Initial channeltls.c/channeltls.h for bug 6465

This commit is contained in:
Andrea Shepard 2012-08-01 04:18:42 -07:00 committed by Andrea Shepard
parent 7f952da553
commit 15303c32ec
9 changed files with 2431 additions and 392 deletions

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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ LIBS = ..\..\..\build-alpha\lib\libevent.a \
..\..\..\build-alpha\lib\libz.a \
ws2_32.lib advapi32.lib shell32.lib
LIBTOR_OBJECTS = buffers.obj channel.obj circuitbuild.obj \
LIBTOR_OBJECTS = buffers.obj channel.obj channeltls.obj circuitbuild.obj \
circuitlist.obj circuituse.obj command.obj config.obj connection.obj
connection_edge.obj connection_or.obj control.obj cpuworker.obj \
directory.obj dirserv.obj dirvote.obj dns.obj dnsserv.obj geoip.obj \

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@ -38,6 +38,11 @@ struct channel_s {
*/
unsigned int is_listener:1;
/** Unique ID for measuring direct network status requests;vtunneled ones
* come over a circuit_t, which has a dirreq_id field as well, but is a
* distinct namespace. */
uint64_t dirreq_id;
/** Why did we close?
*/
enum {

1894
src/or/channeltls.c Normal file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

50
src/or/channeltls.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
/* * Copyright (c) 2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file channeltls.h
* \brief Header file for channeltls.c
**/
#ifndef _TOR_CHANNEL_TLS_H
#define _TOR_CHANNEL_TLS_H
#include "or.h"
#include "channel.h"
#define BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(c) ((channel_tls_t *)(c))
#define TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(c) ((channel_t *)(c))
#ifdef _TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL
struct channel_tls_s {
/* Base channel_t struct */
channel_t _base;
/* or_connection_t pointer */
or_connection_t *conn;
};
#endif /* _TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL */
channel_t * channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest);
channel_t * channel_tls_get_listener(void);
channel_t * channel_tls_start_listener(void);
channel_t * channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn);
/* Things for connection_or.c to call back into */
ssize_t channel_tls_flush_some_cells(channel_tls_t *chan, ssize_t num_cells);
int channel_tls_more_to_flush(channel_tls_t *chan);
void channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
void channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan,
or_connection_t *conn,
uint8_t old_state,
uint8_t state);
void channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell,
or_connection_t *conn);
/* Cleanup at shutdown */
void channel_tls_free_all(void);
#endif

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@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
#include "or.h"
#include "buffers.h"
/*
* Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
* part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
*/
#define _TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL
#include "channel.h"
#include "channeltls.h"
#include "circuitbuild.h"
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "circuituse.h"
@ -257,7 +264,6 @@ or_connection_new(int socket_family)
connection_init(now, TO_CONN(or_conn), CONN_TYPE_OR, socket_family);
or_conn->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = time(NULL);
or_conn->next_circ_id = crypto_rand_int(1<<15);
or_conn->active_circuit_pqueue = smartlist_new();
or_conn->active_circuit_pqueue_last_recalibrated = cell_ewma_get_tick();
@ -693,6 +699,16 @@ _connection_mark_for_close(connection_t *conn, int line, const char *file)
return;
}
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
/*
* Bad news if this happens without telling the controlling channel; do
* this so we can find things that call this wrongly when the asserts hit.
*/
log_debug(LD_CHANNEL,
"Calling connection_mark_for_close on an OR conn at %s:%d",
file, line);
}
conn->marked_for_close = line;
conn->marked_for_close_file = file;
add_connection_to_closeable_list(conn);
@ -1281,12 +1297,19 @@ static int
connection_init_accepted_conn(connection_t *conn,
const listener_connection_t *listener)
{
int rv;
connection_start_reading(conn);
switch (conn->type) {
case CONN_TYPE_OR:
control_event_or_conn_status(TO_OR_CONN(conn), OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0);
return connection_tls_start_handshake(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 1);
rv = connection_tls_start_handshake(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 1);
if (rv < 0) {
connection_or_close_for_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0);
}
return rv;
break;
case CONN_TYPE_AP:
TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->isolation_flags = listener->isolation_flags;
TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->session_group = listener->session_group;
@ -2091,7 +2114,8 @@ static int
connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(connection_t *conn, time_t now)
{
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR &&
TO_OR_CONN(conn)->client_used + CLIENT_IDLE_TIME_FOR_PRIORITY < now)
connection_or_client_used(TO_OR_CONN(conn)) +
CLIENT_IDLE_TIME_FOR_PRIORITY < now)
return 1;
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn))
return 1;
@ -2688,11 +2712,14 @@ connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn)
before = buf_datalen(conn->inbuf);
if (connection_read_to_buf(conn, &max_to_read, &socket_error) < 0) {
/* There's a read error; kill the connection.*/
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR &&
conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING) {
connection_or_connect_failed(TO_OR_CONN(conn),
errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn),
socket_error != 0 ?
errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error) :
END_OR_CONN_REASON_CONNRESET,
socket_error != 0 ?
tor_socket_strerror(socket_error) :
"(unknown, errno was 0)");
}
if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn)) {
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
@ -3214,9 +3241,9 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
if (CONN_IS_EDGE(conn))
connection_edge_end_errno(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR)
connection_or_connect_failed(TO_OR_CONN(conn),
errno_to_orconn_end_reason(e),
tor_socket_strerror(e));
connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn),
errno_to_orconn_end_reason(e),
tor_socket_strerror(e));
connection_close_immediate(conn);
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
@ -3241,6 +3268,10 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
connection_stop_writing(conn);
if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_conn) < 0) {
/* Don't flush; connection is dead. */
connection_or_notify_error(or_conn,
END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC,
"TLS error in connection_tls_"
"continue_handshake()");
connection_close_immediate(conn);
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
@ -3254,19 +3285,23 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
result = flush_buf_tls(or_conn->tls, conn->outbuf,
max_to_write, &conn->outbuf_flushlen);
/* If we just flushed the last bytes, check if this tunneled dir
* request is done. */
/* If we just flushed the last bytes, tell the channel on the
* or_conn to check if it needs to geoip_change_dirreq_state() */
/* XXXX move this to flushed_some or finished_flushing -NM */
if (buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) == 0 && conn->dirreq_id)
geoip_change_dirreq_state(conn->dirreq_id, DIRREQ_TUNNELED,
DIRREQ_OR_CONN_BUFFER_FLUSHED);
if (buf_datalen(conn->outbuf) == 0 && or_conn->chan)
channel_notify_flushed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
switch (result) {
CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY:
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
log_info(LD_NET,result!=TOR_TLS_CLOSE?
log_info(LD_NET, result != TOR_TLS_CLOSE ?
"tls error. breaking.":"TLS connection closed on flush");
/* Don't flush; connection is dead. */
connection_or_notify_error(or_conn,
END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC,
result != TOR_TLS_CLOSE ?
"TLS error in during flush" :
"TLS closed during flush");
connection_close_immediate(conn);
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
@ -3325,8 +3360,16 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force)
if (result > 0) {
/* If we wrote any bytes from our buffer, then call the appropriate
* functions. */
if (connection_flushed_some(conn) < 0)
if (connection_flushed_some(conn) < 0) {
if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) {
connection_or_notify_error(TO_OR_CONN(conn),
END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC,
"Got error back from "
"connection_flushed_some()");
}
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
}
}
if (!connection_wants_to_flush(conn)) { /* it's done flushing */
@ -4125,7 +4168,6 @@ assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now)
case CONN_TYPE_OR:
tor_assert(conn->state >= _OR_CONN_STATE_MIN);
tor_assert(conn->state <= _OR_CONN_STATE_MAX);
tor_assert(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->n_circuits >= 0);
break;
case CONN_TYPE_EXIT:
tor_assert(conn->state >= _EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN);

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@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
#include "or.h"
#include "buffers.h"
/*
* Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
* part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
*/
#define _TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL
#include "channel.h"
#include "channeltls.h"
#include "circuitbuild.h"
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "command.h"
@ -43,6 +50,17 @@ static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn);
static unsigned int
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
/*
* Call this when changing connection state, so notifications to the owning
* channel can be handled.
