Clip invalid path bias counts at startup.

There was a bug in Tor prior to 0.2.4.10-alpha that allowed counts to
become invalid. Clipping the counts at startup allows us to rule out
log messages due to corruption from these prior Tor versions.
This commit is contained in:
Mike Perry 2013-03-25 16:04:30 -07:00 committed by Nick Mathewson
parent 856d57531b
commit 2b05a8c671

View File

@ -1211,6 +1211,21 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
continue;
}
if (use_cnt < success_cnt) {
int severity = LOG_INFO;
/* If this state file was written by a Tor that would have
* already fixed it, then the overcounting bug is still there.. */
if (tor_version_as_new_as(state_version, "0.2.4.12-alpha")) {
severity = LOG_NOTICE;
}
log_fn(severity, LD_BUG,
"State file contains unexpectedly high usage success "
"counts %lf/%lf for Guard %s ($%s)",
success_cnt, use_cnt,
node->nickname, hex_str(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
success_cnt = use_cnt;
}
node->use_attempts = use_cnt;
node->use_successes = success_cnt;
@ -1261,6 +1276,21 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
unusable = 0;
}
if (hop_cnt < success_cnt) {
int severity = LOG_INFO;
/* If this state file was written by a Tor that would have
* already fixed it, then the overcounting bug is still there.. */
if (tor_version_as_new_as(state_version, "0.2.4.12-alpha")) {
severity = LOG_NOTICE;
}
log_fn(severity, LD_BUG,
"State file contains unexpectedly high success counts "
"%lf/%lf for Guard %s ($%s)",
success_cnt, hop_cnt,
node->nickname, hex_str(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
success_cnt = hop_cnt;
}
node->circ_attempts = hop_cnt;
node->circ_successes = success_cnt;