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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-27 22:03:31 +01:00
Merge branch 'maint-0.4.3' into maint-0.4.4
This commit is contained in:
commit
0f39cc10f6
4
changes/bug33119
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4
changes/bug33119
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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o Major bugfixes (NSS):
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- Fix out-of-bound memory access in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` when Tor is
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compiled with NSS support. Fixes bug 33119; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. This
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issue is also tracked as TROVE-2020-001.
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@ -726,23 +726,58 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int,
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tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
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const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
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{
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tor_assert(tls);
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tor_assert(cert);
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tor_assert(cert->cert);
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int rv = 0;
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CERTCertificate *peercert = SSL_PeerCertificate(tls->ssl);
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if (!peercert)
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tor_x509_cert_t *peercert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert((tor_tls_t *)tls);
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if (!peercert || !peercert->cert)
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goto done;
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CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *peer_info = &peercert->subjectPublicKeyInfo;
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CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *peer_info = &peercert->cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo;
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CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *cert_info = &cert->cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo;
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/* NSS stores the `len` field in bits, instead of bytes, for the
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* `subjectPublicKey` field in CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo, but
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* `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` compares the two bitstrings using a length field
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* defined in bytes.
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*
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* We convert the `len` field from bits to bytes, do our comparison with
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* `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()`, and reset the length field from bytes to bits
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* again.
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*
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* See also NSS's own implementation of `SECKEY_CopySubjectPublicKeyInfo()`
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* in seckey.c in the NSS source tree. This function also does the conversion
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* between bits and bytes.
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*/
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const unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len;
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const unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len;
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/* We convert the length from bits to bytes, but instead of using NSS's
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* `DER_ConvertBitString()` macro on both of peer_info->subjectPublicKey and
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* cert_info->subjectPublicKey, we have to do the conversion explicitly since
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* both of the two subjectPublicKey fields are allowed to point to the same
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* memory address. Otherwise, the bits to bytes conversion would potentially
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* be applied twice, which would lead to us comparing too few of the bytes
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* when we call SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(), which would be catastrophic.
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*/
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peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = ((peer_info_orig_len + 7) >> 3);
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cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = ((cert_info_orig_len + 7) >> 3);
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rv = SECOID_CompareAlgorithmID(&peer_info->algorithm,
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&cert_info->algorithm) == 0 &&
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SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&peer_info->subjectPublicKey,
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&cert_info->subjectPublicKey);
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/* Convert from bytes back to bits. */
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peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = peer_info_orig_len;
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cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = cert_info_orig_len;
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done:
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if (peercert)
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CERT_DestroyCertificate(peercert);
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tor_x509_cert_free(peercert);
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return rv;
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}
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@ -105,6 +105,17 @@ const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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"Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n"
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"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
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static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL;
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static tor_x509_cert_t *
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get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls)
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{
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(void)tls;
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if (fixed_x509_cert)
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return tor_x509_cert_dup(fixed_x509_cert);
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else
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return NULL;
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}
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tor_x509_cert_impl_t *
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read_cert_from(const char *str)
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{
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@ -513,6 +524,67 @@ test_tortls_verify(void *ignored)
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crypto_pk_free(k);
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}
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static void
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test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored)
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{
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(void)ignored;
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tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert1 = NULL,
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*cert2 = NULL,
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*cert3 = NULL,
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*cert4 = NULL;
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tor_x509_cert_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL, *c4 = NULL;
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crypto_pk_t *k1 = NULL, *k2 = NULL, *k3 = NULL;
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k1 = pk_generate(1);
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k2 = pk_generate(2);
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k3 = pk_generate(3);
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cert1 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k2, "A", "B", 1000);
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cert2 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k3, "C", "D", 1000);
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cert3 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k2, k3, "C", "D", 1000);
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cert4 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k3, k2, "E", "F", 1000);
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tt_assert(cert1 && cert2 && cert3 && cert4);
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c1 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert1); cert1 = NULL;
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c2 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert2); cert2 = NULL;
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c3 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert3); cert3 = NULL;
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c4 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert4); cert4 = NULL;
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tt_assert(c1 && c2 && c3 && c4);
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MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed);
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fixed_x509_cert = NULL;
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/* If the peer has no certificate, it shouldn't match anything. */
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4));
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fixed_x509_cert = c1;
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/* If the peer has a certificate, it should match every cert with the same
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* subject key. */
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tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1));
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tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4));
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done:
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tor_x509_cert_free(c1);
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tor_x509_cert_free(c2);
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tor_x509_cert_free(c3);
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tor_x509_cert_free(c4);
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if (cert1) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert1);
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if (cert2) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert2);
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if (cert3) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert3);
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if (cert4) tor_x509_cert_impl_free(cert4);
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crypto_pk_free(k1);
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crypto_pk_free(k2);
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crypto_pk_free(k3);
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UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
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}
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#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \
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{ #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL }
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@ -533,5 +605,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_tests[] = {
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0),
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(bridge_init, TT_FORK),
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(verify, TT_FORK),
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0),
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END_OF_TESTCASES
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};
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@ -475,75 +475,6 @@ fake_x509_free(X509 *cert)
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}
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#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
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static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_x509_cert = NULL;
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static tor_x509_cert_t *
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get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed(tor_tls_t *tls)
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{
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(void)tls;
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if (fixed_x509_cert)
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return tor_x509_cert_dup(fixed_x509_cert);
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else
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return NULL;
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}
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static void
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test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored)
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{
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(void)ignored;
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X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *cert3 = NULL, *cert4 = NULL;
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tor_x509_cert_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL, *c4 = NULL;
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crypto_pk_t *k1 = NULL, *k2 = NULL, *k3 = NULL;
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k1 = pk_generate(1);
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k2 = pk_generate(2);
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k3 = pk_generate(3);
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cert1 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k2, "A", "B", 1000);
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cert2 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k1, k3, "C", "D", 1000);
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cert3 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k2, k3, "C", "D", 1000);
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cert4 = tor_tls_create_certificate(k3, k2, "E", "F", 1000);
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tt_assert(cert1 && cert2 && cert3 && cert4);
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c1 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert1); cert1 = NULL;
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c2 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert2); cert2 = NULL;
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c3 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert3); cert3 = NULL;
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c4 = tor_x509_cert_new(cert4); cert4 = NULL;
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tt_assert(c1 && c2 && c3 && c4);
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MOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert, get_peer_cert_mock_return_fixed);
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fixed_x509_cert = NULL;
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/* If the peer has no certificate, it shouldn't match anything. */
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4));
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fixed_x509_cert = c1;
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/* If the peer has a certificate, it should match every cert with the same
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* subject key. */
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tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c1));
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tt_assert(tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c2));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c3));
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tt_assert(! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(NULL, c4));
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done:
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tor_x509_cert_free(c1);
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tor_x509_cert_free(c2);
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tor_x509_cert_free(c3);
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tor_x509_cert_free(c4);
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if (cert1) X509_free(cert1);
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if (cert2) X509_free(cert2);
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if (cert3) X509_free(cert3);
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if (cert4) X509_free(cert4);
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crypto_pk_free(k1);
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crypto_pk_free(k2);
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crypto_pk_free(k3);
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UNMOCK(tor_tls_get_peer_cert);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
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static void
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test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored)
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@ -2275,7 +2206,6 @@ struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[] = {
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INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK),
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0),
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INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0),
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0),
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INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0),
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LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK),
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INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0),
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