*/
static void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state);
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
static void connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev,
short event, void *arg);
@ -127,8 +145,11 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *digest)
return;
/* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
if (! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest))
if (! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) {
connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(conn);
if (conn->chan)
channel_clear_identity_digest(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
}
memcpy(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
@ -139,6 +160,10 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *digest)
tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_identity_map, digest, conn);
conn->next_with_same_id = tmp;
/* Deal with channels */
if (conn->chan)
channel_set_identity_digest(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), digest);
#if 1
/* Testing code to check for bugs in representation. */
for (; tmp; tmp = tmp->next_with_same_id) {
@ -282,6 +307,40 @@ connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
smartlist_free(items);
}
/** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can
* be notified.
*/
static void
connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
{
uint8_t old_state;
tor_assert(conn);
old_state = conn->_base.state;
conn->_base.state = state;
if (conn->chan)
channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(conn->chan, conn,
old_state, state);
}
/** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to
* be an or_connection_t field, but it got moved to channel_t and we
* shouldn't maintain two copies. */
int
connection_or_get_num_circuits(or_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
if (conn->chan) {
tor_assert(!(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->is_listener));
return TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->u.cell_chan.n_circuits;
} else return 0;
}
/**************************************************************/
/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
@ -345,8 +404,11 @@ var_cell_free(var_cell_t *cell)
int
connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_normally(conn, 1);
return 0;
}
@ -375,9 +437,12 @@ connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_CONNECTED);
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0)
ret = -1;
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
if (conn->chan)
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
}
if (ret < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
}
return ret;
@ -410,7 +475,7 @@ connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn) ? "to" : "from",
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port,
conn_state_to_string(conn->_base.type, conn->_base.state));
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
ret = -1;
}
@ -430,18 +495,31 @@ connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
int
connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
{
size_t datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
size_t datalen, temp;
ssize_t n, flushed;
/* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
* high water mark. */
datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
ssize_t n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE);
time_t now = approx_time();
while (conn->active_circuits && n > 0) {
int flushed;
flushed = connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit(conn, 1, now);
n -= flushed;
while ((conn->chan) && channel_tls_more_to_flush(conn->chan)) {
/* Compute how many more cells we want at most */
n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE);
/* Bail out if we don't want any more */
if (n <= 0) break;
/* We're still here; try to flush some more cells */
flushed = channel_tls_flush_some_cells(conn->chan, n);
/* Bail out if it says it didn't flush anything */
if (flushed <= 0) break;
/* How much in the outbuf now? */
temp = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
/* Bail out if we didn't actually increase the outbuf size */
if (temp <= datalen) break;
/* Update datalen for the next iteration */
datalen = temp;
}
}
return 0;
}
@ -480,6 +558,7 @@ connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
{
const int proxy_type = or_conn->proxy_type;
connection_t *conn;
tor_assert(or_conn);
conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
@ -491,18 +570,18 @@ connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
/* start proxy handshake */
if (connection_proxy_connect(conn, proxy_type) < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
return -1;
}
connection_start_reading(conn);
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING;
connection_or_change_state(or_conn, OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING);
return 0;
}
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
return -1;
}
return 0;
@ -516,11 +595,14 @@ connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
time_t now = time(NULL);
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
/* Tell the controlling channel we're closed */
if (or_conn->chan) {
channel_closed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
or_conn->chan = NULL;
}
/* Remember why we're closing this connection. */
if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
/* Inform any pending (not attached) circs that they should
* give up. */
circuit_n_conn_done(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0);
/* now mark things down as needed */
if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_conn)) {
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
@ -548,9 +630,6 @@ connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
}
/* Now close all the attached circuits on it. */
circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(TO_OR_CONN(conn),
END_CIRC_REASON_OR_CONN_CLOSED);
}
/** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
@ -708,152 +787,26 @@ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
}
}
/** Return true iff <b>a</b> is "better" than <b>b</b> for new circuits.
*
* A more canonical connection is always better than a less canonical
* connection. That aside, a connection is better if it has circuits and the
* other does not, or if it was created more recently.
*
* Requires that both input connections are open; not is_bad_for_new_circs,
* and not impossibly non-canonical.
*
* If <b>forgive_new_connections</b> is true, then we do not call
* <b>a</b>better than <b>b</b> simply because b has no circuits,
* unless b is also relatively old.
