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Stop inadvertently upgrading client intro connections to ntor
Also stop logging the intro point details on error by default. Fixes #20012, introduced with ntor in tor 0.2.4.8-alpha.
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12
changes/bug20012
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12
changes/bug20012
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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o Major bugfixes (hidden services):
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- Clients require hidden services to include the TAP keys
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for their intro points in the hidden service descriptor.
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This prevents an inadvertent upgrade to ntor, which a
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malicious hidden service could use to discover which
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consensus a client has.
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Fixes bug 20012; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Patch by teor.
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o Minor bugfixes (hidden services):
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- Stop logging intro point details to the client log on
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certain error conditions.
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Fixed as part of bug 20012; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha.
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Patch by teor.
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@ -1373,40 +1373,15 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,
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smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
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goto again;
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}
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/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
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/* All version 2 HS descriptors come with a TAP onion key.
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* Clients used to try to get the TAP onion key from the consensus, but this
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* meant that hidden services could discover which consensus clients have. */
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if (!extend_info_supports_tap(intro->extend_info)) {
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const node_t *node;
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extend_info_t *new_extend_info;
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if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest))
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node = node_get_by_hex_id(intro->extend_info->nickname);
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else
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node = node_get_by_id(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
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if (!node) {
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log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.",
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intro->extend_info->nickname);
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smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
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goto again;
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}
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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new_extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, options->Tor2webMode);
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#else
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new_extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
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#endif
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if (!new_extend_info) {
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const char *alternate_reason = "";
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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alternate_reason = ", or we cannot connect directly to it";
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#endif
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log_info(LD_REND, "We don't have a descriptor for the intro-point relay "
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"'%s'%s; trying another.",
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extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info), alternate_reason);
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smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
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goto again;
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} else {
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extend_info_free(intro->extend_info);
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intro->extend_info = new_extend_info;
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}
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tor_assert(intro->extend_info != NULL);
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log_info(LD_REND, "The HS descriptor is missing a TAP onion key for the "
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"intro-point relay '%s'; trying another.",
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safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)));
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smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
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goto again;
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}
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/* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */
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if (strict &&
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