make it clearer that streams on a circuit can exit at different ORs

svn:r716
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2003-11-02 22:11:49 +00:00
parent 30ba3520a2
commit 1a19daf5eb

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@ -140,6 +140,14 @@ Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}.
Tor multiplexes multiple TCP streams along each virtual
circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity.
\item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band signalling
within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway
down the circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also allows
traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus frustrating traffic
shape and volume attacks based on observing the end of the circuit.
\item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original
Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving
from each circuit. It also included padding between onion routers and,
@ -157,16 +165,6 @@ convenient design for traffic shaping or low-latency mixing that
will improve anonymity against a realistic adversary, we leave these
strategies out.
\item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band
signalling within the
circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway down the
circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also
allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus
frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the
end of the circuit.
\item \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not
address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to load
balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node control