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start reformatting and editing the pluggable-transport proposal

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doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-pluggable-transport.txt
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@ -6,142 +6,21 @@ Status: Draft
Overview Overview
This proposal describes a way to decouple protocol-level obfuscation
from the core Tor protocol in order to better resist client-bridge
censorship. Our approach is to specify a means to add pluggable
transport implementations to Tor clients and bridges so that they can
negotiate a superencipherment for the Tor protocol.
Scope
This is a document about transport plugins; it does not cover This is a document about transport plugins; it does not cover
discovery, or bridgedb improvements. Each transport plugin discovery improvements, or bridgedb improvements. While these
specification should make clear any external requirements but those requirements might be solved by a program that also functions as a
are generally out of scope if they fall into discovery or transport plugin, this proposal only covers the requirements and
infrastructure components. operation of transport plugins.
We should include a description of how to write a good set of plugins, Motivation
how to evaluate and how to classify a plugin. For example, if a plugin
is said to be hard to detect on the wire if you know what it is and
how it works, it should say so. If it's easy, it's still possibly
functional for a given network but perhaps it is not well hidden or
automatically filtered. Detection and blocking are not always the same
thing right off. In both cases, a plugin should be quite clear about
its security claims.
Target use-cases[a][b]
Here's some stuff we want to be able to support. We're listing these
in the draft to try to define the problem space. We won't put this
section in the final version.
1. The 'obfuscated SSH' superencipherment:
http://github.com/brl/obfuscated-openssh/blob/master/README.obfuscation
2. Big P2P-network style transports where instead of connecting to a
bridge at a known IP, you connect to a bridge by a username, a public
key, or whatever.
1. We need the ability to have two kinds of proxies - one for
incoming connections and one for outgoing connections. [Sure, but
that's about how we implement stuff arg arg dumb touchpad -NM]
1. Probably we want to have the ability to get connections
anyway we'll take them
2. So, bridges use the incoming kind, and clients use the ougoing
kind? Sounds right.-N
1. Probably also we're a multi-plexed incoming kind of Tor
relay - so we should take connections from say localhost's
little helper and also, we should take connections from
external ips. This would be useful to identify though. I think
this is how we would already work as of today.
1. You mean, regular non-bridge relays should support this
too? I hadn't considered that. it has seemed pointless
because of IP blocking, but if we have a p2p transport, it
would be useful for regular relays to allow it. Yes -io
1. Also it would be nice for stats purposes to ensure that
we know what kinds of connections we're handling, even if
we basically treat them exactly the same. Perhaps Karsten
wants to weigh in on how we should have Tor handle these
things? I guess we'll really fuck up his stats collection
if all of sudden he's getting lots of connections from
127.0.0.1...
1. Various protocol-impersonation tools
1. NSTX, iodyne, Ozymandns or such, for the lulz.
1. DNS tunneling of many types - eg: TXT records or the NULL
protocol trick
1. HTTP -- many kinds are possible, some may even be right
1. HTTP POST requests are implemented in Firepass
1. FTP
1. Perhaps some kind of anonymous ftp login with sending and
receiving of data would be useful?
1. Lots to think about before designing off the cuff crappy
protocol covert channels
1. NTP
1. Hardly anyone knows about NTP these days - it's almost always
outbound allowed and it's usually not well inspected
1. That makes it good for short-term circumvention, but bad
for long-term hiding.
1. Triangle-boy
2. IPSec look-alike
3. UDP
4. IPv6
1. A forged-RST-ignoring tool
1. A forged-RST-ignoring tool that pretends that it is getting all
of its connections closed and retrying all the time, when really
it is just carrying on with business as usual. Hooray for
crypto.
1. Perhaps it's a good idea to mention CCTT?
1. What else goes here?
1. We should ask Nextgens about protocol filters from Freenet
2. http://gray-world.net/papers.shtml
3. http://gray-world.net/pr_cook_cc.shtml
4. http://gray-world.net/pr_firepass.shtml
5. We should ensure we cover the topics and lessons learned from
"FIREWALL RESISTANCE TO METAFEROGRAPHY IN NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS"
- see
https://ritdml.rit.edu/bitstream/handle/1850/12272/RSavacoolThesis5-21-2010.pdf
Here's some stuff that seems out-of-scope:
1. A generic firewall-breaker that works with all Tor nodes and
bridges. Like, if you're using a VPN to get through your firewall,
and it lets you connect to any Tor node, you can just use it without
any special plug-in support. I think this spec is just for stuff
that requires buy-in from the server side of the connection. Agreed?
