From 245fb8e8ba32facb4ad7c4210016b9ede904ef8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roger Dingledine Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2006 22:21:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] add johnny's further discussion on incentives. svn:r6115 --- doc/incentives.txt | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 125 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/incentives.txt b/doc/incentives.txt index d217b1bfa7..8c1ee7738c 100644 --- a/doc/incentives.txt +++ b/doc/incentives.txt @@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ accept claims from every Tor user and build a complex weighting / reputation system to decide which claims are "probably" right. + One possible way to implement the latter is something similar to + EigenTrust [http://www.stanford.edu/~sdkamvar/papers/eigentrust.pdf], + where the opinion of nodes with high reputation more is weighted + higher. + 3. Related issues we need to keep in mind. 3.1. Relay and exit configuration needs to be easy and usable. @@ -98,6 +103,10 @@ also through indirect interaction (middle of the circuit). That way you can never be sure when your guards are measuring you. + Both 3.2 and 3.3 may be solved by having a global notion of reputation, + as in 2.3 and 2.4. However, computing the global reputation from local + views could be expensive (O(n^2)) when the network is really large. + 3.4. Restricted topology: benefits and roadmap. As the Tor network continues to grow, we will need to make design @@ -164,6 +173,15 @@ maybe it's an argument in favor of a more penny-counting reputation approach. + Addendum: I was more thinking of measuring based on who is the service + provider and service receiver for the circuit. Say Alice builds a + circuit to Bob. Then Bob is providing service to Alice, since he + otherwise wouldn't need to spend is bandwidth. So traffic in either + direction should be charged to Alice. Of course, the same attack would + work, namely, Bob could cheat by sending bytes back quickly. So someone + close to the origin needs to detect this and close the circuit, if + necessary. -JN + 3.7. What is the appropriate resource balance for servers vs. clients? If we build a good incentive system, we'll still need to tune it @@ -255,15 +273,106 @@ third approach is to remember which connections have recently sent us high-priority cells, and preferentially read from those connections. - Hopefully we can get away with not solving this section at all. + Hopefully we can get away with not solving this section at all. But if + necessary, we can consult Ed Knightly, a Professor at Rice + [http://www.ece.rice.edu/~knightly/], for his extensive experience on + networking QoS. + +3.11. Global reputation system: Congestion on high reputation servers? + + If the notion of reputation is global (as in 2.3 or 2.4), circuits that + go through successive high reputation servers would be the fastest and + most reliable. This would incentivize everyone, regardless of their own + reputation, to choose only the highest reputation servers in its + circuits, causing an over-congestion on those servers. + + One could argue, though, that once those servers are over-congested, + their bandwidth per circuit drops, which would in turn lower their + reputation in the future. A question is whether this would overall + stablize. + + Another possible way is to keep a cap on reputation. In this way, a + fraction of servers would have the same high reputation, thus balancing + such load. + +3.12. Another anonymity attack: learning from service levels. + + If reputation is local, it may be possible for an evil node to learn + the identity of the origin through provision of differential service. + For instance, the evil node provides crappy bandwidth to everyone, + until it finds a circuit that it wants to trace the origin, then it + provides good bandwidth. Now, as only those directly or indirectly + observing this circuit would like the evil node, it can test each node + by building a circuit via each node to another evil node. If the + bandwidth is high, it is (somewhat) likely that the node was a part of + the circuit. + + This problem does not exist if the reputation is global and nodes only + follow the global reputation, i.e., completely ignore their own view. + +3.13. DoS through high priority traffic. + + Assume there is an evil node with high reputation (or high value on + Alice) and this evil node wants to deny the service to Alice. What it + needs to do is to send a lot of traffic to Alice. To Alice, all traffic + from this evil node is of high priority. If the choice of circuits are + too based toward high priority circuits, Alice would spend most of her + available bandwidth on this circuit, thus providing poor bandwidth to + everyone else. Everyone else would start to dislike Alice, making it + even harder for her to forward other nodes' traffic. This could cause + Alice to have a low reputation, and the only high bandwidth circuit + Alice could use would be via the evil node. 4. Sample designs. 4.1. Two classes of service for circuits. + Whenever a circuit is built, it is specified by the origin which class, + either "premium" or "normal", this circuit belongs. A premium circuit + gets preferred treatment at each node. A node "spends" its value, which + it earned a priori by providing service, to the next node by sending + and receiving bytes. Once a node has overspent its values, the circuit + cannot stay as premium. It can either breaks or converts into a normal + circuit. Each node also reserves a small portion of bandwidth for + normal circuits to prevent starvation. + + Pro: Even if a node has no value to spend, it can still use normal + circuits. This allow casual user to use Tor without forcing them to run + a server. + + Pro: Nodes have incentive to forward traffic as quick and as much as + possible to accumulate value. + + Con: There is no proactive method for a node to rebalance its debt. It + has to wait until there happens to be a circuit in the opposite + direction. + + Con: A node needs to build circuits in such a way that each node in the + circuit has to have good values to the next node. This requires + non-local knowledge and makes circuits less reliable as the values are + used up in the circuit. + + Con: May discourage nodes to forward traffic in some circuits, as they + worry about spending more useful values to get less useful values in + return. + 4.2. Treat all the traffic from the node with the same service; hard reputation system. + This design is similar to 4.1, except that instead of having two + classes of circuits, there is only one. All the circuits are + prioritized based on the value of the interacting node. + + Pro: It is simpler to design and give priority based on connections, + not circuits. + + Con: A node only needs to keep a few guard nodes happy to forward their + traffic. + + Con: Same as in 4.1, may discourage nodes to forward traffic in some + circuits, as they worry about spending more useful values to get less + useful values in return. + 4.3. Treat all the traffic from the node with the same service; soft reputation system. @@ -300,7 +409,10 @@ one way through: if there are few exits, then they will attract a lot of use, so lots of people will like them, so when they try to use the network they will find their first hop to be particularly - pleasant. After that they're like the rest of the world though. + pleasant. After that they're like the rest of the world though. (An + alternative would be to reward exit nodes with higher values. At the + extreme, we could even ask the directory servers to suggest the extra + values, based on the current availability of exit nodes.) Pro: this is a pretty easy design to add; and it can be phased in incrementally simply by having new nodes behave differently. @@ -337,5 +449,16 @@ 5. Recommendations and next steps. +5.1. Simulation. + For simulation trace, we can use two: one is what we obtained from Tor + and one from existing web traces. + + We want to simulate all the four cases in 4.1-4. For 4.4, we may want + to look at two variations: (1) the directory servers check the + bandwidth themselves through Tor; (2) each node reports their perceived + values on other nodes, while the directory servers use EigenTrust to + compute global reputation and broadcast those. + +5.2. Deploying into existing Tor network.