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another attack on bridges. darn it.

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svn:r12639
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2007-12-02 13:51:16 +00:00
parent 07dbaaac16
commit 25a43314d1
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17
doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt
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@ -329,3 +329,20 @@ Status: Open
Once proposal 124 (modified TLS handshake) is in place, we should
consider doing the switch. This might even be in the 0.2.0.x timeframe.
3.8. Do we need a second layer of entry guards?
If the bridge user uses the bridge as its entry guard, then the
triangulation attacks from Lasse and Paul's Oakland paper work to
locate the user's bridge(s).
Worse, this is another way to enumerate bridges: if the bridge users
keep rotating through second hops, then if you run a few fast servers
(and avoid getting considered an Exit or a Guard) you'll quickly get
a list of the bridges in active use.
That's probably the strongest reason why bridge users will need to
pick second-layer guards. Would this mean bridge users should switch
to four-hop circuits?
We should figure this out in the 0.2.1.x timeframe.