*/
static int
connection_or_is_better(time_t now,
const or_connection_t *a,
const or_connection_t *b,
int forgive_new_connections)
/** These just pass all the is_bad_for_new_circs manipulation on to
* channel_t */
static unsigned int
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
{
int newer;
/** Do not definitively deprecate a new connection with no circuits on it
* until this much time has passed. */
#define NEW_CONN_GRACE_PERIOD (15*60)
tor_assert(or_conn);
if (b->is_canonical && !a->is_canonical)
return 0; /* A canonical connection is better than a non-canonical
* one, no matter how new it is or which has circuits. */
newer = b->_base.timestamp_created < a->_base.timestamp_created;
if (
/* We prefer canonical connections regardless of newness. */
(!b->is_canonical && a->is_canonical) ||
/* If both have circuits we prefer the newer: */
(b->n_circuits && a->n_circuits && newer) ||
/* If neither has circuits we prefer the newer: */
(!b->n_circuits && !a->n_circuits && newer))
return 1;
/* If one has no circuits and the other does... */
if (!b->n_circuits && a->n_circuits) {
/* Then it's bad, unless it's in its grace period and we're forgiving. */
if (forgive_new_connections &&
now < b->_base.timestamp_created + NEW_CONN_GRACE_PERIOD)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
return 0;
if (or_conn->chan)
return channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
else return 0;
}
/** Return the OR connection we should use to extend a circuit to the router
* whose identity is <b>digest</b>, and whose address we believe (or have been
* told in an extend cell) is <b>target_addr</b>. If there is no good
* connection, set *<b>msg_out</b> to a message describing the connection's
* state and our next action, and set <b>launch_out</b> to a boolean for
* whether we should launch a new connection or not.
*/
or_connection_t *
connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest,
const tor_addr_t *target_addr,
const char **msg_out,
int *launch_out)
static void
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
{
or_connection_t *conn, *best=NULL;
int n_inprogress_goodaddr = 0, n_old = 0, n_noncanonical = 0, n_possible = 0;
time_t now = approx_time();
tor_assert(or_conn);
tor_assert(msg_out);
tor_assert(launch_out);
if (!orconn_identity_map) {
*msg_out = "Router not connected (nothing is). Connecting.";
*launch_out = 1;
return NULL;
}
conn = digestmap_get(orconn_identity_map, digest);
for (; conn; conn = conn->next_with_same_id) {
tor_assert(conn->_base.magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
tor_assert(conn->_base.type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
tor_assert(tor_memeq(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
if (conn->_base.marked_for_close)
continue;
/* Never return a connection on which the other end appears to be
* a client. */
if (conn->is_connection_with_client) {
continue;
}
/* Never return a non-open connection. */
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
/* If the address matches, don't launch a new connection for this
* circuit. */
if (!tor_addr_compare(&conn->real_addr, target_addr, CMP_EXACT))
++n_inprogress_goodaddr;
continue;
}
/* Never return a connection that shouldn't be used for circs. */
if (conn->is_bad_for_new_circs) {
++n_old;
continue;
}
/* Never return a non-canonical connection using a recent link protocol
* if the address is not what we wanted.
*
* (For old link protocols, we can't rely on is_canonical getting
* set properly if we're talking to the right address, since we might
* have an out-of-date descriptor, and we will get no NETINFO cell to
* tell us about the right address.) */
if (!conn->is_canonical && conn->link_proto >= 2 &&
tor_addr_compare(&conn->real_addr, target_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
++n_noncanonical;
continue;
}
++n_possible;
if (!best) {
best = conn; /* If we have no 'best' so far, this one is good enough. */
continue;
}
if (connection_or_is_better(now, conn, best, 0))
best = conn;
}
if (best) {
*msg_out = "Connection is fine; using it.";
*launch_out = 0;
return best;
} else if (n_inprogress_goodaddr) {
*msg_out = "Connection in progress; waiting.";
*launch_out = 0;
return NULL;
} else if (n_old || n_noncanonical) {
*msg_out = "Connections all too old, or too non-canonical. "
" Launching a new one.";
*launch_out = 1;
return NULL;
} else {
*msg_out = "Not connected. Connecting.";
*launch_out = 1;
return NULL;
}
if (or_conn->chan)
channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
}
/** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
@ -874,8 +827,8 @@ connection_or_get_for_extend(const char *digest,
* - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
* connection exists to the same router at the same address.
