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
or_conn.tracked_for_dos_mitigation = 0;
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
@ -489,26 +488,11 @@ test_known_relay(void *arg)
entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, NULL,
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
tt_assert(entry);
/* We should have a count of 0. */
tt_uint_op(entry->dos_stats.conn_stats.concurrent_count, OP_EQ, 0);
/* To make sure that his is working properly, make a unknown client
* connection and see if we do get it. */
tor_addr_parse(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, "42.42.42.43");
geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
NULL, 0);
or_conn.tracked_for_dos_mitigation = 0;
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
or_conn.tracked_for_dos_mitigation = 0;
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, NULL,
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
tt_assert(entry);
/* We should have a count of 2. */
tt_uint_op(entry->dos_stats.conn_stats.concurrent_count, OP_EQ, 2);
/* We should have a count of 5. */
tt_uint_op(entry->dos_stats.conn_stats.concurrent_count, OP_EQ, 5);
done:
routerstatus_free(rs); routerinfo_free(ri); microdesc_free(md);
routerstatus_free(rs);
smartlist_clear(dummy_ns->routerstatus_list);
networkstatus_vote_free(dummy_ns);
dos_free_all();