The reading-arbitrary-memory bug in June had a CVE too

svn:r5866
This commit is contained in:
Peter Palfrader 2006-01-25 12:26:21 +00:00
parent ef8787b7ee
commit 17e0d9f238
2 changed files with 8 additions and 5 deletions

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@ -740,8 +740,8 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.15 - 2005-09-23
Changes in version 0.1.0.14 - 2005-08-08
o Bugfixes on 0.1.0.x:
- Fix the other half of the bug with crypto handshakes.
(CVE-2005-2643)
- Fix the other half of the bug with crypto handshakes
(CVE-2005-2643).
- Fix an assert trigger if you send a 'signal term' via the
controller when it's listening for 'event info' messages.
@ -802,7 +802,8 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.10 - 2005-06-14
o Assert / crash bugs:
- Refuse relay cells that claim to have a length larger than the
maximum allowed. This prevents a potential attack that could read
arbitrary memory (e.g. keys) from an exit server's process.
arbitrary memory (e.g. keys) from an exit server's process
(CVE-2005-2050).
- If unofficial Tor clients connect and send weird TLS certs, our
Tor server triggers an assert. Stop asserting, and start handling
TLS errors better in other situations too.
@ -1128,7 +1129,8 @@ Changes in version 0.0.9.10 - 2005-06-16
o Bugfixes on 0.0.9.x (backported from 0.1.0.10):
- Refuse relay cells that claim to have a length larger than the
maximum allowed. This prevents a potential attack that could read
arbitrary memory (e.g. keys) from an exit server's process.
arbitrary memory (e.g. keys) from an exit server's process
(CVE-2005-2050).
Changes in version 0.0.9.9 - 2005-04-23

3
debian/changelog vendored
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@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ tor (0.0.9.10-1) unstable; urgency=high
upload of the 0.0.9.x tree:
- Refuse relay cells that claim to have a length larger than the
maximum allowed. This prevents a potential attack that could read
arbitrary memory (e.g. keys) from an exit server's process.
arbitrary memory (e.g. keys) from an exit server's process
(CVE-2005-2050).
-- Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org> Thu, 16 Jun 2005 22:56:11 +0200