*
* See connection_or_is_better() for our idea of what makes one OR connection
* better than another.
* See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR
* connection better than another.
*/
static void
connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
@ -888,7 +841,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
* everything else is. */
for (or_conn = head; or_conn; or_conn = or_conn->next_with_same_id) {
if (or_conn->_base.marked_for_close ||
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs)
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
continue;
if (force ||
or_conn->_base.timestamp_created + TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
@ -898,10 +851,10 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
"(fd %d, %d secs old).",
or_conn->_base.address, or_conn->_base.port, or_conn->_base.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->_base.timestamp_created));
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
}
if (or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs) {
if (connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) {
++n_old;
} else if (or_conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
++n_inprogress;
@ -916,7 +869,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
* expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
for (or_conn = head; or_conn; or_conn = or_conn->next_with_same_id) {
if (or_conn->_base.marked_for_close ||
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs)
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
if (or_conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
@ -930,12 +883,17 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
"another connection to that OR that is.",
or_conn->_base.address, or_conn->_base.port, or_conn->_base.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->_base.timestamp_created));
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
continue;
}
if (!best || connection_or_is_better(now, or_conn, best, 0))
if (!best ||
channel_is_better(now,
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan),
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
0)) {
best = or_conn;
}
}
if (!best)
@ -957,10 +915,13 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
*/
for (or_conn = head; or_conn; or_conn = or_conn->next_with_same_id) {
if (or_conn->_base.marked_for_close ||
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs ||
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn) ||
or_conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
continue;
if (or_conn != best && connection_or_is_better(now, best, or_conn, 1)) {
if (or_conn != best &&
channel_is_better(now,
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan), 1)) {
/* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it,
even when we're being forgiving. */
if (best->is_canonical) {
@ -971,7 +932,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
or_conn->_base.address, or_conn->_base.port, or_conn->_base.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->_base.timestamp_created),
best->_base.s, (int)(now - best->_base.timestamp_created));
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
} else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn->real_addr,
&best->real_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
log_info(LD_OR,
@ -981,7 +942,7 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness(or_connection_t *head, int force)
or_conn->_base.address, or_conn->_base.port, or_conn->_base.s,
(int)(now - or_conn->_base.timestamp_created),
best->_base.s, (int)(now - best->_base.timestamp_created));
or_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
}
}
}
@ -1019,8 +980,43 @@ connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
control_event_bootstrap_problem(msg, reason);
}
/** <b>conn</b> got an error in connection_handle_read_impl() or
* connection_handle_write_impl() and is going to die soon.
*
* <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
* <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
*/
void
connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn,
int reason, const char *msg)
{
channel_t *chan;
tor_assert(conn);
/* If we're connecting, call connect_failed() too */
if (TO_CONN(conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
connection_or_connect_failed(conn, reason, msg);
/* Tell the controlling channel if we have one */
if (conn->chan) {
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
/* This shouldn't ever happen in the listening state */
tor_assert(chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING);
/* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
if (!(chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING ||
chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED ||
chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR)) {
channel_close_for_error(chan);
}
}
/* No need to mark for error because connection.c is about to do that */
}
/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
* handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.
* handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>. Optionally,
* pass in a pointer to a channel using this connection.
*
* If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
* return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
@ -1035,7 +1031,8 @@ connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
*/
or_connection_t *
connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest)
const char *id_digest,
channel_tls_t *chan)
{
or_connection_t *conn;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
@ -1058,9 +1055,17 @@ connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
conn = or_connection_new(tor_addr_family(&addr));
/* set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember */
/*
* Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels
*
* This stuff needs to happen before connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
* so connection_or_set_identity_digest() and such know where to look to
* keep the channel up to date.
*/
conn->chan = chan;
chan->conn = conn;
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &addr, port, id_digest, 1);
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
conn->is_outgoing = 1;
@ -1129,6 +1134,56 @@ connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
return conn;
}
/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
* the closing state.
