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more thoughts on incentives
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
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that provide resources will get and provide better service on average.
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This approach could be complemented with an anonymous e-cash
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implementation to let people spend reputations gained in one context
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implementation to let people spend reputations gained from one context
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in another context.
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2.2. "Soft" or qualitative reputation tracking.
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@ -84,10 +84,10 @@
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3.3. Guard nodes
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As of Tor 0.1.1.11, Tor users pick from a small set of semi-permanent
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"guard nodes" for their first hop of each circuit. This seems to have
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a big impact on pairwise reputation systems since you will only be
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cashing in on your reputation to a few people, and it is unlikely
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that a given pair of nodes will use each other as guard nodes.
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"guard nodes" for their first hop of each circuit. This seems like it
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would have a big impact on pairwise reputation systems since you
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will only be cashing in on your reputation to a few people, and it is
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unlikely that a given pair of nodes will use each other as guard nodes.
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What does this imply? For one, it means that we don't care at all
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about the opinions of most of the servers out there -- we should
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@ -121,9 +121,9 @@
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partitioned randomly but instead based on some external properties.
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Social network topologies can provide incentives in other ways, because
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people may be more inclined to help out their friends, and more willing
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to relay traffic if only their friends are relaying through them. It
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also opens the door for out-of-band incentive schemes because of the
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out-of-band links in the graph.
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to relay traffic if most of the traffic they are relaying comes
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from their friends. It also opens the door for out-of-band incentive
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schemes because of the out-of-band links in the graph.
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3.5. Profit-maximizing vs. Altruism.
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@ -139,8 +139,8 @@
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if we turn the act of relaying traffic into a selfish act.
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I am not too worried about this issue for now, since we're aiming
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for an incentive scheme so effective that it produces thousands of
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new servers.
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for an incentive scheme so effective that it produces tens of
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thousands of new servers.
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3.6. What part of the node's performance do you measure?
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@ -150,7 +150,7 @@
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Further, many transactions in Tor involve fetching lots of
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bytes and not sending very many. So it seems that we want to turn
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things around: we need to measure how quickly a node can _send_
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things around: we need to measure how quickly a node is _sending_
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us bytes, and then only send it bytes in proportion to that.
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However, a sneaky user could simply connect to a node and send some
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@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
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If we build a good incentive system, we'll still need to tune it
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to provide the right bandwidth allocation -- if we reserve too much
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bandwidth for fast servers, then we're wasting some potential, but we
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bandwidth for fast servers, then we're wasting some potential, but
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if we reserve too little, then fewer people will opt to become servers.
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In fact, finding an optimum balance is especially hard because it's
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a moving target: the better our incentive mechanism (and the lower
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@ -193,35 +193,69 @@
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still be uncertain whether the fast node originated the traffic, or
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was the entry node for some other lucky user -- and we already accept
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this level of attack in other cases such as the Murdoch-Danezis attack
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(http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05).
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[http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05].
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3.9. How do we allocate bandwidth over the course of a second?
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This may be a simple matter of engineering, but it still needs to be
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addressed. Our current token bucket design refills each bucket once a
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second. If we have N tokens in our bucket, and we don't know ahead of
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time how many connections are going to want to send how many bytes,
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time how many connections are going to want to send out how many bytes,
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how do we balance providing quick service to the traffic that is
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already here compared to providing service to potential high-importance
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future traffic?
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If we have only two classes of service, here is a simple design:
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At each point, when we are 1/t through the second, the total number
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of non-priority bytes we are willing to accept is N/t. Thus if N
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priority bytes arrive at the beginning of the second, we drain our
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whole bucket then, and otherwise we provide some delayed service to
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the non-priority bytes.
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of non-priority bytes we are willing to send out is N/t. Thus if N
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priority bytes are waiting at the beginning of the second, we drain
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our whole bucket then, and otherwise we provide some delayed service
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to the non-priority bytes.
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Does this design expand to cover the case of three priority classes?
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Ideally we'd give each remote server its own priority number. Or
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hopefully there's an easy design in the literature to point to --
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this is clearly not my field.
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Is our current flow control mechanism (each circuit and each stream
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start out with a certain window, and once they've exhausted it they
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need to receive an ack before they can send more) going to have
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problems with this new design now that we'll be queueing more bytes
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for less preferred nodes? If it turns out we do, the first fix is
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to have the windows start out at zero rather than start out full --
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it will slow down the startup phase but protect us better.
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While we have outgoing cells queued for a given server, we have the
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option of reordering them based on the priority of the previous hop.
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Is this going to turn out to be useful? If we're the exit node (that
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is, there is no previous hop) what priority do those cells get?
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Should we do this prioritizing just for sending out bytes (as I've
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described here) or would it help to do it also for receiving bytes?
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See next section.
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3.10. Different-priority cells arriving on the same TCP connection.
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In some of the proposed designs, servers want to give specific circuits
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priority rather than having all circuits from them get the same class
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of service.
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Since Tor uses TCP's flow control for rate limiting, this constraints
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our design choices -- it is easy to give different TCP connections
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different priorities, but it is hard to give different cells on the
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same connection priority, because you have to read them to know what
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priority they're supposed to get.
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There are several possible solutions though. First is that we rely on
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the sender to reorder them so the highest priority cells (circuits) are
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more often first. Second is that if we open two TCP connections -- one
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for the high-priority cells, and one for the low-priority cells. (But
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this prevents us from changing the priority of a circuit because
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we would need to migrate it from one connection to the other.) A
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third approach is to remember which connections have recently sent
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us high-priority cells, and preferentially read from those connections.
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Hopefully we can get away with not solving this section at all.
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4. Sample designs.
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