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Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8'
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commit
2197bfcc6a
4
changes/bug19499
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4
changes/bug19499
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Minor features (build):
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- Tor now again builds with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development branch
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(tested against 1.1.0-pre6-dev).
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@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct crypto_dh_t {
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};
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static int setup_openssl_threading(void);
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static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn);
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static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn);
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/** Return the number of bytes added by padding method <b>padding</b>.
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*/
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@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_ok(const crypto_pk_t *k)
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if (!k || !k->key)
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return 0;
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BIGNUM *p, *q;
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const BIGNUM *p, *q;
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RSA_get0_factors(k->key, &p, &q);
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return p != NULL; /* XXX/yawning: Should we check q? */
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#else
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@ -876,10 +876,10 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env)
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tor_assert(env);
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tor_assert(env->key);
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BIGNUM *e;
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const BIGNUM *e;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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BIGNUM *n, *d;
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const BIGNUM *n, *d;
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RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);
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#else
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e = env->key->e;
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@ -905,11 +905,11 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b)
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if (an_argument_is_null)
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return result;
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BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;
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BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;
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const BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;
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const BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;
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const BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;
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RSA_get0_key(a->key, &a_n, &a_e, &a_d);
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RSA_get0_key(b->key, &b_n, &b_e, &b_d);
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#else
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@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env)
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/* It's so stupid that there's no other way to check that n is valid
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* before calling RSA_bits().
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*/
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BIGNUM *n, *e, *d;
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const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d;
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RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);
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tor_assert(n != NULL);
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@ -2422,7 +2422,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
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* recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness
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* can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure.
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*/
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BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
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const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
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DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
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if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) {
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log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
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@ -2456,10 +2456,10 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
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int bytes;
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tor_assert(dh);
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BIGNUM *dh_pub;
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const BIGNUM *dh_pub;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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BIGNUM *dh_priv;
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const BIGNUM *dh_priv;
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DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);
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#else
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dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key;
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@ -2498,7 +2498,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
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* See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips.
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*/
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static int
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tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn)
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tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn)
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{
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BIGNUM *x;
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char *s;
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@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ main(int c, char **v)
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} else {
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rsa = crypto_pk_get_rsa_(env);
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BIGNUM *rsa_n;
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const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d;
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const BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d;
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RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
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#else
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rsa_n = rsa->n;
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