1. Yeah - I think we should simply codify the proxy stuff to ensure
that we plan to remain pluggable for incoming and outgoing connections
in some formal way.
I'm uncertain if we want to support stuff like:
1. An ssh tunnel that uses openssh to tunnel raw tor packets, with no
actual TLS going on underneath. Promising, but risky. -NM
1. I think there isn't much to gain by doing this but perhaps so - we
are too dependent on TLS and our certs are trivial to fingerprint -io
1. Also, Tor-over-TLS-tunneled-over-SSH looks even weirder than
Tor-over-SSH. -N
2. It might be nice to allow certs [cn] fields to be configurable by
bridge nodes? -io
1. If we allowed "raw traffic" transports, a transport could get this
trivially by implementing TLS with the right certs. -NM
1. perhaps we just want a "raw traffic port" where we connect to pass
around cells? thoughts?
1. A bridge-discovery-and-round-robin p2p tool that connects you to a
randomly chosen one of an unknown number of bridges.
1. Stackable plugins
1. Tor over DNS over HTTP Post over Obfuscated Tor to reach the Tor
network to read a copy of uncensored Google News.
1. Christ, what the fuck world are we building? Or even more,
what kind of world are we resisting?
1. More like RST-drop plus sshobfs over HTTP over VPN.
Goals & Motivation
Frequently, people want to try a novel circumvention method to help Frequently, people want to try a novel circumvention method to help
users connect to Tor bridges. Some of these methods are already users connect to Tor bridges. Some of these methods are already
@ -153,8 +32,8 @@ Goals & Motivation
might want to support: might want to support:
1. A protocol obfuscation tool that transforms the output of a TLS 1. A protocol obfuscation tool that transforms the output of a TLS
connection into something that looks like HTTP as it leaves the client, connection into something that looks like HTTP as it leaves the
and back to TLS as it arrives at the bridge. client, and back to TLS as it arrives at the bridge.
2. An additional authentication step that a client would need to 2. An additional authentication step that a client would need to
perform for a given bridge before being allowed to connect. perform for a given bridge before being allowed to connect.
3. An information passing system that uses a side-channel in some 3. An information passing system that uses a side-channel in some
@ -186,8 +65,20 @@ Goals & Motivation
that there are too many connections from 127.0.0.1, and start that there are too many connections from 127.0.0.1, and start
paring them down to avoid a DoS. paring them down to avoid a DoS.
3. 3. Censorship and anticensorship techniques often evolve faster than
4. (what else?) the typical Tor release cycle. As such, it's a good idea to
provide ways to test out new anticensorship mechanisms on a more
rapid basis.
4. Transport obfuscation is a relatively distinct problem
from the other privacy problems that Tor tries to solve, and it
requires a fairly distinct skill-set from hacking the rest of Tor.
By decoupling transport obfuscation from the Tor core, we hope to
encourage people working on transport obfuscation who would
otherwise not be interested in hacking Tor.
5. Finally, we hope that defining a generic transport obfuscation plugin
mechanism will be useful to other anticensorship projects.
Non-Goals Non-Goals
@ -202,7 +93,8 @@ Non-Goals
discovery extensions. discovery extensions.
This proposal is not about what transport plugins are the best ones This proposal is not about what transport plugins are the best ones
for people to write. for people to write. We do, however, make some general
recommendations for plugin authors in an appendix.
We've considered issues involved with completely replacing Tor's TLS We've considered issues involved with completely replacing Tor's TLS
with another encryption layer, rather than layering it inside the with another encryption layer, rather than layering it inside the
@ -210,43 +102,39 @@ Non-Goals
current proposal, though we are not currently sure whether it's a good current proposal, though we are not currently sure whether it's a good
idea to implement. idea to implement.
We deliberately reject any design that would involve linking more code
into Tor's process space.