*/
void
connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
{
channel_t *chan = NULL;
tor_assert(orconn);
if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(orconn));
else connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(orconn));
if (orconn->chan) {
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
/* This shouldn't ever happen in the listening state */
tor_assert(chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING);
/* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
if (!(chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING ||
chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED ||
chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR)) {
channel_close_from_lower_layer(chan);
}
}
}
/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
* the error state.
*/
void
connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
{
channel_t *chan = NULL;
tor_assert(orconn);
if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(orconn));
else connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(orconn));
if (orconn->chan) {
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
/* This shouldn't ever happen in the listening state */
tor_assert(chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING);
/* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
if (!(chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING ||
chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED ||
chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR)) {
channel_close_for_error(chan);
}
}
}
/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
* we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
*
@ -1140,7 +1195,23 @@ connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
int
connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving)
{
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING;
channel_t *chan_listener, *chan;
/* Incoming connections will need a new channel passed to the
* channel_tls_listener */
if (receiving) {
/* It shouldn't already be set */
tor_assert(!(conn->chan));
chan_listener = channel_tls_get_listener();
if (!chan_listener) {
chan_listener = channel_tls_start_listener();
command_setup_listener(chan_listener);
}
chan = channel_tls_handle_incoming(conn);
channel_queue_incoming(chan_listener, chan);
}
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
tor_assert(!conn->tls);
conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->_base.s, receiving);
if (!conn->tls) {
@ -1201,7 +1272,7 @@ connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
/* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
/* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
}
}
@ -1242,7 +1313,8 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
} else {
log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side)."
" Requesting renegotiation.");
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
connection_or_change_state(conn,
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING);
goto again;
}
}
@ -1254,7 +1326,8 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
conn);
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING;
connection_or_change_state(conn,
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
@ -1287,7 +1360,7 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event,
if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
if (tor_tls_finish_handshake(conn->tls) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Problem finishing handshake");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
return;
}
}
@ -1298,14 +1371,15 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event,
if (tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(conn->tls)) {
log_info(LD_OR, "Client got a v3 cert!");
if (connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn) < 0)
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
return;
} else {
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
connection_or_change_state(conn,
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING);
tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(conn->tls);
if (bufferevent_ssl_renegotiate(conn->_base.bufev)<0) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Start_renegotiating went badly.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
}
tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(conn->tls);
return; /* ???? */
@ -1320,7 +1394,8 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event,
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
conn);
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING;
connection_or_change_state(conn,
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
} else if (handshakes == 2) {
/* v2 handshake, as a server. Two handshakes happened already,
* so we treat renegotiation as done.
@ -1329,18 +1404,18 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event,
} else if (handshakes > 2) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "More than two handshakes done on connection. "
"Closing.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We were unexpectedly told that a connection "
"got %d handshakes. Closing.", handshakes);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
}
return;
}
}
connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn), READ_EVENT|WRITE_EVENT);
if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0)
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); /* ???? */
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); /* ???? */
return;
}
@ -1370,29 +1445,6 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
}
/** Set the circid_type field of <b>conn</b> (which determines which part of
* the circuit ID space we're willing to use) based on comparing our ID to
* <b>identity_rcvd</b> */
void
connection_or_set_circid_type(or_connection_t *conn,
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd)
{
const int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
crypto_pk_t *our_identity =
started_here ? get_tlsclient_identity_key() :
get_server_identity_key();
if (identity_rcvd) {
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(our_identity, identity_rcvd)<0) {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
} else {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER;
}
} else {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER;
}
}
/** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
* return -1 if he is lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
*
@ -1470,7 +1522,8 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
}
connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd);
tor_assert(conn->chan);
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), identity_rcvd);
crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
if (started_here)
@ -1547,6 +1600,19 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
return 0;
}
/** Return when a client used this, for connection.c, since client_used
* is now one of the timestamps of channel_t */
time_t
connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
if (conn->chan) {
return channel_when_last_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
} else return 0;
}
/** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
*
* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with.
