Merge branch 'maint-0.2.8'

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2016-06-27 13:17:42 -04:00
commit 2197bfcc6a
3 changed files with 18 additions and 14 deletions

4
changes/bug19499 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
o Minor features (build):
- Tor now again builds with the recent OpenSSL 1.1 development branch
(tested against 1.1.0-pre6-dev).

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@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct crypto_dh_t {
};
static int setup_openssl_threading(void);
static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn);
static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn);
/** Return the number of bytes added by padding method <b>padding</b>.
*/
@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ crypto_pk_private_ok(const crypto_pk_t *k)
if (!k || !k->key)
return 0;
BIGNUM *p, *q;
const BIGNUM *p, *q;
RSA_get0_factors(k->key, &p, &q);
return p != NULL; /* XXX/yawning: Should we check q? */
#else
@ -876,10 +876,10 @@ crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(crypto_pk_t *env)
tor_assert(env);
tor_assert(env->key);
BIGNUM *e;
const BIGNUM *e;
#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
BIGNUM *n, *d;
const BIGNUM *n, *d;
RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);
#else
e = env->key->e;
@ -905,11 +905,11 @@ crypto_pk_cmp_keys(const crypto_pk_t *a, const crypto_pk_t *b)
if (an_argument_is_null)
return result;
BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;
BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;
const BIGNUM *a_n, *a_e;
const BIGNUM *b_n, *b_e;
#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;
const BIGNUM *a_d, *b_d;
RSA_get0_key(a->key, &a_n, &a_e, &a_d);
RSA_get0_key(b->key, &b_n, &b_e, &b_d);
#else
@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ crypto_pk_num_bits(crypto_pk_t *env)
/* It's so stupid that there's no other way to check that n is valid
* before calling RSA_bits().
*/
BIGNUM *n, *e, *d;
const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d;
RSA_get0_key(env->key, &n, &e, &d);
tor_assert(n != NULL);
@ -2422,7 +2422,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
* recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness
* can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure.
*/
BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
@ -2456,10 +2456,10 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
int bytes;
tor_assert(dh);
BIGNUM *dh_pub;
const BIGNUM *dh_pub;
#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
BIGNUM *dh_priv;
const BIGNUM *dh_priv;
DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);
#else
dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key;
@ -2498,7 +2498,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
* See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips.
*/
static int
tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn)
tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn)
{
BIGNUM *x;
char *s;

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@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ main(int c, char **v)
} else {
rsa = crypto_pk_get_rsa_(env);
BIGNUM *rsa_n;
const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d;
const BIGNUM *rsa_e, *rsa_d;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
#else
rsa_n = rsa->n;