Design overview Design overview
Clients run one or more "Transport client" programs that act like To write a new transport protocol, an implementer must provide two
SOCKS proxies. They accept connections on localhost on different pieces: a "Client Proxy" to run at the initiator side, and a "Server
ports. Each one implements one or more transport methods. Parameters Proxy" to run a the server side. These two pieces may or may not be
are passed from Tor inside the regular username/password parts of the implemented by the same program.
SOCKS protocol.
Bridges (and maybe relays) run one or more programs that act like Each client may run any number of Client Proxies. Each one acts like
stunnel-server (or whatever the option is): they get connections from a SOCKS proxy that accepts accept connections on localhost. Each one
the network (typically by listening for connections on the network) runs on a different port, and implements one or more transport
and relay them to the Bridge's real ORPort. methods. If the protocol has any parameters, they passed from Tor
inside the regular username/password parts of the SOCKS protocol.
1. The bridge needs to know which methods these servers support Bridges (and maybe relays) may run any number of Server Proxies: these
programs provide an interface like stunnel-server (or whatever the
option is): they get connections from the network (typically by
listening for connections on the network) and relay them to the
Bridge's real ORPort.
1. The bridge needs to advertise this fact some way that the clients To configure one of these programs, it should be sufficient simply to
will find out about it--probably by sticking it in its bridge list it in your torrc. The program tells Tor which transports it
descriptor so that the bridgedb can find out and see that the clients provides.
get informed.
2. Somebody needs to launch these programs Bridges (and maybe relays) report in their descriptors which transport
protocols they support. This information can be copied into bridge
3. The bridge may want to just not have a public ORPort at all. lines. Bridges using a transport protocol may have multiple bridge
lines.
4. The bridge may not want to advertise a real IP at all
5. The bridge will want to find out from the program any client
identification information it can get (IP, etc) to implement rules
about max clients at once
Any methods that are wildly successful, we can bake into Tor. Any methods that are wildly successful, we can bake into Tor.
Proposed terminology:
Transport protocol:
Transport proxy:
Specifications: Client behavior Specifications: Client behavior
Bridge lines can now follow the extended format "bridge method Bridge lines can now follow the extended format "bridge method
@ -261,42 +149,37 @@ Specifications: Client behavior
splitting them across the fields as necessary. The "id-fingerprint" splitting them across the fields as necessary. The "id-fingerprint"
field is always provided in a field named "keyid", if it was given. field is always provided in a field named "keyid", if it was given.
Example: if the bridge line is "bridge trebuchet www.example.com:3333
example: if the bridge line is "bridge trebuchet www.example.com:3333 rocks=20 height=5.6m" AND if the Tor client knows that the
rocks=20 height=5.6m" then, if the Tor client knows that the 'trebuchet' method is provided by a SOCKS5 proxy on
‘trebuchet' method is provided by a SOCKS5 proxy on 127.0.0.1:19999, 127.0.0.1:19999, the client should connect to that proxy, ask it to
it should connect to that proxy, ask it to connect to www.example.com, connect to www.example.com, and provide the string
and provide the string "rocks=20\0height=5.6m" as the username, the "rocks=20\0height=5.6m" as the username, the password, or split
password, or split across the username and password. across the username and password.
There are two ways to tell Tor clients about protocol proxies: There are two ways to tell Tor clients about protocol proxies:
external proxies and managed proxies. An external proxy is configured external proxies and managed proxies. An external proxy is configured
with "Transport trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:9999". This tells Tor that with "ClientTransportPlugin trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:9999". This
another program is already running to handle ‘trubuchet' connections, tells Tor that another program is already running to handle
and Tor doesn't need to worry about it. A managed proxy is configured 'trubuchet' connections, and Tor doesn't need to worry about it. A
with "Transport trebuchet /usr/libexec/tor-proxies/trebuchet managed proxy is configured with "ClientTransportPlugin trebuchet
[options]", and tells Tor to launch an external program on-demand to /usr/libexec/tor-proxies/trebuchet [options]", and tells Tor to launch
provide a socks proxy for ‘trebuchet' connections. The Tor client only an external program on-demand to provide a socks proxy for 'trebuchet'
launches one instance of each external program, even if the same connections. The Tor client only launches one instance of each
executable is listed for more than one method. external program, even if the same executable is listed for more than
one method.
