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Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key

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This commit is contained in:
teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) 2016-07-06 17:15:48 +10:00
parent 33da2abd05
commit 24e8bb2d83
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 450CBA7F968F094B
3 changed files with 25 additions and 7 deletions
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8
changes/reject-tap
View File

@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
o Major bug fixes (circuit building):
- Authorites should not trust the version a relay claims (if any),
instead, they should check specifically for an ntor key.
- Tor authorities, relays, and clients no longer support
circuit-building using TAP. (The hidden service protocol
still uses TAP.)
- Relays make sure their own descriptor has an ntor key.
- Authorites no longer trust the version a relay claims (if any),
instead, they check specifically for an ntor key.
Fixes bug 19163; bugfix on 0.2.4.18-rc.

4
src/or/router.c
View File

@ -2753,6 +2753,10 @@ router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
(const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf);
} else {
/* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */
log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key");
goto err;
}
/* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */

20
src/test/test_dir.c
View File

@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
const addr_policy_t *p;
time_t now = time(NULL);
port_cfg_t orport, dirport;
char cert_buf[256];
(void)arg;
pk1 = pk_generate(0);
@ -135,6 +136,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
tor_addr_parse(&r1->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::");
r1->ipv6_orport = 9999;
r1->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
/* Fake just enough of an ntor key to get by */
curve25519_keypair_t r1_onion_keypair;
curve25519_keypair_generate(&r1_onion_keypair, 0);
r1->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_memdup(&r1_onion_keypair.pubkey,
sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
r1->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2);
r1->bandwidthrate = 1000;
r1->bandwidthburst = 5000;
@ -167,11 +173,6 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
&kp2.pubkey,
now, 86400,
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
char cert_buf[256];
base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
(const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
r2->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
r2->cache_info.published_on = 5;
r2->or_port = 9005;
@ -247,6 +248,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
strlcat(buf2, "hidden-service-dir\n", sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "contact Magri White <magri@elsewhere.example.com>\n",
sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key ", sizeof(buf2));
base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
(const char*)r1_onion_keypair.pubkey.public_key, 32,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "reject *:*\n", sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "tunnelled-dir-server\nrouter-signature\n", sizeof(buf2));
buf[strlen(buf2)] = '\0'; /* Don't compare the sig; it's never the same
@ -276,6 +282,10 @@ test_dir_formats(void *arg)
"router Fred 10.3.2.1 9005 0 0\n"
"identity-ed25519\n"
"-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
base64_encode(cert_buf, sizeof(cert_buf),
(const char*)r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
r2->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
strlcat(buf2, cert_buf, sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sizeof(buf2));
strlcat(buf2, "master-key-ed25519 ", sizeof(buf2));