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Revise the manpage to contain the actual intended *Nodes behavior
This is a squashed version of my former desired_nodes_behavior branch that we used to specify the intended results wrt bug 1090.
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@ -489,32 +489,74 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
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**ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
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A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
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patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:
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ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
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patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit.
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(Example:
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ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
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+
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By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
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to override in order to keep working.
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For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
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but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
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Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
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behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
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+
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Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
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options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
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Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
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can tell Tor to build circuits through any node.
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**ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
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A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
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patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any
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patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
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node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any
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node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
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list.
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list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below
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**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
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A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address
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patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are
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treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
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**ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
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A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
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patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These
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are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
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patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
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node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. +
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+
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Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
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nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
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if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
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be able to browse the web. +
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+
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Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
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the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
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used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
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those used for self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To
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keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
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+
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The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
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ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
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+
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The .exit address notation, if enabled, overrides this option.
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**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
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A list of identity fingerprints and nicknames of nodes
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to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. (Country codes and
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address patterns are not yet supported.) This includes all
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circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
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option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
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UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
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+
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The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
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EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
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**StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
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If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
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besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit.
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If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
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besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit
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circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits
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such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits.
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If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a
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requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so
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will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will
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still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the
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side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells
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Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to
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perform self-tests, connect to
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a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit
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request, upload directory information, or download directory information.
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(Default: 0)
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**FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
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If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
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