Make the mis-named V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER/CLIENT macros always-on.

They selected the V2 handshake *and* the V3 handshake, in a strange
mixture.  Both handshakes have been mandatory for a long time.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2015-10-07 10:07:29 -04:00
parent bd1a137893
commit 2ad6e1bb0e

View File

@ -83,11 +83,6 @@
#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert))
/* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake.
*/
#define V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
#define V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
/* Copied from or.h */
#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
@ -1288,8 +1283,6 @@ tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
}
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
* 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
* that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
@ -1569,7 +1562,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
}
}
}
#endif
/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
* the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
@ -1679,12 +1671,9 @@ tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
}
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (isServer) {
SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
} else
#endif
{
} else {
SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
}
@ -1723,13 +1712,11 @@ tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
tls->callback_arg = arg;
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (cb) {
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
} else {
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
}
#endif
}
/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
@ -1816,7 +1803,6 @@ tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
if (r > 0) {
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
/* Renegotiation happened! */
log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
@ -1824,7 +1810,6 @@ tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
}
#endif
return r;
}
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
@ -1941,7 +1926,6 @@ tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
/* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
* we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
@ -1956,9 +1940,9 @@ tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
} else {
tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
}
#endif
} else {
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
#if 1111
/* XXXXXXXX remove v1 detection support, NM! */
/* If we got no ID cert, we're a v2 handshake. */
X509 *cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl);
@ -2362,20 +2346,7 @@ check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
int
tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
#if defined(V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER) && defined(V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT)
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
#else
if (tls->isServer) {
# ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
# endif
} else {
# ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
# endif
}
return 1;
#endif
}
/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on