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Remove some stuff from the SHA-1 paragraph.

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We don't need to explain the difference between 2nd preimage and
collision: anybody who doesn't know can use wikipedia.
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2009-05-08 12:49:15 -04:00
parent 7a2c8e55af
commit 183b5905bb
1 changed files with 8 additions and 12 deletions
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doc/spec/proposals/ideas/xxx-what-uses-sha1.txt
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@ -75,18 +75,14 @@ Triage
SHA-1 usage that depends on collision resistance
and doesn't need the attacker to have any special keys.
There is no need to put much effort into fixing PREIMAGE and
SECOND PREIMAGE usages in the near-term: while SHA-1 is
theoretically broken with regards to those attacks, no practical
attack has been published as far as we know. The difference
between finding any collisions and finding a second preimage is
like the difference between finding any two people with the same
birthday and finding someone with the same birthday as you
personally. To fix COLLISION<code-signing> usages is not too
important either, since anyone who has the key to sign the code
can mount far worse attacks. It would be good to fix
COLLISION<authority> usages, since we try to resist bad authorities
to a limited extent. The COLLISION usages are the most important
There is no need to put much effort into fixing PREIMAGE and SECOND
PREIMAGE usages in the near-term: while there have been some
theoretical results doing these attacks against SHA-1, they don't
seem to be close to practical yet. To fix COLLISION<code-signing>
usages is not too important either, since anyone who has the key to
sign the code can mount far worse attacks. It would be good to fix
COLLISION<authority> usages, since we try to resist bad authorities
to a limited extent. The COLLISION usages are the most important
to fix.
Kelsey and Schneier published a theoretical second preimage attack