@ -1588,7 +1654,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
tor_tls_block_renegotiation(conn->tls);
return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
} else {
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2;
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2);
if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
return -1;
if (!started_here) {
@ -1613,7 +1679,7 @@ connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times);
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
return -1;
@ -1732,35 +1798,9 @@ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state,
int
connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
{
int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
time_t now = time(NULL);
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
if (started_here) {
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times);
rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(conn->identity_digest, now);
if (entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest,
1, 0, now) < 0) {
/* Close any circuits pending on this conn. We leave it in state
* 'open' though, because it didn't actually *fail* -- we just
* chose not to use it. (Otherwise
* connection_about_to_close_connection() will call a big pile of
* functions to indicate we shouldn't try it again.) */
log_debug(LD_OR, "New entry guard was reachable, but closing this "
"connection so we can retry the earlier entry guards.");
circuit_n_conn_done(conn, 0);
return -1;
}
router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 1);
} else {
/* only report it to the geoip module if it's not a known router */
if (!router_get_by_id_digest(conn->identity_digest)) {
geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &TO_CONN(conn)->addr,
now);
}
}
or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state);
conn->handshake_state = NULL;
IF_HAS_BUFFEREVENT(TO_CONN(conn), {
@ -1769,8 +1809,6 @@ connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
}
circuit_n_conn_done(conn, 1); /* send the pending creates, if any. */
return 0;
}
@ -1790,6 +1828,10 @@ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
connection_write_to_buf(networkcell.body, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, TO_CONN(conn));
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
if (conn->chan)
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
@ -1816,6 +1858,10 @@ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
if (cell->command != CELL_PADDING)
conn->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = approx_time();
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
if (conn->chan)
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
}
/** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>or_conn</b>'s
@ -1852,8 +1898,13 @@ connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn, &var_cell)) {
if (!var_cell)
return 0; /* not yet. */
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
if (conn->chan)
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times);
command_process_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
var_cell_free(var_cell);
} else {
char buf[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE];
@ -1862,6 +1913,10 @@ connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
< CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* whole response available? */
return 0; /* not yet */
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
if (conn->chan)
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times);
connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, TO_CONN(conn));
@ -1869,34 +1924,11 @@ connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
* network-order string) */
cell_unpack(&cell, buf);
command_process_cell(&cell, conn);
channel_tls_handle_cell(&cell, conn);
}
}
}
/** Write a destroy cell with circ ID <b>circ_id</b> and reason <b>reason</b>
* onto OR connection <b>conn</b>. Don't perform range-checking on reason:
* we may want to propagate reasons from other cells.
*
* Return 0.
*/
int
connection_or_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn, int reason)
{
cell_t cell;
tor_assert(conn);
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
cell.circ_id = circ_id;
cell.command = CELL_DESTROY;
cell.payload[0] = (uint8_t) reason;
log_debug(LD_OR,"Sending destroy (circID %d).", circ_id);
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
return 0;
}
/** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3 };
/** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */

View File

@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ void connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns,
void connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
int reason, const char *msg);
void connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn,
int reason, const char *msg);
or_connection_t *connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest);
const char *id_digest,
channel_tls_t *chan);
void connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush);
void connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush);
void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain);
@ -50,8 +56,8 @@ void connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
int started_here);
int connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
const uint8_t *peer_id);
void connection_or_set_circid_type(or_connection_t *conn,
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd);
time_t connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_get_num_circuits(or_connection_t *conn);
void or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state);
void or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state,
const cell_t *cell,
@ -65,8 +71,6 @@ void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell,
or_connection_t *conn);
void connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn,
int reason);
int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus);
int connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn);

View File

@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ endif
src_or_libtor_a_SOURCES = \
src/or/buffers.c \
src/or/channel.c \
src/or/channeltls.c \
src/or/circuitbuild.c \
src/or/circuitlist.c \
src/or/circuituse.c \
@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ src_or_tor_LDADD = src/or/libtor.a src/common/libor.a src/common/libor-crypto.a
ORHEADERS = \
src/or/buffers.h \
src/or/channel.h \
src/or/channeltls.h \
src/or/circuitbuild.h \
src/or/circuitlist.h \
src/or/circuituse.h \

View File

@ -879,6 +879,102 @@ typedef uint16_t circid_t;
/** Identifies a stream on a circuit */
typedef uint16_t streamid_t;
/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_s is in channel.h */
typedef struct channel_s channel_t;
/* channel states for channel_t */
typedef enum {
/*
* Closed state - channel is inactive
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
/*
* Listening state - channel is listening for incoming connections
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING,
/*
* Opening state - channel is trying to connect
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING,
/*
* Open state - channel is active and ready for use
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN,
/*
* Maintenance state - channel is temporarily offline for subclass specific
* maintenance activities such as TLS renegotiation.
