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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 13:13:44 +01:00
Fix some conversion problems
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647b7d37c2
commit
241e6b0937
@ -2336,6 +2336,21 @@ crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max)
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return min + crypto_rand_int(max - min);
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}
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/** As crypto_rand_int_range, but supports uint64_t. */
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uint64_t
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crypto_rand_uint64_range(uint64_t min, uint64_t max)
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{
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tor_assert(min < max);
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return min + crypto_rand_uint64(max - min);
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}
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/** As crypto_rand_int_range, but supports time_t. */
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time_t
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crypto_rand_time_range(time_t min, time_t max)
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{
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return (time_t) crypto_rand_uint64_range(min, max);
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}
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/** Return a pseudorandom 64-bit integer, chosen uniformly from the values
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* between 0 and <b>max</b>-1. */
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uint64_t
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@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
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int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
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int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max);
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int crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max);
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uint64_t crypto_rand_uint64_range(uint64_t min, uint64_t max);
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time_t crypto_rand_time_range(time_t min, time_t max);
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uint64_t crypto_rand_uint64(uint64_t max);
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double crypto_rand_double(void);
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struct tor_weak_rng_t;
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@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
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* then we might pick a time where we're about to expire. Lastly, be
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* sure to start on a day boundary. */
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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start_time = crypto_rand_int_range(now - cert_lifetime, now) + 2*24*3600;
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start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(now - cert_lifetime, now) + 2*24*3600;
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start_time -= start_time % (24*3600);
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tor_assert(rsa);
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@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend,
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* precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
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* this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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entry->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_int_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
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entry->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_time_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
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entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
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/* Are we picking this guard because all of our current guards are
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@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
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} else {
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if (state_version) {
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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e->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_int_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
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e->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_time_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
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e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version);
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}
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}
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@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
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time_to.check_for_correct_dns < now &&
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! router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star()) {
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if (!time_to.check_for_correct_dns) {
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time_to.check_for_correct_dns = crypto_rand_int_range(now, now + 120) + 60;
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time_to.check_for_correct_dns = crypto_rand_time_range(now, now + 120) + 60;
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} else {
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dns_launch_correctness_checks();
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time_to.check_for_correct_dns = now + 12*3600 +
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