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make it clearer that streams on a circuit can exit at different ORs

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svn:r716
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Roger Dingledine 2003-11-02 22:11:49 +00:00
parent 30ba3520a2
commit 1a19daf5eb
1 changed files with 8 additions and 10 deletions
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18
doc/tor-design.tex
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@ -140,6 +140,14 @@ Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}.
Tor multiplexes multiple TCP streams along each virtual Tor multiplexes multiple TCP streams along each virtual
circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity. circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity.
\item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band signalling
within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway
down the circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also allows
traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic
shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit.
\item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original \item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original
Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving
from each circuit. It also included padding between onion routers and, from each circuit. It also included padding between onion routers and,
@ -157,16 +165,6 @@ convenient design for traffic shaping or low-latency mixing that
will improve anonymity against a realistic adversary, we leave these will improve anonymity against a realistic adversary, we leave these
strategies out. strategies out.
\item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band
signalling within the
circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway down the
circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also
allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus
frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the
end of the circuit.
\item \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not \item \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not
address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to load address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to load
balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node control balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node control