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT,
/*
* Closing state - channel is shutting down
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED,
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING,
/*
* Error state - channel has experienced a permanent error
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - None
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR,
/*
* Placeholder for maximum state value
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_LAST
} channel_state_t;
/* TLS channel stuff */
typedef struct channel_tls_s channel_tls_t;
/** Parsed onion routing cell. All communication between nodes
* is via cells. */
typedef struct cell_t {
@ -1061,9 +1157,6 @@ typedef struct connection_t {
/** Unique identifier for this connection on this Tor instance. */
uint64_t global_identifier;
/** Unique ID for measuring tunneled network status requests. */
uint64_t dirreq_id;
} connection_t;
/** Subtype of connection_t; used for a listener socket. */
@ -1203,6 +1296,9 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t {
/** When we last used this conn for any client traffic. If not
* recent, we can rate limit it further. */
/* Channel using this connection */
channel_tls_t *chan;
tor_addr_t real_addr; /**< The actual address that this connection came from
* or went to. The <b>addr</b> field is prone to
* getting overridden by the address from the router
@ -1245,8 +1341,6 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t {
/* XXXX we could share this among all connections. */
struct ev_token_bucket_cfg *bucket_cfg;
#endif
int n_circuits; /**< How many circuits use this connection as p_conn or
* n_conn ? */
struct or_connection_t *next_with_same_id; /**< Next connection with same
* identity digest as this one. */
@ -1299,6 +1393,10 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t {
* cells. */
unsigned int edge_blocked_on_circ:1;
/** Unique ID for directory requests; this used to be in connection_t, but
* that's going away and being used on channels instead. We still tag
* edge connections with dirreq_id from circuits, so it's copied here. */
uint64_t dirreq_id;
} edge_connection_t;
/** Subtype of edge_connection_t for an "entry connection" -- that is, a SOCKS
@ -1421,6 +1519,10 @@ typedef struct dir_connection_t {
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of the public RSA key for
* the directory server's signing key. */
/** Unique ID for directory requests; this used to be in connection_t, but
* that's going away and being used on channels instead. The dirserver still
* needs this for the incoming side, so it's moved here. */
uint64_t dirreq_id;
} dir_connection_t;
/** Subtype of connection_t for an connection to a controller. */
@ -1520,98 +1622,6 @@ static INLINE listener_connection_t *TO_LISTENER_CONN(connection_t *c)
return DOWNCAST(listener_connection_t, c);
}
/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_s is in channel.h */
typedef struct channel_s channel_t;
/* channel states for channel_t */
typedef enum {
/*
* Closed state - channel is inactive
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
/*
* Listening state - channel is listening for incoming connections
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING,
/*
* Opening state - channel is trying to connect
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING,
/*
* Open state - channel is active and ready for use
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN,
/*
* Maintenance state - channel is temporarily offline for subclass specific
* maintenance activities such as TLS renegotiation.
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT,
/*
* Closing state - channel is shutting down
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED,
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING,
/*
* Error state - channel has experienced a permanent error
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - None
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR,
/*
* Placeholder for maximum state value
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_LAST
} channel_state_t;
/* Conditional macros to help write code that works whether bufferevents are
disabled or not.
@ -4199,10 +4209,10 @@ typedef enum {
/** Flushed last cell from queue of the circuit that initiated a
* tunneled request to the outbuf of the OR connection. */
DIRREQ_CIRC_QUEUE_FLUSHED = 3,
/** Flushed last byte from buffer of the OR connection belonging to the
/** Flushed last byte from buffer of the channel belonging to the
* circuit that initiated a tunneled request; completes a tunneled
* request. */
DIRREQ_OR_CONN_BUFFER_FLUSHED = 4
DIRREQ_CHANNEL_BUFFER_FLUSHED = 4
} dirreq_state_t;
#define WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL (24*60*60)