The same program can implement a managed or an external proxy: it just The same program can implement a managed or an external proxy: it just
needs to take an argument saying which one to be. needs to take an argument saying which one to be.
[I don't like the terminology here. We should pick better words before
this "external/managed" stuff catches on. Also, to most users a
"proxy" is a computer that relays stuff for them, not a local program
on their computer. -NM I think we should go with Helper of some kind
as it's less technically overloaded and more friendly feeling - io
"Helper" is too overloaded already. -NM]
Client proxy behavior Client proxy behavior
When launched from the command-line by a Tor client, a transport When launched from the command-line by a Tor client, a transport
proxy needs to tell Tor which methods and ports it supports. It does proxy needs to tell Tor which methods and ports it supports. It does
this by printing one or more METHOD: lines to its stdout. These look this by printing one or more CMETHOD: lines to its stdout. These look
like CMETHOD: trebuchet SOCKS5 127.0.0.1:19999 ARGS:rocks,height like
CMETHOD: trebuchet SOCKS5 127.0.0.1:19999 ARGS:rocks,height \
OPT-ARGS:tensile-strength OPT-ARGS:tensile-strength
The ARGS field lists mandatory parameters that must appear in every The ARGS field lists mandatory parameters that must appear in every
@ -307,9 +190,6 @@ Client proxy behavior
The proxy should print a single "METHODS:DONE" line after it is The proxy should print a single "METHODS:DONE" line after it is
finished telling Tor about the methods it provides. finished telling Tor about the methods it provides.
[Should methods be versionable? Can they be? -nm I think probably?
-io Then how? -nm]
The transport proxy MUST exit cleanly when it receives a SIGTERM from The transport proxy MUST exit cleanly when it receives a SIGTERM from
Tor. Tor.
@ -319,14 +199,26 @@ Client proxy behavior
In the future, if we need a control mechanism, we can use the In the future, if we need a control mechanism, we can use the
stdin/stdout from Tor to the transport proxy. stdin/stdout from Tor to the transport proxy.
Transport proxy requirements
A transport proxy MUST handle SOCKS connect requests using the SOCKS A transport proxy MUST handle SOCKS connect requests using the SOCKS
version it advertises. version it advertises.
Tor clients SHOULD NOT use any method from a client proxy unless it
is both listed as a possible method for that proxy in torrc, and it
is listed by the proxy as a method it supports.
[XXXX say something about versioning.]
Server behavior
Server proxies are configured similarly to client proxies.
Server proxy behavior Server proxy behavior
[So, we can have this work like client proxies, where the bridge
[so, we can have this work like client proxies, where the bridge
launches some programs, and they tell the bridge, "I am giving you launches some programs, and they tell the bridge, "I am giving you
method X with parameters Y"? Do you have to take all the methods? If method X with parameters Y"? Do you have to take all the methods? If
not, which do you specify?] not, which do you specify?]
@ -348,17 +240,9 @@ Bridge authority behavior
Implementation plan Implementation plan
Finish the design work here.
Clean up all the inline conversations to just get summarized by the
conclusions they arrived at.
Turn this into a draft proposal Turn this into a draft proposal
Circulate and discuss on or-dev Circulate and discuss on or-dev.
(Use Cinderblock Of Loving Correction to reeducate anybody who tries
to divert discussion of how pluggable transports should work into
discussion of what is the best possible transport, or whatever.)
We should ship a couple of null plugin implementations in one or two We should ship a couple of null plugin implementations in one or two
popular, portable languages so that people get an idea of how to popular, portable languages so that people get an idea of how to
@ -419,12 +303,4 @@ Appendix: recommendations for transports
Appendix: Raw-traffic transports Appendix: Raw-traffic transports
This section describes an optional extension to the proposal above. This section describes an optional extension to the proposal above.
We are not sure whether it is a good idea.
[a]I agree that we should remove this section - perhaps we should also save the links and move them to the possible plugin examples? - ioerror
[b]This whole section should get removed from the final thing. I tried to summarize broad themes in the Motivations section below. - NM
[c]That doesn't really help - does it? Or do you mean that the Tor should set the CN to be say, the IP or hostname of the relay? - ioerror
The "Address" field when we have it. After that, the hostname if we know it. After that, do a PTR lookup on our IP. After that, use our IP. -NM